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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
 
The following five essays investigate topical issues related to energy economics. Chapters 2 and 3 
present empirical studies to determine efficient electricity-generating portfolios in the United 
States and Switzerland for the year 2003. Two different types of real asset portfolio holders will 
be considered, viz. current user (Chapter 2) and investor (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 assesses the 
current impact of liberalization on the scope for efficiency improvement in electricity-generating 
portfolios for the United States and Switzerland; while chapter 5 explores which future electricity-
generating technologies seem most promising to be part of an efficient portfolio for Switzerland, 
using predicted data from 2005 to 2035. Chapter 6 outlines a game-theoretic analysis, modeling a 
gas transit game for Russia. Chapter 7 concludes.  
    The first four essays are based on Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory (1952), where the 
variances (standard deviations), covariances, and expected returns of electricity-generating 
technologies are calculated to construct efficient portfolios. An efficient portfolio does not create 
unnecessary risk for a given expected return or, put the other way around, it maximizes the 
expected return for a given amount of risk. As stated by Fabozzi et al. (2002), portfolio theory is 
still the major instrument for constructing efficient portfolios for financial assets. According to 
Jansen et al. (2006), the first application of Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory to energy is 
due to Bar-Lev and Katz (1976), who examined the efficiency of U.S. power utility companies. 
However, it took almost 30 more years until that subject became an issue for countries in 
Western Europe (see for example Awerbuch and Berger, 2003). One key contribution of the first 
four essays concerns the econometric procedure. Since shocks in generation costs per kWh (the 
inverse of expected returns) are correlated, seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) is 
applied throughout to filter out the systematic components of the covariance matrix. The fifth 
essay purports to determine the bargaining power of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus when 
negotiating transit fees, taking account of new projects such as the Northern European Gas 
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Pipeline (NEGP). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent states became 
indispensible parts of the Eurasian gas chain, causing a dramatic change for Russia, which now 
has to negotiate with third parties to agree on transit fees. This contribution predicts possible 
coalitions amongst the three countries, where estimated payoffs allow to determine whether co-
operation or independent optimization is the dominant strategy. The following paragraphs 
provide some more detail about each individual chapter. 
    In Chapter 2 mean-variance portfolio theory is applied to power technologies of the United 
States and Switzerland adopting a current user view (here expected return is defined as 
kWh/USD in levels). Since some of the portfolios of particular interest (minimum variance, 
maximum expected return) call for a high share of one technology, security of supply becomes an 
issue. Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices are calculated to see the trade-off 
between efficiency and security of supply. Results suggest that risk-averse utilities (and ultimately, 
consumers) in the United States would have gained from adopting a feasible portfolio containing 
more Coal, Gas and Oil at a price of a somewhat reduced security of supply. In the case of 
Switzerland, the realistic portfolio consists of Nuclear, Storage hydro, Run of river and Solar, with 
shares identical to those of the actual portfolio in 2003. Therefore, the current mix of Swiss 
generating technologies in Switzerland may be deemed efficient.    
    A current user is interested in the absolute value of expected returns of an electricity-
generating portfolio. For example, a technology mix that promises to generate 7 kWh/USD 
electricity is preferred to one that offers 3 kWh/USD. By way of contrast, an investor usually 
does not care whether a portfolio mix of technologies costs USD 10 million or USD 500 million, 
as long as the expected return (measured in KWh/USD, say) increases in value over time. 
Depending on which view is adopted, different efficient portfolio recommendations may result.        
    Chapter 3 therefore complements the analysis presented in chapter 2 by adopting an investor 
view (here expected return is defined as changes of kWh/USD) and applies financial portfolio 
theory to determine efficient electricity-generating technology portfolios for the United States 
and Switzerland. The actual portfolio in 2003 contains Coal, Nuclear, Gas, Oil, and Wind in the 
case of the United States, and Nuclear, Storage hydro, Run of river, and Solar in the case of 
Switzerland, a country without domestic supplies of fossil fuels. Results suggest that as of 2003, 
the feasible maximum expected return (MER) electricity portfolio for the United States contains 
more Coal, Nuclear, and Wind than actual but markedly less Gas and Oil. By way of contrast, the 
minimum variance (MV) portfolio combines markedly more Oil, Coal, Nuclear, and Wind but 
almost no Gas. Therefore, regardless of the choice between MER and MV, U.S. utilities as 
investors are substantially inside the efficient frontier. This is even more true of their Swiss 
Introduction  
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counterparts, likely due to continuing regulation of electricity markets, which is the subject of 
analysis in the next chapter.   
    In Chapter 4, both an investor (focused on changes in return) and a current user (focused on 
return in levels) view are adopted to determine efficient frontiers of electricity generation 
technologies in terms of expected return and risk as of 2003 for the United States and 
Switzerland. Here, results suggest that risk-averse investors and risk-neutral current users in the 
United States are considerably closer to their efficient frontier than their Swiss counterparts. As 
will be argued in this chapter, this is arguably due to earlier and more thorough deregulation of 
electricity markets in the United States. 
    Chapter 5 uses Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory with forecasted data for the years 
2005 to 2035 to determine efficient future electricity-generating technology mixes for 
Switzerland. In contrast to preceding chapters, additional generating technologies are included 
that are expected to be in use by 2035 but which have not been part of the generation mix in the 
year 2000. Results indicate that risk-averse electricity users in 2035 gain in terms of higher 
expected return, less risk, more security of supply and a higher return-to-risk ratio compared to 
2000 by adopting a feasible minimum variance (MV) technology mix containing 28 percent Gas, 
20 percent Run of river, 13 percent Storage hydro, 9 percent Nuclear, and 5 percent each of Solar, 
Smallhydro, Wind, Biomass, Incineration, and Biogas respectively. However, this mix comes at the cost 
of higher CO2 emissions. 
    Chapter 6 departs from Markowitz mean-variance portfolio analysis but stays in the field of 
applied energy economics. The essay presented in this chapter deals with gas transition from 
Russia to Western Europe. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia must somehow form a 
coalition with at least one of the transit countries Belarus and Ukraine in order to be able to ship 
gas to Western Europe. In modeling the gas transit game, this contribution accordingly contains a 
cooperative module serving to determine the bargaining power of the three countries, which 
depends on the coalition achieved. In the non-cooperative module, the three countries involved 
decide whether to cooperate or not, with Russia using side payments to induce cooperation. 
Using published demand and cost estimates, the predicted Nash equilibrium is the cooperative 
one resulting in the grand coalition. Predicted gas quantities correspond quite closely to actual 
2004 and forecasted 2010 and 2030 figures. The completion of the North European Gas Pipeline 
(NEGP), a direct pipeline between Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea, will benefit 
Russia decisively, to the detriment particularly of Ukraine.  
    Note that Peter Zweifel co-authored chapters 2-4 and Sandro Schirillo co-authored chapter 6. 
While the undersigned author was at least equally responsible for the intellectual inputs of 
chapters 2-4, the main contribution to chapter 6 is by Peter Zweifel. Chapter 2 appears 2009 in: 
Introduction  
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Analytical Methods for Energy Diversity – Mean-Variance Optimization for Electric Utilitities. 
Energy Policy and Economics Series, Elsevier (refereed). Chapter 3 has been submitted to the 
Energy Economics. Chapter 4 appears in the Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft (refereed). Chapter 5 will 
be submitted to an energy economics journal soon, and Chapter 6 has been submitted to the 
Journal of Resource and Energy Economics. During his Ph.D. studies the undersigned author also 
contributed to: Zweifel, Peter, Boris Krey and Maurizio Tagli (2006). Private Voluntary Health 
Insurance in Developing Countries: Friend or Foe? Chapter Three: Supply of Private Voluntary 
Health Insurance in Low-Income Countries, World Bank, Washington D.C. But since this 
contribution has nothing in common with energy economics, the undersigned author decided not 
to include this study in his thesis.  
 
 
Boris Krey 
Bassersdorf, August 2008 
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Chapter 2 
 
Efficient and Secure Power for the United States 
and Switzerland 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Efficient portfolios of assets maximize expected return for any given level of risk or alternatively 
minimize expected risk for every level of expected return. This founding concept of finance, 
developed by Markowitz (1952), can be applied to a portfolio of real assets as well. Power 
companies, holding a portfolio of power generation technologies, face the task of achieving 
maximum expected return (defined as kWh/U.S.$1) for any given level of risk (defined as the 
standard deviation of expected return), or put the other way around, the minimum risk for every 
level of expected return in terms of kWh/U.S.$. In this way, they contribute to the attainment of 
widely recognized objectives of energy policy, viz. the provision of electricity in an economical 
way while minimizing the overall risk of cost variability. This calls for taking into account the 
correlations between costs and therefore expected returns 2
    For example, fossil fuel-generated electricity faced dramatic cost fluctuations during the past 
decade, mainly caused by a oil price surge exceeding 300 percent
 of different power generation 
technologies.  
3
                                                 
1 The definition of expected return adopted in this study is similar to Awerbuch (2004), who used the definition 
kWh/cents. 
2 As outlined in Awerbuch (2006b) and Awerbuch and Berger (2003), generation cost is nothing but the inverse of 
expected return. Therefore results are unaffected by whether portfolio optimization is based on maximizing expected 
return or minimizing cost, both ways leading to the same outcome. 
3 Source: WTRG Economics (www.wtrg.com) 
 since 1999. In contrast, power 
generated by storage hydro fluctuated by less than 5 percent in Switzerland, mainly because of a 
stable price of water use. A portfolio containing both generation technologies therefore reduces 
risk considerably. Indeed, portfolio mixes in 2003 containing a larger share of gas power (for the 
United States) and the same share of nuclear (for Switzerland), combined with new-renewable 
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generation technologies such as wind (for the United States) and solar (for Switzerland) serve to 
greatly increase expected returns for both countries while keeping risk more or less constant. 
However, this concentration on mainly two technologies implies a reliance on two primary 
energy sources, which may jeopardize security of supply.  
    Apart from containing an international comparison, the present contribution has three novel 
features. First, while most of the published research adopts the investor’s point of view that 
characterizes financial analysis, this work takes the current user’s point of view. For financial 
investors, the current price of a share is irrelevant for the composition of their portfolio. All that 
counts is its future increase in value. By way of contrast, a utility must consider the current cost 
per kWh of the inputs it intends to use. Second, correlations between unobserved shocks 
influencing the cost of electricity generation technologies (the inverse of expected return) are 
taken into account, improving the efficiency of estimates. This clearly differs from previous 
contributions, where these correlations are not accounted for. Third, the security of supply issue 
is also addressed. Indeed, an efficient portfolio of electricity generation technologies may call for 
a high share of one particular technology (and hence energy source) if unit costs are strongly 
correlated, obviating diversification effects. However, such a solution would be deemed to impart 
excessive risk to the provision of electricity in the eyes of most policy makers. To reflect this 
concern, indices of concentration are calculated in order to depict a possible tradeoff between 
efficiency and security of supply with regard to electricity generation technologies. 
     This study is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents a short review of key literature on 
portfolio theory as applied to power generation technologies and on the measurement of supply 
security. In section 2.3, the theory of efficient power generation portfolios from a current user’s 
point of view is laid out. Because common shocks (such as weather) impinge on generation costs 
(the inverse of expected return) seemingly unrelated regression estimation method is adopted. In 
section 2.4, SURE-based efficient frontiers are constructed for the United States and Switzerland, 
with emphasis on solutions with special features, i.e. minimum variance (MV), same expected 
return (SER), same variance (SV), and maximum expected return (MER) portfolios. Shannon-
Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices will also be calculated to see whether U.S. and Swiss 
power generation technologies are sufficiently diversified. Conclusions are offered in section 2.5.  
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
Portfolio theory and the concept of diversification were introduced by Markowitz (1952). 
Efficient portfolios maximize expected return for a given amount of risk (which is measured by 
the variance or standard deviation of the return of the portfolio). Equivalently, they minimize risk 
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for a given expected return. As stated by Fabozzi et al. (2002), portfolio theory continues to be 
the most important tool for constructing efficient portfolios for financial assets.  
    More recently, portfolio theory has also been applied to real assets, such as those related to 
energy generation. According to Jansen et al. (2006), the first application to energy is due to Bar-
Lev and Katz (1976), who examined whether U.S. power utility companies are efficient users of 
fossil fuel. Costs of inputs are “as burned”, including overheads resulting from transportation 
expenses, heating of oil lines, stock cleaning, and fuel handling facilities for coal, fuel storage, 
inventory, and maintenance. Compared to the efficient frontier, actual operations by electric 
utilities are characterized by a relatively high rate of expected returns, combined with an excessive 
amount of risk however. The authors argue that utilities could move towards the efficient frontier 
by purchasing fuels at a higher but guaranteed (i.e. futures market) price.       
    Adegbulugbe et al. (1989) examine the long-term optimal structure of energy supply in Nigeria. 
They use a multiperiod linear programming model of the total energy system to minimize direct 
fuel costs while achieving certain developmental objectives. Results indicate that gas and 
petroleum should play an important role in the future Nigerian energy mix, with coal limited to a 
very small share as long as its costs of production and transportation are as high as they were at 
the time. Nuclear power and solar energy are not part of the efficient frontier at all.          
    A major limitation characterizing the contributions of both Bar-Lev and Katz (1976) and 
Adegbulugbe et al. (1989) is that they fail to account for time-varying covariances in energy 
prices. In addition, they neglect possible correlations between shocks impinging on primary 
energy prices. Finally, only the unit costs of fuels enter calculations, causing other private costs 
(current operation, use of capital) to be disregarded, let alone social costs (health and global 
warming).     
    Humphreys and McClain (1998) tackle at least three previous limitations by (i) filtering out the 
systematic components of the covariance matrix of energy prices over time, (ii) using a more 
comprehensive definition of private cost, and by (iii) including external costs. As to (i), their 
estimated variances and covariances are derived from so-called Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) models. By applying GARCH, the authors try to filter 
out systematic changes in volatility in response to shocks. Their results suggest that a shift away 
from oil towards natural gas would reduce overall volatility at a given rate of expected return (in 
terms of reduced cost of power). Focusing on changes rather than levels, Humphreys and 
McClain adopt the conventional financial portfolio approach, i.e. the investor’s point of view. 
However, producers are mainly interested in the level of prices they have to pay for their inputs, 
with expected future changes being of secondary importance. Finally, as is true of all other 
Efficient and Secure Power for the United States and Switzerland  
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studies, the authors fail to control for unobserved shocks affecting several generation 
technologies at the same time.   
    More recently, there has been research singling out electricity. Berger et al. (2003) use 
Markowitz theory to examine existing and projected generation technology mixes in the 
European Union. According to their study, renewables that are characterized by high fixed but 
low variable costs (such as wind) figure prominently in efficient portfolios both due to their 
favorable expected returns and diversification effects. A weakness of this study is its data base. 
Important components of cost are proxied by business indicators such as the S&P 500 index. In 
addition, neither external costs nor common unobserved shocks are taken into account.  
    Roques et al. (2006, 2005) apply stochastic optimization to determine whether nuclear power 
may serve as a hedge against uncertain gas and carbon prices. However, high and uncertain 
capital cost as well as potential construction and licensing delays cause the role of nuclear to be 
limited. Rather than estimating correlations between unit costs, the authors resort to the use of 
arbitrary correlation scenarios. This arbitrariness is crucial because the stronger the (positive) 
correlation between the cost of nuclear power and other technologies, the weaker its 
diversification effect.  
    Jansen et al. (2006) again apply Markowitz theory to determine efficient portfolios of power-
generating technologies for the Netherlands in the year 2030. Their results suggest that 
diversification may yield a risk reduction of up to 20 percent at no extra loss in expected returns.  
    Portfolio analysis assumes shocks to be stochastic. However, cost hikes may be the result of 
concerted behavior on the part of suppliers who have market power. The risk of collusion is the 
higher the smaller the number of suppliers, which in turn varies directly with the number of 
energy sources. Based on this line of argument, measures of concentration such as the Shannon-
Wiener (SW) and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) indices have been increasingly applied in studies 
related to power generation technologies. The SW index (a measure of entropy) reflects diversity, 
while the HH index measures market concentration. Both indices permit to evaluate the security 
of supply of different power generating technologies thanks to a greater number of suppliers. 
They therefore complement the mean-variance portfolio approach for policy makers who fear 
purchases of primary energy to be exposed to collusion or monopoly – a consideration of 
relevance especially in the markets for natural gas and uranium.     
    Grubb et al. (2005) explore the relationship between low-carbon objectives and strategic 
security of supplies in the context of the UK power system by calculating both SW and HH 
indices. They identify a complementarity between the two objectives in that a reduction of 
carbon intensity is uniformly associated with greater long-term diversity in UK power generation. 
Efficient and Secure Power for the United States and Switzerland  
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However, they neglect stochastic shocks altogether, which could cause a tradeoff between 
Markowitz efficiency and protection from market power.   
    Doherty et al. (2005) complement their portfolio analysis with the SW index to assess the fuel 
portfolio of a power plant in Ireland as of 2020. Not surprisingly, the plant’s efficient minimum 
variance portfolio contains a much more diversified mix of generation technologies than the 
maximum expected return portfolio, while the SW index favors the minimum variance 
alternative. However, this study is based on a covariance matrix of returns that has not been 
purged of extreme shocks and therefore may lack stability.  
 
 
2.3 Methodology  
 
2.3.1 Real asset portfolio estimation  
 
Owners of a real asset portfolio seek to maximize its expected return at a given risk or 
alternatively to minimize risk given their expected return. In more formal terms, the expected 
return of a real asset portfolio ( )pRE  consisting of m risky assets is given by 
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,          (1) 
 
where iw  is the share of asset i and ( )iRE  its expected return. In the present case of five 
components, the portfolio standard deviation )( pσ  involves the variances and correlation 
coefficients in the following way, 
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where ( ) 51,/cov ,...,i,j    jiijij == σσρ , are correlation coefficients and iσ  are individual standard 
deviations. In the case of the United States, the five sources are Oil, Coal, Gas, Nuclear, and Wind. 
Accordingly, eqs. (1) and (2) become  
 
      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )WindWindNuclearNuclearGasGasCoalCoalOilOilUSp REwREwREwREwREwRE ++++= ;        (3)                 
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Portfolio theory does not determine a single best mix but an efficient frontier containing an 
infinite number of solutions. The optimal solution depends on consumer preferences, which 
reflect risk aversion. In Figure 1, let there be only two generation technologies, GT1 and GT2. 
By assumption, GT1  (e.g. Solar generated power) has low expected return (measured as 
kWh/U.S.$) but low volatility of unit cost. By way of contrast, GT2 has much higher expected 
return but is more risky (e.g. Run of river generated power). If the correlation between the two 
generation technologies is less than perfect, the efficient frontier runs concave. The lower the 
correlation coefficient, the stronger this portfolio effect 4 . In Figure 1, the efficient frontier 
formed by GT1 and GT2 with its high expected return but also high volatility runs concave 
rather than linear, permitting holders of this power portfolio to profit from a diversification 
effect (Awerbuch and Berger, 2003). Although adding GT3 may not look attractive at first due to 
low expected returns, this technology is so little correlated with GT1 and especially GT2 that it 
causes the efficient frontier to become more concave. One example of this effect can be found in 
Awerbuch (2006a), who shows that by adding risky Wind generation to the existing power mix of 
Scotland, a substantially reduced portfolio standard deviation can be attained. Indeed, Wind 
generation costs in Scotland do not correlate with fossil prices, causing it to have a marked 
diversification effect (Awerbuch, 2006a)5
    In order to determine the optimal portfolio (to be selected among the efficient ones), 
knowledge of the consumer's preferences would be necessary. Along an indifference curve 
. 
EU , 
expected utility is held constant. The preference gradient of Figure 1 indicates a risk-averse 
decision-maker who likes a higher expected return but dislikes volatility. Evidently, the optimum 
allocation is given by the highest-valued indifference curve that is still an element of the efficient 
frontier. For the frontier composed of GT1 and GT2 only, this optimum is depicted by point C*. 
                                                 
4 Awerbuch (2006b) claims portfolio effects to become pronounced when correlation coefficients are below about 
0.6. 
5 Awerbuch (2006b) also refers to Brealey and Myers (1994), who show that by adding riskless government bonds 
yielding as little as 3 percent to a stock portfolio with a rate of return of 8 percent still serves to raise the expected 
return at any level of risk.     
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If GT3 is indeed available, C** becomes the new optimum, with both higher expected return and 
less volatility. Clearly, C** dominates C*, demonstrating the future contribution to welfare that 
can be expected from the availability of additional energy technologies thanks to improved 
diversification.  
 
Figure 1: Efficient portfolios of generation technologies (GT) 
 
        In the absence of information about utilities’ and societies’ degree of risk aversion, some 
solutions that do not depend on this information are of interest. First, a very risk-averse decision 
maker (presented by indifference curves IIIEU  is predicted to prefer the minimum variance 
(MV) portfolio, which coincides with GT3 in Figure 1. Another solution of importance is the 
same expected return (SER) portfolio. It contains generation technology mixes that are reshuffled 
as to have the same expected return as the actual portfolio (AP)6
IIEU
 while being on the efficient 
frontier. A SER thus offers a much lower volatility than the current portfolio. Third, the same 
variance portfolio (SV) contains the mix of technologies that is as risky as AP but being located 
on the efficient frontier generates more expected return. Fourth, an almost risk-neutral decision 
maker (represented by indifference curves ) will opt for the maximum expected return 
(MER) portfolio (GT2 in the example). These four portfolios along the efficient frontier (MV, 
SER, SV, and MER) permit to narrow down the choice for utilities and policy makers.  
    Finally, the Sharpe ratio (SR), a measure of return-to-risk, can be used for the same purpose. It 
is given by  
                   ppERSR σ/= ,                                                           (5) 
                                                 
6 The actual portfolio contains the de facto power mix as of 2003 (see section 4.2). 
IIIEU
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where )( pRE  is the expected return of the efficient portfolio (eq. 1) while pσ  represents the 
volatility (measured as standard deviation of the expected return) of the efficient portfolio (eq. 2). 
A higher value of the Sharpe ratio (SR) is preferred over a lower one.  
    Some solutions (MV and MER) involve only one technology (GT3 and GT2, respectively; 
Figure 1). However, contrary to financial markets, where investors can allocate their entire wealth 
to one asset, opting for a single generation technology often is not feasible. For example, a 
portfolio containing photovoltaic generation only would have to be excluded unless a very long 
planning horizon is adopted. This consideration calls for imposing constraints, as in section 2.4 
below. 
 
 
2.3.2 Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE)7
pσ
  
 
In view of eq. (2), portfolio risk  depends on individual standard errors iσ  and the 
correlations between returns ijρ . As argued before, it is important to derive estimates of the 
covariance matrix (i.e. of iσ  and ijσ ) that are reasonably time-invariant. In each time series of 
electricity generation costs considered, this calls for the estimation of predicted values 
tititi uRR ,,, ˆˆ −=  that do not contain a systematic shift. Such values can be computed from the 
residuals tiu ,ˆ  of the following autoregressive process of order j (sometimes complemented by a 
time variable) 
     ,
1
,,0, ∑
=
− +⋅+=
m
j
tijtiijiti uRR αα                                                 (6) 
 
where tiR ,  is the (return) for technology i in year t, 0iα  is a constant for technology i, ijα  is the 
coefficient of the return lagged j years, jtiR −,  is the dependent variable (rate of return) lagged j 
years, and tiu ,  is the error term for technology i in year t. 
     If the shocks tiu ,  causing volatility in tiR ,  were uncorrelated across technologies, one could 
estimate the expected return for each electricity-generating technology separately to obtain 
residuals tiu ,ˆ  and hence values for tiR ,ˆ . However, as shown by previous research (Krey and 
Zweifel, 2006), error terms are significantly correlated across energy sources. This constitutes 
information that can be exploited for improving the efficiency of estimation, typically resulting in 
sharper estimates of the parameters ijα , of residuals tiu , , and hence of the iσ  and ijσ  making 
                                                 
7 This section is based on Krey and Zweifel (2006). 
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up the covariance matrix of returns. The pertinent econometric method is called Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Estimation, or SURE for short. The SURE model consists of m regression 
equations (m is the number of electricity generation technologies), each of which satisfies the 
requirements of the standard regression model. The assumption that is specific to SURE is that 
the covariance matrix ( )uu'E  is not diagonal, with I the m x m identy matrix. 
 
                   ( ) 





=
II
II
E
kkjk
kiii
,,
,,
σσ
σσ
uu' .         (7) 
 
By way of contrast, traditional OLS estimation would be appropriate if the disturbance terms of 
technologies i and k were not correlated. However, this does not hold for U.S. and Swiss power 
technologies (see section 2.4.3), giving rise to the covariance matrix shown in eq. (8) for the case 
of the United States,  
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In sum, SURE allows to simultaneously estimate the expected returns of all power generation 
technologies in one regression while taking into account the possible correlation of error terms 
across equations. This approach is novel and has to the best of the authors’ knowledge not been 
applied in previous research concerned with portfolios of real assets. 
 
 
2.3.3 Shannon-Wiener index 
 
Whereas up to this point, shocks to expected returns were considered to be stochastic, measures 
of concentration reflect a concern about supplier strategies. The fewer technologies a power 
system relies upon, the fewer (as a rule) the number of suppliers, and the more the system is 
exposed to the (nonstochastic) effects of collusion and monopoly. One measure of concentration 
(or rather diversity) is entropy, also known as the Shannon-Wiener index given by 
 
 ,)ln(
1
∑
=
−=
m
i
ii ppSW                                                      (9) 
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where ip  (i=1,…; m) is the proportion of generation represented by the ith type of generation 
technology. A value below 1.00 indicates a system that is highly concentrated and therefore 
subject to the risk of collusion or monopoly, leading to interrupted supply and/or price hikes. 
 
 
2.3.4 Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
Another measure of concentration and therefore of security of supply is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. This index is calculated according to  
 
                        ∑
=
=
m
i
ipHH
1
2 ,                                  (10) 
 
where ip  is the share of the ith technology, usually expressed as a percentage. Therefore, HH = 
10,000 in the case of a monopoly. Conversely, a value HH < 1,000 is taken by antitrust 
authorities as indicating no concentration. In the present context, a value of HH > 1,800 is 
interpreted as being problematic in terms of exposure to supply risk (Grubb, 2005).   
    Stirling (1998) prefers the Shannon-Wiener index over the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
primarily because the mathematical properties of the Shannon-Wiener index are more readily 
derived from first principles. Moreover the rank orderings of SW are not sensitive to changes in 
the base of logarithm. Here, both indices will be used, since HH is better known in the economic 
literature while generating results that are consistent with those of SW (Grubb, 2005).      
 
 
2.4 Efficient U.S. and Swiss power generation frontiers in 
2003  
 
2.4.1 The data  
 
This study uses time-series data containing annual power generation returns for several 
technologies, measured in kWh electric power per U.S. dollar8. The data covers the years 1981 to 
2003 (United States) and 1985 to 2003 (Switzerland), respectively. Throughout, generation 
returns comprise fuel cost, cost of current operations, and capital user cost 9
                                                 
8 For Switzerland, the year 2000 mean value of the Swiss Franc (CHF) exchange rate was used (U.S. Federal Reserve: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org).   
9 As correctly pointed out by Fabien Roques (personal communication), there are different ways to measure capital 
user costs, yielding different generation costs. However, the utilities concerned did not provide the background data 
that would permit to calculate variants of capital user cost. 
. In the case of 
Nuclear power, decommissioning and disposal are also included. The data is adjusted to contain 
externality surcharges for environmental damage (mainly related to health and global warming). 
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The data on external costs were obtained from the European Commission (2003) for the United 
States 10
   Table 1 presents the U.S. generation returns for 1995 and 2000, for five categories, Oil, Coal, 
Gas, Nuclear, and Wind power
 and from Hirschberg and Jakob (1999) for Switzerland. While based on the same 
methods, these studies contain several externality cost scenarios, ranging from low external costs 
(optimistic view) to very high costs (conservative view). The conservative estimate will be used 
throughout. All variables are deflated by the U.S. and Swiss CPI respectively, with 2000 serving as 
the base year (=100).  
11
Year 
. Returns, range between 9 and 24 kWh/U.S. Dollar in 2000, with 
Oil attaining the minimum and Wind, the maximum.   
 
  Table 1: U.S. generation returns taking account of external costs, kWh/U.S. Dollar 
 
Oil Coal Gas Nuclear Wind 
1995 8.87 8.74 16.13 17.34 18.37 
2000 9.03 10.22 11.48 22.48 24.18 
 
    The Swiss data set contains Nuclear12, Run of river13, Storage hydro14, and Solar15
Year 
. Three of the four 
generation technologies are comparable to the United States in terms of returns, being in the 26 
to 57 kWh/U.S. Dollar range in 2000 (see Table 2). By way of contrast, Solar was markedly more 
expensive in 1995 but experienced large cost decreases since, resulting in a steady increase of 
return. 
 
Table 2: Swiss generation returns taking account of external costs, kWh/U.S. Dollar 
 
Nuclear Run of river Storage hydro Solar 
1995 20.14 38.57 17.59 1.24 
2000 26.65 57.09 28.80 1.77 
     
    The historical development of returns in U.S. power generation is shown in Figure 2. Oil 
exhibits large fluctuations in returns, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. Similar fluctuations 
                                                 
10 Since no external cost data for the United States were available, external cost data from the UK were used instead. 
The UK power industry’s generation mix is similar to that of the United States. 
11 Data for Oil, Coal, Gas, and Nuclear was obtained from the UIC (2005). Wind [State Hawaii, USA (www.state.hi.us) 
and U.S. Department of Energy (www.energy.gov)]. Since the Wind data were not available for every year, values for 
1983, 1985-1987, 1989-1994, 1996-1999 were generated by cubic spline interpolation.  
12 Data sources: KKL (2005), KKG (2005). 
13 Data source: personal correspondence. 
14 Data source: personal correspondence. 
15 RWE Schott Solar (2005); The average exchange rate of 2000 was used to convert Euro cents into U.S. cents 
(source: U.S. Federal Reserve). RWE Schott Solar data from Germany is used as a proxy for Swiss Solar power data, 
since Solar generation technologies in both countries are similar. 
Efficient and Secure Power for the United States and Switzerland  
 
18 
 
can be found for Gas, pointing to its strong correlation with Oil. By way of contrast, Wind and 
Nuclear might have favorable diversification properties thanks to their independence from 
fluctuations in fossil fuel prices.  
 
Figure 2: U.S. returns in power generation (kWh/U.S. Dollar), 1981-2003 
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    In the Swiss data set, Run of river exhibits the strongest fluctuations, particularly in 1999 and 
2000 (see Figure 3). The likely reason is changes in financial transactions between key Run of river 
power suppliers (Axpo, 2002). In contrast, returns of Nuclear increase slowly over time, making it 
a likely candidate for diversification.  
 
Figure 3: Swiss returns in power generation (kWh/U.S. Dollar), 1985/1992-2003 
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2.4.2 Actual mix of power generation as of 2003
 
In order to have a benchmark against which to hold efficient solutions, actual 2003 shares of 
current input to U.S. and Swiss power generation are displayed in Table 3. The U.S. mix contains 
56 percent Coal, 21 percent Nuclear, 18 percent Gas, 3 percent Oil, and 2 percent Wind (Table 3a). 
No data was available for hydro power, which normally makes up for some 7 percent of total 
power production in the United States. Still, the ensuing analysis covers more than 90 percent of 
U.S. capacity, going beyond earlier studies that were limited to Gas, Coal, and Wind (Awerbuch, 
2006b) and Gas, Coal, and Oil, respectively (Humphreys and McClain, 1998). The actual Swiss 
power mix (shown in Table 3b) consists of 40 percent Nuclear, 32 percent Storage hydro, 24 percent 
Run of river, and 4 percent Solar. However, Solar serves as a proxy for (negligible) conventional 
thermic and renewable sources for which data is unavailable. Again, the data account for more 
than 90 percent of capacity. 
 
Table 3a: Actual shares of power generation  
                 technologies, United States (2003) 
 
United States 
Technology Shares (in %) 
 
Coal 56 
Nuclear 21 
Gas 18 
Oil 3 
Wind 2 
 
 
Table 3b: Actual shares of power generation  
                 technologies, Switzerland (2003) 
 
Switzerland 
Technology Shares (in %) 
 
Nuclear 40 
Storage hydro 32 
Run of river 24 
Solar 4 
  
 
 
2.4.3 SURE results for the United States and Switzerland 
 
 
Recall that SURE seeks to increase the efficiency of estimation by accounting for correlations in 
unobserved shocks. Table 4 provides evidence supporting this notion.  
 
 
 
 Oil Coal Gas Nuclear Wind 
Oil 1 0.9354 0.9524 0.8303 0.9031 
Coal 0.9354 1 0.8830 0.9588 0.9711 
Gas 0.9524 0.8830 1 0.7503 0.8259 
Nuclear 0.8303 0.9588 0.7503 1 0.9169 
Wind 0.9031 0.9711 0.8259 0.9169 1 
 Oil Coal Gas Nuclear Wind 
Oil 1 0.0803 0.2704 0.0988 -0.0860 
Coal 0.0803 1 0.7754 -0.4051 -0.4405 
Gas 0.2704 0.7754 1 -0.2805 -0.4813 
Nuclear 0.0988 -0.4051 -0.2805 1 -0.2265 
Wind -0.0860 -0.4405 -0.4813 -0.2265 1 
Table 4b:  Partial correlation coefficients for  
                  tiu ,ˆ  residuals from eq. (6), U.S.    
                  (1981-2003) 
 
 
Table 4a:  Partial correlation coefficients                
                  for U.S. returns (1981-2003) 
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In panel (a), partial correlation coefficients relating to returns (kWh/U.S. Dollar) in the United 
States are shown. The figures indicate strong and positive correlations. For instance, Oil and Gas 
exhibit a correlation coefficient of no less than 0.95. Panel (b) contains the correlations of tiu ,ˆ , i.e. 
the residuals from eq. (6), which represent the components due to unobserved shocks. 
Correlation coefficients drop throughout, turning negative in some cases, but remain substantial. 
For example, the correlation across the equations for Oil and Gas is still 0.27. 
    The evidence for Switzerland is presented in Table 5. Here, the most marked correlation is 
between Solar and Nuclear, amounting to 0.98 (Panel a). The corresponding correlation between 
residuals tiu ,ˆ  is estimated as 0.39 (Panel b). Correlation coefficients drop as well, but much less 
than in the case of the United States.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A possible explanation of this difference is that prices for primary energy sources purchased by 
Swiss utilities, being predominantly domestic, are much more disjoint from world market 
developments than their U.S. counterparts.   
    
Table 6: Results of SURE regression, United States (1981-2003) 
 R  St.D. Const. Rt-1 Rt-2 Rt-3 Rt-3 Trend Obs R2 
Oil 8.23 2.00 1.84** 1.00*** -0.77*** 0.73** - -0.69 19 0.86 
                 
Coal 7.83 2.26 0.88*** 1.07*** -0.28* - - 0.07* 19 0.99 
                 
Gas 12.58 2.63 2.99*** 1.17*** -1.07*** 1.11*** -0.67*** 0.18 19 0.90 
                 
Nuclear 15.06 6.35 0.65** 0.62*** - - - 0.44*** 19 0.99 
                 
Wind 18.01 4.19 5.39*** 1.15*** -0.53 -0.35 - 0.52*** 19 0.99 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
 
 Nuclear Run of river Storage hydro Solar 
Nuclear 1 0.6421 0.7534 0.9795 
Run of river 0.6421 1 0.8522 0.5535 
Storage hydro 0.7534 0.8522 1 0.6879 
Solar 0.9795 0.5535 0.6879 1 
 Nuclear Run of river Storage hydro Solar 
Nuclear 1 0.4934 0.7420 0.3861 
Run of river 0.4934 1 0.7967 0.0205 
Storage hydro 0.7420 0.7967 1 -0.0021 
Solar 0.3861 0.0205 -0.0021 1 
Table 5b: Partial correlation coefficients for   
tiu ,ˆ  residuals from eq. (6), Switzerland              
                (1992-2003)                       
 
Table 5a: Partial correlation coefficients          
                 for  Swiss returns (1992-2003)         
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Table 6 displays the SURE regression results for the United States. As can be seen from the 
column denoted R , Wind has the largest expected return, amounting to 18.01 kWh/U.S.$, while 
Coal has the smallest expected return, at a mere 7.83 kWh/U.S.$. The standard deviations (St.D.) 
of all technologies vary widely, with Oil being the least volatile (2.00), and Nuclear the most 
volatile (6.35). All regressions include a time trend, which however turned out insignificant for Oil 
and Gas. The positive coefficients for trend in the Coal, Nuclear, and Wind regressions indicate 
that expected returns increase over time. The coefficients of determination R2 are comfortably 
high.  
 
Table 7: Results of SURE regression, Switzerland (1992-2003) 
 R  St.D. Const. Rt-1 Rt-2 Rt-3 Rt-4 Trend Obs R2 
Nuclear 20.29 4.93 4.01** 0.28 - - - 0.92*** 9 0.94 
                 
Run of river 47.09 4.76 8.87   -0.17  0.17 0.13 - 2.11*** 9 0.45 
                 
Storage hydro 23.73 2.22    -0.50*** 0.04 -0.15 - - 1.85*** 9 0.79 
                 
Solar 1.47 0.39 0.10 0.10 - - - 0.10*** 9 0.99 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
 
    Turning to Switzerland, the R  column in Table 7 shows expected returns for Run of river to be 
maximum with 47.09 kWh/U.S.$, whereas Solar only generates 1.47 kWh/U.S.$. Comparing 
Tables 6 and 7, Nuclear in Switzerland displays both higher expected return and less risk than in 
the United States. The time trend has a positive and significant coefficient for all generation 
technologies, showing the strongest increase for Run of river (2.11), however only 45 percent of 
the variation can be explained. 
 
2.4.4 Efficient power generation frontiers  
 
2.4.4.1 Efficient frontiers for the United States 
 
The efficient frontier of U.S. power generation technologies is shown in Figure 4. With no 
feasibility constraints applied, a U.S. utility interested in minimizing risk would opt for the MV 
portfolio, which contains Oil exclusively. There, the standard deviation (Risk) is a mere 2.00, 1.13 
percentage points less than the actual portfolio (AP2003) with 3.13 (see insert). If the utility is 
risk-neutral, causing it to opt for the MER portfolio, then 100 percent Wind would be efficient, 
offering an expected return of 18.01, again more than the AP2003 with 10.53. Two intermediate 
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solutions of interest are the same expected return portfolio (SER) and the same variance (SV) 
portfolio. For the SER, the benchmark is the 10.53 kWh/U.S.$ achieved by the AP2003, which 
contains 55 percent Gas and 45 percent Oil. At this mix, the SER offers the same expected return 
but at a lower risk (down from 3.13 to 2.28). However, it calls for more Gas (up from 18 to 55 
percent) and more Oil (up from 3 to 45 percent) but no Coal, Nuclear, or Wind. As to the SV its 
expected return is 14.97 rather than 10.53 kWh/U.S.$, achieved by changing from 18 to 56 
percent Gas and from 2 to 44 percent Wind. This time, Coal, Nuclear and Oil are not part of the 
efficient portfolio. 
 
Figure 4: Efficient frontier for the United States 
(2003, SURE-based, no constraint, high external costs) 
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    However, such unconstrained portfolios are not very realistic. For instance, 44 percent Wind 
generation in 2003 would not have been technically feasible. Therefore, two additional scenarios 
are presented, with one constraining the share of Wind to a maximum of 5 percent (Figure 5, C1) 
and the other, constraining the shares of Coal, Oil, Nuclear, and Wind to no more than 60, 10, 25, 
and 5 percent, respectively (Figure 6, C2), shares that reflect technical feasibility. As expected, the 
MV_C1 and SER_C1 portfolios of Figure 5 contain the same mixes as in Figure 4, because Wind 
was not part of the MV and SER efficient portfolios in the first place. However, a look at the 
SV_C1 and MER_C1 portfolios reveals modifications. The SV_C1 portfolio places a greater 
weight on Gas (78 rather than 56 percent as in the unconstrained portfolio) and Nuclear (17 vs. 0 
percent, compared to 21 percent in the AP2003). The constraint on Wind becomes binding at a 
 AP2003 MV SER SV MER 
ER 10.53 8.23 10.53 14.97 18.01 
Risk  3.13 2.00 2.28 3.13 4.19 
      
Coal 56%     
Nuclear 21%     
Gas 18%  55% 56%  
Oil 3% 100% 45%   
Wind 2%   44% 100% 
 
MER 
SV 
SER 
MV 
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share of 5 percent. Interestingly, these constraints cause only minor losses in terms of 
performance. For example, the SV_C1 portfolio has an expected return amounting to 13.27 as 
compared to 14.97 kWh/$ for the unconstrained frontier. Nuclear takes a weight of 95 percent in 
the MER_C1 portfolio, while Wind is constrained to its binding share of 5 percent. As expected, 
expected return is lower and risk higher as in the unconstrained portfolio (15.21 and 6.24 rather 
than 18.01 and 4.19, respectively). 
 
Figure 5: Efficient frontier for the United States  
(2003, SURE-based, with constraint, high external costs) 
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By way of contrast, Figure 6 shows a more diversified mix of generation technologies, due to the 
imposition of item-wise maximum shares that prevent one single technology from becoming 
dominant. Portfolio risk increases beyond that of the minimum variance portfolios of Figures 4 
and 5 but still falls short of AP2003.  
    Focusing on the SV portfolios, a comparison of Figure 6 with Figures 4 and 5 reveals two 
salient features. First, all portfolios put some weight on Gas, with shares ranging between 56 
percent to 78 percent. This is much more than the 18 percent of AP2003. Second, maximum 
expected returns fall the more constraints are applied.  
 
 
Constraint imposed:  Wind ≤ 5% 
MV_C1 
SER_C1 
SV_C1 
MER_C1 
 AP2003 MV_C1 SER_C1 SV_C1 MER_C1 
ER 10.53 8.23 10.53 13.27 15.21 
Risk  3.13 2.00 2.25 3.13 6.24 
      
Coal 56%     
Nuclear 21%   17% 95% 
Gas 18%  50% 78%  
Oil 3% 100% 50%   
Wind 2%   5% 5% 
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Figure 6: Efficient frontier for the United States  
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints, high external costs) 
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    From this section, the following conclusions can be drawn with regard to the United States. A 
feature common to all scenarios is that a move towards the efficient frontier is possible with an 
increasing share of Wind. This feature is particularly marked in all SV portfolios, where Wind 
takes a share between 5 to 44 percent, depending on the scenario considered. In all SV portfolios, 
expected return exceeds that of AP2003 with no increase in risk. Assuming that utilities are rather 
risk-averse, the MV portfolio should be of particular interest, implying a very strong reliance on 
Oil (between 10 to 100 percent, depending on the scenario considered). The SER portfolios point 
to Gas and Oil with combined shares between 66 and 100 percent. If maximum returns are of 
interest, a combination of Nuclear power and Wind appears promising. 
    However, these results need to be compared with those of other studies. In his U.S. portfolio 
analysis, Awerbuch (2006b) finds that Gas generated power should play a major role in the SER, 
SV, and MER portfolios, with shares between 45 to 100 percent. The same holds true of Wind 
according to his MV and SER portfolios. The present study arrives at similar conclusions, with 
SER and SV portfolios displaying a share of Gas between 55 and 78 percent. 
 
 
 
 
Constraints imposed:  
Coal ≤ 60%, Nuclear ≤ 25%, Oil ≤ 10%, Wind ≤ 5% 
 AP2003 MV_C2 SER_C2 SV_C2 MER_C2 
ER 10.53 9.29 10.53 13.27 13.47 
Risk  3.13 2.26 2.35 3.13 3.42 
      
Coal 56% 60% 34%   
Nuclear 21%   17% 25% 
Gas 18% 30% 56% 78% 70% 
Oil 3% 10% 10%   
Wind 2%   5% 5% 
 
MV_C2 
SER_C2 
MER_C2 SV_C2 
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2.4.4.2 Efficient frontiers for Switzerland 
 
Figure 7 displays the set of efficient power generation portfolios for Switzerland, without any 
constraints imposed. As in the case of the United States (Figures 4 to 6), the actual portfolio 
(AP2003) is located inside the efficient frontier, indicating a good deal of inefficiency (see section 
2.3.1 again). The SV portfolio serves to increase expected return to 35.63 kWh/$ (up from 24.78 
in the AP2003), while its volatility coincides with the actual portfolio. It implies a mix of 51 
(rather than 24) percent Run of river and 49 (rather than 32) percent Storage hydro. 
 
Figure 7: Efficient frontier for Switzerland  
(2003, SURE-based, no constraints, high external costs) 
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Risk-averse utilities opting for the MV portfolio would use 100 percent Solar, reducing risk to 
0.39, down from 3.28 in the AP2003. Conversely, the MER portfolio would imply 100 percent 
Run of river, with expected return of 47.09, twice that of AP2003. By keeping expected returns at 
24.78 (the AP2003 value), utilities could reduce risk from 3.28 to 2.22, with a mix containing 74 
percent Storage hydro, 14 percent Run of river, and 12 percent Solar. 
    Again, unconstrained portfolios such as these are not realistic (at least not in the short run). 
For shares of 100 percent Solar (MV) the climate is not sufficiently sunny, and for 100 percent 
Run of river (MER), the extra hydro resources are lacking (Laufer, 2004). Therefore, Run of river, 
Storage hydro, and Solar are constrained to equal their AP2003 shares, leaving only Nuclear to be 
freely determined. 
MER 
SV 
SER 
MV 
 AP2003 MV SER SV MER 
ER 24.78 1.47 24.78 35.63 47.09 
Risk  3.28 0.39 2.22 3.28 4.76 
      
Nuclear 40%     
Storage hydro 32%  74% 49%  
Run of river 24%  14% 51% 100% 
Solar 4% 100% 12%   
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Figure 8: Efficient frontier for Switzerland  
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints, high external costs) 
 
Standard Deviation (Risk)
Expected Return
0.0 5.00.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.5
-10.0
50.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
Nuclear
Run of river
Storage hydro
Solar
AP2003
 
 
 
 
The corresponding efficient frontier is shown in Figure 8. The MV_C portfolio mirrors the 
technology shares of the AP2003, which are 40 percent Nuclear, 32 percent Storage hydro, 24 
percent Run of river and 4 percent Solar. Interestingly, it exhibits slightly more risk than the 
AP2003 (3.54 as compared to 3.28), which is due to the use of stabilized correlations in this 
particular instance (see section 2.3.2 again). At the same time, it has 2.3 percentage points more 
expected return (27.07 vs. 24.78), making it an attractive choice. No SER_C and SV_C portfolios 
can be determined, since the imposed constraints result in a solution set of measure zero. Absent 
risk aversion, the MER_C portfolio would be preferred, implying 44 percent Nuclear, 32 percent 
Storage hydro, and 24 percent Run of river. Not surprisingly, expected return attains a high 27.82, 
compared to 24.78 kWh/CHF in the AP2003, while risk increases slightly from 3.28 to 3.72.  
   In all, in the case of Switzerland, portfolios containing Solar power serve to reduce risk 
significantly, as can be seen in Figure 7 (MV and SER portfolios) and Figure 8 (MV_C portfolio), 
respectively. Conversely, Nuclear power helps to maximize expected return, as shown in Figure 8 
(MV_C and MER_C portfolios, respectively). Storage hydro and Run of river continue to weigh 
heavy both in Figure 7 (SER and SV portfolios) and Figure 8 (MV_C and MER_C portfolios).            
 
 
Constraints imposed:  
Run of river ≤ 24%, Storage hydro ≤ 32%, Solar ≤ 4% 
MV_C 
MER_C 
 AP2003 MV_C SER_C SV_C MER_C 
ER 24.78 27.07 N.A. N.A 27.82 
Risk  3.28 3.54 N.A. N.A 3.72 
      
Nuclear 40% 40% N.A. N.A. 44% 
Storage hydro 32% 32% N.A. N.A. 32% 
Run of river 24% 24% N.A. N.A. 24% 
Solar 4% 4% N.A. N.A.  
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2.4.4.3 Comparing efficient power frontiers: a tale of two countries 
 
Both the United States and Switzerland, different as they may be otherwise, share one salient 
feature with regard to power generation. Their actual portfolio AP2003 definitely falls short of 
the efficient frontier. On the one hand, both countries could reduce risk importantly by allocating 
larger shares to new-renewable technologies. As shown in Figures 4 to 6 for the United States, 
increasing the shares of Wind beyond the AP2003 value goes along with higher expected return 
while risk increases slightly at worst. In Switzerland, all portfolios that contain more Solar than 
AP2003 entail less risk. The SER portfolio of Figure 7 even suggests that a mix of 74 percent 
Storage hydro, 14 percent Run of river, and 12 percent Solar achieves 1.06 percentage points less risk 
while attaining the same expected return as AP2003.  
    Utilities in both countries are likely to be puzzled by these results. It seems obvious to them 
that increasing the shares of Wind (in the USA) and Solar (in Switzerland) must reduce expected 
returns. Although this notion has intuitive appeal because Wind and Solar have comparatively low 
returns, it does not hold true. According to eq. (1), )( pRE  admittedly decreases if a below-
average return component is added – provided the other shares remain (roughly) constant. 
However, the transition from the actual portfolio to a point on the efficient frontier causes this 
condition not to hold anymore. For instance, the Swiss share of Nuclear drops from 40 to 0 
percent while that of Solar increases from 4 to 12 percent (see Figure 7, SER portfolio). An 
important implication is that in dynamic and uncertain environments, the merits of generating 
technologies must be determined not by evaluating single technologies, but technology 
portfolios. This is also the key explanation for the divergence between users’ actual choices and 
efficient choices. In the past, utilities and policy makers have been selecting generating 
technologies solely on an individual, case-per-case basis, failing to consider their contribution to 
overall portfolio performance.  
    On the whole, remaining within the technically feasible and assuming that U.S. utilities are risk-
averse, it appears that they would have gained by adopting the MV_C2 portfolio by 2003, 
containing 60 percent Coal, 30 percent Gas, and 10 percent Oil. This mix would have reduced 
volatility by 0.8 percentage points but also expected return by 1.2 points below the AP2003 
benchmark. On the other hand, Swiss utilities may be said to act in an efficient manner by 
adopting the MV_C portfolio, which is identical to the AP2003 (made up of 40 percent Nuclear, 
32 percent Storage hydro, 24 percent Run of river, and 4 percent Solar).  
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2.4.5 Supply security 
 
Current concentration values for U.S. and Swiss power generation portfolios are obtained by 
calculating the Shannon-Wiener (SW) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) indices (see sections 
2.3.3 and 2.3.4 for details). Both indices help to see whether a power generation portfolio is 
sufficiently diversified in terms of technologies, which also implies diversification in terms of 
purchases of primary energy sources. In addition, the Sharpe Ratio (SR) is calculated to identify 
portfolios with favorable return-to-risk values (see section 2.3.1). 
 
2.4.5.1 Supply security for the United States 
 
Figure 9 provides an overview of all U.S. portfolios that were presented in section 2.4.4.1, with 
the AP2003 appearing in the first column. Its SW exceeds 1.00, which corresponds to a 
reasonably diversified portfolio. However, the HH exceeds 1,800, suggesting that generation 
technologies and therefore purchases of primary sources for U.S. power generation are 
concentrated. The SR has a fairly low value of 3.4. With the sole exception of MER_C1 (last 
column, see Figure 5), all efficient portfolios offer a higher expected return than AP2003 for the 
same amount of risk. As expected, MV, MER, and MV_C1 portfolios are heavily concentrated 
and thus prone to supply disruptions. However, their Sharpe ratios are high, attaining 4.3 in the 
case of the MER portfolio. Incorporating short-to-medium term technological constraints, the 
MV_C2 and SV_C2 portfolios presumably appeal to U.S. utilities. While their Sharpe ratios are 
high (4.1 to 4.2), they are not well diversified according to the SW index. This points to a trade-
off between economic efficiency and supply security in U.S. power generation. 
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2.4.5.2 Supply security for Switzerland 
 
Like the actual portfolio of the United States, AP2003 of Switzerland has a SW in excess of 1.00, 
indicating a reasonably secure mix of technologies and hence primary energy sources (see Figure 
10).  
 
  Figure 10: SW, HH, and SR for Switzerland (2003)  
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However, HH exceeds 1,800, implying that more diversification of generation technologies (and 
hence more competition between suppliers of primary energy, ceteris paribus) would be 
beneficial. Arguably the best technology mix for risk-averse utilities and policy makers would be 
the SV portfolio because it keeps portfolio volatility constant while limiting the increase of the 
HH to 5,002 and the drop of SW to 0.70 but raising the SR to a high 10.8 (compared to 3,216, 
1.20, and 7.5 respectively under the AP2003). However, the implied shares of Run of river of 51 
and Storage hydro of 49 percent are not attainable anytime soon. The 12 percent share of Solar that 
comes with the SER may be considered realistic. Compared to the AP2003, it serves to reduce 
portfolio volatility while raising SR to 11.0. The real difficulty lies with the concomitant increase 
of Storage hydro’s share to no less than 74 percent, more than double its current value. As 
evidenced by Laufer et al. (2004), present Storage hydro technologies and geographic conditions 
render such a share unattainable.   
                                c.f. Fig 7                            c.f. Fig 8 
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    In all, Swiss utilities, policy makers, and ultimately consumers face a situation that is very 
different from their American counterparts. If they wish to break away from a markedly 
inefficient AP2003 (relative to domestic potential, not compared to the United States), they have 
to bet on Storage hydro (SER). This calls for a reduction of Run of river capacities (which are alleged 
to be environmentally friendly – but recall that external costs are accounted for throughout) and 
scrapping Nuclear power entirely. On the other hand, the restricted MV_C portfolio is secure 
according to the SW while containing the same technology shares as AP2003. Risk-averse current 
users thus seem to be best advised to keep the AP2003 mix. By way of contrast, risk-averse 
utilities (and consumers) in the United States could increase their SR from 3.4 to almost 4.1 by 
opting for the SV_C2 portfolio, which, however, contains significantly more Oil and Gas and 
therefore would jeopardize security of supply.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
    The objective of this contribution was to determine the efficient frontiers of electric power 
generation in the United States and Switzerland, taking into account their implications in terms of 
security of supply. In contrast to existing portfolio studies, returns are defined as kWh of power 
per U.S. Dollar spent, which amounts to adopting a current user rather than an investor point of 
view. The observation period covers the years 1981 to 2003 (United States) and 1985 to 2003 
(Switzerland), respectively. Because the error terms of the expected return regressions are 
correlated, seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) was adopted for estimating the 
covariance matrix used in determining efficient portfolios. 
    In the absence of information about the degree of risk aversion of utilities and policy makers 
in the two countries, the minimum variance (MV), same expected return (SER), same variance 
(SV), and (as a contrast) maximum expected return (MER) portfolios were singled out for 
detailed analysis. One could argue that for populations as risk-averse as the U.S. and especially 
the Swiss, the minimum variance portfolio is the appropriate one. However, this choice may 
result in allocations that are too different from the actual ones to be deemed technically feasible 
in the short to medium run. With realistic maximum shares of 60 percent Coal, 25 percent 
Nuclear, 10 percent Oil, and 5 percent Wind for the United States, the following efficient portfolio 
of the constrained MV type (MV_C2) was obtained. It contains 60 percent Coal, 30 percent Gas, 
and 10 percent Oil, but no Nuclear at all. While volatility declines, both the Shannon-Wiener and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices suggest that power generation technologies (and with them, 
supplies of primary energy sources) are not sufficiently diversified. 
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    The one MV_C portfolio for Switzerland considered comprises 40 percent Nuclear, 32 percent 
Storage hydro, 24 percent Run of river, and 4 percent Solar, which mimics the AP2003. Therefore, 
Swiss utilities can be said to generate electricity in an efficient manner. In addition, the Shannon-
Wiener index indicates a degree of diversification that is sufficient to avoid any threat to supply 
security.   
    An issue of interest would have been the efficient use of technologies along the load curve. 
However, this aspect had to be neglected in the present work. First, not all generating 
technologies can economically contribute to all load segments; for instance, hydro storage is 
reserved for the peak load segment for good reasons. Second, the available data does not allow a 
consistent assignment of cost to load segments, which seems to have been a problem with 
previous studies as well (Awerbuch 2006a, 2005, 2003). 
    To sum up, depending on the scenario considered, failure to exploit new-renewable resources 
such as Wind (in the United States) and Solar (in Switzerland) causes expected returns to be below 
and volatility to be the same or even in excess of the efficient frontier of power generating 
portfolios. In addition, a larger share of Nuclear would move both countries closer to their 
feasible maximum expected return (MER) portfolio. However, such a move would entail a loss in 
terms of supply security.  
    Future research should deal with several aspects that had to be neglected in this work. First, 
investments in energy technology often must be considered irreversible, raising the issue of their 
optimal timing which cannot be addressed by Markowitz theory. The appropriate approach in 
these cases is real options theory (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), whose prescriptions might differ 
from those presented here. Second, although defining returns in terms of kilowatthours 
generated per U.S. Dollar has some appeal, future changes in this quantity, reflecting an investor’s 
point of view, are relevant for planning. The present study thus needs to be complemented by 
using changes rather than levels of costs and productivities of energy technologies. Third, 
information about the risk preferences of utilities, policy makers, and ultimately citizens with 
regard to both the costs and prices of final energy and to purchases of primary energy inputs 
would be extremely valuable because this would permit to determine truly optimal (rather than a 
set of efficient) power portfolios. However, the present work makes first steps towards the 
attainment of these more ambitious goals.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United 
States and Switzerland: An Investor View  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
    
    Like most industrial countries, the United States and Switzerland face great challenges in the 
provision of energy arising from increased demand by emerging economies and dwindling 
domestic resources. The experiences of California in 2001 (and Italy in 2003) demonstrate the 
high costs of power shortages to the economy. Both the United States and Switzerland are 
expected to confront substantial shortfalls in the provision of energy during the next twenty 
years. According to the U.S. National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPG), the projected 
gap amounts to nearly 50 percent of 2020 demand. Over the next ten years, demand for 
electricity in particular is predicted to increase by about 25 percent, calling for more than 200,000 
MWe of new capacity (NEPG, 2001). As for Switzerland, a study conducted by the Paul Scherrer 
Institute estimates a power shortfall of almost 20 percent by 2020 given a (slow) demand increase 
of 15 percent over 2000, and more than 40 percent given a surge in demand of 30 percent 
(Gantner, 2000).  
    The solutions available to the two countries is the same, too; viz. import more power (from 
Canada and France, respectively); improve energy efficiency even more than expected; and 
increase domestic supply. However, more efficient electricity-generating portfolios could also 
make a contribution. Can U.S. and Swiss utilities do better as investors by modifying the current 
technology mix? If so, what are the attractive technologies from an investor’s point of view, 
taking into account external costs that sooner or later will be factored into the prices of energy 
sources?   
    Financial investors take great interest in reducing their exposure to the ups and downs of the 
market by holding a diversified portfolio of securities. Taking into account the variances 
Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United States and Switzerland: An Investor View  
 
38 
 
(standard deviations), covariances, and expected returns between assets, Markowitz (1952) 
pioneered the construction of the efficient portfolio set. An efficient portfolio does not create 
unnecessary risk for a given expected return, or put the other way round, it maximizes expected 
return for a given amount of risk, measured by the standard deviation of portfolio returns. 
    Indeed, the objectives of the U.S. NEPG support the portfolio approach to energy advocated 
here. They are “to promote dependable, affordable and environmentally sound production and 
distribution of energy for the future” (NEPG, 2001). The objectives of energy policy as laid 
down in the Swiss constitution1
    A comparison between the United States and Switzerland is of interest for several reasons. 
First, in spite of the difference in size (the U.S. population is almost 40 times larger than the 
Swiss), both countries heavily rely on imported fuels (gas and nuclear, respectively) for their 
power generation. While primary energy sources can be purchased at market prices in both 
countries, there are differences in their technology mix, giving rise to the question of whether 
they reflect differences in efficiency. Specifically, about 18 percent of total U.S. capacity for 
electricity was based on gas in 2003, while at present Switzerland has no gas-fueled power plants 
at all (see Table 1 in section 3.4.2). In the event that gas should enter its efficient electricity 
portfolios, Switzerland can learn from the United States. On the other hand, the United States, 
doing almost without hydro (7 percent of generating capacity in 2003), may benefit from learning 
about the performance of hydro in Switzerland (some 55 percent
 are to provide energy that should be (i) sufficient, (ii) diversified, 
(iii) secure, (vi) affordable, and (v) environmentally compatible. To be “dependable”, energy must 
be available in sufficient quality, diversified, and secure; to be “affordable”, its provision must be 
economical. Compatibility with the environment can be achieved by including external costs 
(which will be done in this study). Again, the portfolio approach appears to be suitable. 
2
    The last-mentioned consideration calls for an investor view. This means that returns are not 
defined in terms of kilowatthours (kWh) per Dollar spent (which would be appropriate for a 
 of capacity, see panel B of 
Table 1). Somewhat more general insights may be expected with regard to regulation. Contrary to 
the United States, the Swiss electricity market continues to be highly regulated. The usual 
presumption would be that U.S. power generation is closer to the efficient frontier than its Swiss 
counterpart. The present investigation may allow to test this prediction, thus shedding light on 
the impact of public regulation in the case of energy. Finally, several countries (notably China and 
India) have to meet a rapidly increasing demand for electricity. For them, it is of considerable 
importance to invest in energy sources in a way that avoids inefficiency. This contribution should 
provide some help towards achieving that objective.  
                                                 
1 Section 6, art. 89 
2 Run of river and Storage hydro  combined 
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current user view), but in terms of relative changes of kWh/$ over time. Accordingly, volatility is 
measured as the standard deviation of that quantity to determine a risk-expected return tradeoff. 
Indeed, investment prospects differ between the two countries. Whereas about 90 percent of all 
new U.S. capacity for power will be fueled by natural gas (NEPG, 2001), in Switzerland gas 
(much of which comes from Russia) is only slowly being considered as an alternative to nuclear 
power and electricity imports. Indeed, Russian state-owned Gazprom raised the specter of 
gauching and squeezing, a behavior that may serve as a model for suppliers of gas worldwide 
(Economist, 2006).   
    This paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 is devoted to a review of the portfolio approach 
(Markowitz, 1992) as applied to the provision of energy. While Markowitz theory has been 
applied to the energy sources of the United States and the European Union before, a recurrent 
weakness is that estimated variances and covariances (the covariance matrix henceforth), which 
importantly determine results, may not be stable. Therefore, after specifying U.S. and Swiss 
efficient electricity production frontiers in section 3.3, econometric techniques for filtering out 
the systematic, time-invariant components of the covariance matrix are described in section 3.4.  
    The methodological innovation introduced in this study consists in recognizing that there are 
common shocks impinging on the generation costs of energy sources. Taking this correlation 
into account in the estimation of the covariance matrix (using so-called Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Estimation, SURE) can give rise to important gains in the efficiency of estimation. To 
the best of the authors' knowledge, SURE has not been applied yet to the calculation of efficient 
electricity portfolios adopting the investor view. In section 3.5, SURE-based efficient power 
generation frontiers are constructed for the United States and Switzerland and contrasted with 
frontiers derived from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates. It will be shown that expected 
returns and volatilities differ greatly depending on the two estimation procedures. However, even 
if the SURE-based frontier is accepted as the appropriate one, there remains the open question as 
to which of the efficient energy mixes is optimal. While optimal choice depends on risk aversion 
(which is not known), the maximum expected return (MER) and the minimum variance (MV) 
portfolios constitute two extreme solutions that can be compared with the current portfolios of 
the two countries. Conclusions are offered in the final section.  
 
 
3.2 Review of the literature 
 
Portfolio theory and the concept of diversification have proved useful in areas other than 
corporate and personal investment. This review of the literature exclusively focuses on 
applications to energy. 
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    Bar-Lev and Katz (1976) examine fossil fuel procurement to determine the extent to which the 
U.S. utility industry has been an efficient user of scarce resources. They derive a Markowitz-
efficient frontier of fuel mixes which minimize the expected cost of fuels at a given risk (see 
section 3.3 on portfolio theory). Their results show that while generally utilities are efficiently 
diversified, their portfolios are characterized by both high rates of return and excessive risk, with 
regulation being the likely cause according to the authors. Utilities could move towards the 
efficient frontier by purchasing higher-priced fuels that exhibit smaller price fluctuations. 
However, the seminal contribution of Bar-Lev and Katz is limited in several regards. First, it 
comprises only fuel costs, neglecting other important components such as operating, capital user, 
and external costs. Fuel is assumed to constitute approximately 80 percent of total generation 
cost. This assumption may have been legitimate in the early 1970s when electricity was produced 
mainly by fuel-intensive technologies such as coal, oil, and gas. Today, nuclear, wind, and solar 
where fuel costs are negligible, play a more important role.  
    Second, their approach is best described as a current user view, since efficient current 
operation of a utility calls for choosing the cost-minimizing input bundle. It has been adopted by 
several later studies, most notably by Adegbulugbe et al. (1989), Roques et al. (2005, 2006), 
Doherty et al. (2005), Grubb et al. (2005), Jansen et al. (2006), and Krey and Zweifel (2009). 
However, utilities make a choice of technology often involving an upfront investment that 
promises a stream of future revenues and costs. They are thus in a position of an investor who – 
while not irreversibly tied to a set of assets – expects to hold a given portfolio for a few years. 
The appropriate view in that case is that of an investor who is concerned about changes in value 
over time, viz. the percentage reduction of unit cost associated with a generating technology. 
Indeed, this contribution is one of the first to adopt this investor view, which is actually 
predicated by portfolio theory, following the lead of Humphreys and McClain (1998).  
    A third limitation of the study by Bar-Lev and Katz is that it fails to take into account the fact 
that the covariance matrix of primary energy prices (and their relative changes over time) are 
likely to vary over time. This problem was also addressed by Humphreys and McClain, who 
introduced a time-varying covariance matrix in their construction of an efficient portfolio of U.S. 
energy sources. Estimated variances and covariances are derived from so-called Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (henceforth: GARCH) models. GARCH modeling 
allows to filter out systematic changes in volatility in response to shocks. Without filtering, these 
shocks may result in unstable estimates of the covariance matrix. The authors find that while the 
electric utility industry is operating close to the minimum variance (MV) portfolio, a shift towards 
coal would still reduce overall price volatility at a given rate of return. With the inclusion of 
expected external costs, the shift away from oil, while confirmed, now favors natural gas rather 
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than coal. Humphreys and McClain also present evidence suggesting that changes in generation 
costs are characterized by skewness and excess kurtosis, implying that conditional densities likely 
are not normal. However, under these conditions GARCH does not provide useful inferences 
and should be replaced by an alternative approach. In addition, their study is limited to fuel price 
and environmental externality surcharges excluding operating and capital user costs. With a 
broader range of technologies considered, it becomes increasingly important to account for 
possible correlations between unobserved shocks impinging on the unit cost of generating 
technologies to achieve efficiency gains [applying Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation 
(SURE)] in estimation. The present study promises advances on these scores as well.  
    Yu (2003) presents a short-term market risk model again based on the Markowitz mean-
variance approach, where the covariance matrix reflects differing developments of fuel prices 
across regional electricity markets. He includes transaction costs and other constraints such as 
minimum contracting quantities that limit wheeling, resulting in a mixed-integer programming 
problem. An interesting observation is that the resulting efficient frontier is neither smooth nor 
concave from below anymore, contrary to the illustration of Figure 1 in section 3.3 below. 
    However, Yu does not control for non-normal conditional densities, which easily lead to 
biased regression estimates that result in faulty predictions of future price changes. In addition, 
the study continues to neglect possible correlations between unobserved shocks impinging on 
prices. Such correlations should be of great concern in his study since it uses data from regions in 
the United States, which may be subject to common shocks (notably weather, as evidenced by 
the electricity price hikes in California that were mainly caused by dry and hot weather in the 
states of Washington, Utah, Nevada, and Arizona (Cicchetti et al., 2004, Ch. 18)).       
    Being strong advocates of the investor view, Berger et al. (2003) analyze existing and projected 
generating portfolios in the European Union (EU), comparing existing risk-return properties to a 
set of Markowitz-efficient portfolios. In general, their results indicate that both existing and 
projected EU technology mixes are suboptimal from a risk-return perspective. Their analysis 
further suggests that portfolios with lower cost increases and less risk can be attained by 
including greater amounts of renewables (which typically have high fixed but low variable costs, 
such as wind).     
    However, the study by Berger et al. does not take account of external costs, likely biasing 
results somewhat in favor of fossil fuels (but see the qualification in section 3.4.2 below). Also, 
their return and risk estimates are derived using financial proxies. For example, fixed and variable 
costs of operation and management (O&M) are approximated by using historical business data 
such as the S&P 500 index, the Morgan Stanley MCSI Europe index, and treasury bills. Finally, 
the report does not publish results of commonly known statistical tests showing whether their 
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proxies do correlate with endogenous variables (using e.g. Shea’s partial r-squared test, or F-tests 
for excluded instruments), and whether they are orthogonal to disturbance terms (Sargan test). 
There is strong support in the econometric literature of the view that weak proxies result in 
unreliable estimates (Greene, 2003, ch. 5). As is true of the other studies, Berger et al. fail to 
consider correlations of unobserved shocks impinging on generation costs. 
    Summing up this review, using a more comprehensive set of technologies, more 
comprehensive cost data, and refined econometric methodology appears to be a promising 
approach to obtain improved efficient frontiers for electricity-generating energy portfolios.  
 
 
3.3 Portfolio theory 
    
   Rational holders of a portfolio of assets seek to maximize its expected return at a given level of 
risk or alternatively to minimize risk given a certain expected return. In the present context, the 
portfolio consists of generating technologies. Its expected return depends on the expected 
returns of the individual technologies, weighted by their share, with returns measured by the 
percentage change in kWh/U.S. cents of power generated. This definition is similar to that of 
Berger (2003) and Awerbuch and Berger (2003). 
    The expected return on a portfolio ( )pRE  consisting of m technologies is thus given by 
 
                        ( ) ( )∑
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,1         (1) 
 
where ( )iRE  is the expected return (percentage change of kWh/U.S. cents) of technology i and 
iw  is the share (weight) of technology i in the portfolio. For example, the 2003 portfolio for the 
United States consists of five electricity assets, viz. Coal, Nuclear, Gas, Oil, and Wind (as described 
in section 3.4.2 below). Therefore, 
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The volatility of the portfolio's expected return involves not only the respective variances but all 
the covariances as well. Therefore, one has for the standard error of portfolio returns pσ ,     
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where  ( ) 51,/cov ,, ,...,i,j    jijiji == σσρ , are correlation coefficients, and iσ , the standard error 
of technology i’s returns.  
The set of efficient portfolios is the solution of two equivalent problems,  
 
    ( ) ∑ ≤= ,1max σσ ,w s.t.  RE ipwi                                 (4) 
 
    ( )∑ ≥= .1min R  RE ,w s.t.  pipwi σ           (5) 
 
The first formulation says that the expected return of the portfolio is to be maximized subject to 
the constraint that volatility must not exceed a limit value σ . The second formulation says that 
volatility shall be minimized, without however having expected return fall below a limit value R . 
In both cases, the decision variables are the shares iw  assigned to the components of the 
portfolio, i.e. the generating technologies in the present context. As for Switzerland, the 2003 
portfolio contains four assets, viz. Nuclear, Storage hydro, Run of river, and Solar (see section 3.4.2 for 
details). Equations (2) and (3) are modified accordingly.  
    Figure 1 illustrates the case of two generating technologies (initially; later, a third will be 
added). The vertical axis displays the expected return ( )pRE , while the horizontal axis depicts 
risk as measured by the standard deviation pσ , defined in analogy to eqs. (2) and (3), respectively. 
For an investor, the positive segment of the vertical axis reflects the case where the costs of 
generation technologies are falling, causing expected returns to be positive. By assumption, let 
generating technology GT1 have increasing generation cost (e.g. Run or river in the case of 
Switzerland). By way of contrast, let GT2 be more risky but have positive expected returns 
because its cost tend to fall (e.g. Storage hydro). Due to the correlation terms contained in equation 
(3), the efficient frontier linking GT1 and GT2 (i.e. combining the two technologies) is not linear 
but part of an ellipse. Thus, if the correlation between two electricity generation technologies is 
less than perfect (– 1< ρ12 <1), the efficient frontier between GT1 and GT2 runs concave from 
below. The lower the correlation coefficient, the stronger this portfolio effect. However, the 
choice of the optimal among the efficient portfolios depends on the preferences of the investor. 
Figure 1 exhibits three types, extremely risk-averse (I), almost risk-neutral (II), and moderately 
risk-averse (III). Along an indifference curve, expected utility (EU) is held constant. The more 
the preference gradient points towards the ( )pRE  and away from the pσ  axis, the more marked 
is the investor’s risk aversion. Thus, for the intermediate type III, the solution C* is optimal. 
However, an actual portfolio given by point AP would be inefficient regardless of risk 
preferences, lying inside the efficient frontier. Note that if returns of GT1 and GT2 move in a 
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perfectly opposite way (ρ12 = –1), then a portfolio with no volatility at all can be constructed 
(Ingersoll, 1987, ch. 4). Such a portfolio always yields the same expected return, since whenever 
returns of GT2 are higher than expected, returns of GT1 are below expectation by an equal 
amount.   
 
Figure 1: Efficient portfolios of generation technologies (GT) 
 
 
    Now let there be a third technology (GT3). This creates additional opportunities for 
diversification, shifting the efficient frontier upward and inward. As before, knowledge of 
investors risk preferences would be necessary to predict their choices of portfolio. While this 
knowledge is lacking with regard to U.S. and Swiss utilities, two extreme solutions are worth 
pointing out. As can be gleaned from Figure 1, a very risk-averse investor (type I) is predicted to 
opt for the minimum variance (MV) portfolio. By way of contrast, an (almost) risk-neutral utility 
(type II) prefers the maximum expected return (MER) portfolio, usually implying a very different 
mix of generating technologies (see section 3.5.2 below). Comparing these two extreme solutions 
permits to assess the maximum influence of risk aversion on the optimal portfolio of power 
generation technologies.  
    Note that this approach does not revolve around single technologies, but an efficient mix of 
several technologies. Even if a particular technology appears dominant, less promising 
technologies (featuring low expected returns and/or high risk) may still contribute to the 
portfolio because of their diversification effect [see the impact of low or even negative 
correlation coefficients in eq. (3)].  
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3.4 Econometric analysis 
 
The objective of this section is to construct a correlation matrix of returns that purges the 
observations from singular shocks while retrieving as much information from the data as 
possible. To this end, observed unit cost changes will be related to a set of explanatory variables 
using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE). 
 
3.4.1 Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) 
    Expected rates of return pertaining to technologies [ ( )iRE  in eq. (1)] could in principle be 
estimated equation by equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, if there are 
unobserved common shocks impinging on technologies at the same time, the error terms ti ,ε  are 
correlated across equations. This constitutes information that can be used to obtain sharper 
estimates of the β  parameters in the following regression,  
 
     ,
1
,,,0, ∑
=
− +⋅+=
m
j
tijtijiiti RR εββ                    (6) 
 
where tiR ,  is the percentage change in generation cost (inverse of returns) of technology i in year 
t, 0iβ  is a constant for technology i indicating a positive drift, ji ,β  is the coefficient pertaining to 
the returns lagged k years, jtiR −,  is the dependent variable lagged k years, and ti ,ε  is the error 
term pertaining to technology i in year t. Where appropriate this autoregressive equation is 
augmented by a time trend ( tiTrend , ). 
   While this formulation suffices to insulate expected conditional values tiR ,ˆ  from extreme 
shocks (which would spill over into the estimated correlation matrix), SURE holds the promise 
of achieving this aim in a particular way, benefitting from the fact that the error terms are 
correlated across equations (see section 3.5.1.2 for empirical evidence). 
    In the present context, the SURE model consists of q regression equations (q being the 
number of electricity-generating technologies), each of which satisfies the assumptions of the 
standard regression model. Model (7) displays the set of equations that make up SURE of the 
U.S. portfolio for 2003 (coefficients are postmultiplied to prepare for the matrix notation 
introduced below), 
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    Generally, influences such as technological change, increases and decreases in the cost of 
inputs used in the production of the technology considered, and natural disasters are 
hypothesized to influence unit costs of electricity generation and hence returns. However, 
estimating such a comprehensive model is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the relative 
cost change of nuclear energy in the United States in the year 2003 e.g., 03,NuclR , is related to a 
constant ( 0n ), the cost change in the preceding year 02,NuclR , and a time trend ( tTrend ).  
In analogy, the cost change of nuclear energy in Switzerland in the year 2003, 03,NuclR , is related 
to a constant )0(n' , the cost changes in the preceding years 02,NuclR , 01,NuclR , 00,NuclR , and 99,NuclR , 
and a time trend )' tTrend( . The other equations relate to Run of river (Ror), Storage hydro (Sh), and 
Solar (Solar, which also includes other renewable energy sources such as waste),  
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    As for ti ,ε , the tht  element of iε , we assume that the ( )tqtt ,,2,1 ,...,, εεε  are iid, with ( ) 0, =tiE ε  
and ( ) jisjtiE ,,, σεε =  if st =  and = 0 if st ≠ . This is the SURE specification, admitting 
nonzero contemporaneous correlations between error terms. Written in matrix algebra, the 
system (7)3
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3 The equation system for Switzerland can be constructed in the same way but for brevity is not shown. 
 (7) 
(8) 
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where e.g.  
]1[ 98,99,00,01,02, tOilOilOilOilOilOil Trend  R R  R  R  R  X =  and  
][03, 5543210Oil o o o o o o oO =
/. 
 
All other variables are defined analogously. The regressor matrix on the right-hand side is block 
diagonal, indicating that e.g. the cost change in the nuclear technology of 2003 is only related to 
its own history but not to cost changes in the other technologies. These k equations (involving T 
observations each) can be presented as a system by using X as the symbol of the block diagonal 
matrix in system (9),  
 
  ( ) Ωee' e,XbR =+= E     .             (10) 
 
The assumption that is specific to SURE is that the covariance matrix of error terms is not 
diagonal,  
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The seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) model therefore allows to simultaneously estimate 
the expected returns of all power generation technologies in one regression, taking into account 
possible correlations of error terms across equations.  
 
 
3.4.2 The data 
The U.S. data set consists of five variables; Coal, Nuclear, Gas, Oil, and Wind power4, covering the 
years 1982 to 2003. All variables are annual cost changes in U.S. cents per kWh electricity (inverse 
of expected returns), deflated by CPI, with 2000 serving as the base year (=100)5. The Swiss data 
on Nuclear6 covers the years 1986 to 2003, those on Run of river7 and Storage hydro8
                                                 
4 Data for Coal, Nuclear, Gas and Oil were obtained from the UIC (2005). Wind (State Hawaii, USA (www.state.hi.us) 
and U.S. Department of Energy (www.energy.gov)). Since the Wind data was not available for every year, values for 
1983, 1985-1987, 1989-1994, 1996-1999 were generated by cubic spline interpolation (Knott, 2000).  
5 The mean value of the exchange rate for the year 2000 was used to convert Swiss cents into U.S. cents, as published 
by the U.S. Federal Reserve (http://research.stlouisfed.org). Deflation is appropriate because contrary to financial 
investors, utilities need to adopt a long planning horizon in view of the lags involved in the construction of new 
plants 
6 Data sources: KKL (2005), KKG (2005) 
7 Data source: personal correspondence 
 1993 to 2003, 
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and Solar9, 1991 to 2003. Only aggregated data were available, marking regional variations in 
generating costs. However, the data do represent more than 50 percent of national production 
capacity in both countries. Throughout, generation costs comprise (i) fuel costs, (ii) costs of 
current operations, and (iii) capital user cost10
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Data source: personal correspondence 
9 RWE (2005); The average exchange rate of 2000 was used to convert Euro cents into U.S. cents (source: U.S. 
Federal Reserve). RWE data from Germany is used as a proxy for Swiss solar electricity data, since solar generation 
technologies in both countries are similar. 
10 Capital user cost can be defined in several ways. The variant “linear depreciation and interest” is used here 
exclusively due to lack of source data, that would permit to calculate other variants. 
 (depreciation of book value plus interest). In the 
case of Nuclear, decommissioning and waste disposal are also included. An externality surcharge 
for environmental damage caused by power generation is added on top of each cost variable. 
These cost data are available for total production only, precluding a differentiation according to 
load segments, which seems to have been a problem with previous studies as well (Awerbuch 
2006, 2005, 2003). 
    From society's point of view, the price of a product should reflect external costs to the extent 
that the marginal benefit of internalization effort still covers its marginal cost. This means that 
full internalization almost always entails an efficiency loss because in that event, expected 
marginal benefit necessarily is zero, while the marginal cost of internalization effort is substantial 
(e.g., filtering out the last 0.1 percent of toxic substances contained in a body of water causes very 
high cost). No external cost data for the United States were available; therefore data from the 
United Kingdom were used (European Commission, 2003). They serve as a good proxy because 
the UK generation mix and structure of the electricity industry are similar to that of the United 
States. Externality surcharges for Switzerland are taken from Hirschberg (1999), who implicitly 
assumes 100 percent internalization when dividing estimated total external cost by total final 
energy produced by the technology considered. Swiss and UK external cost data are comparable, 
both being generated by the same methods. While external costs related to health and global 
warming do enter calculations, no data are available for some other categories such as external 
costs related to agriculture and forestry. In this paper, the upper bound of social cost estimates is 
adopted for both countries (Hirschberg, 1999; EC, 2003). 
    The results of these calculations are displayed in Table 1. As noted in the Introduction section, 
U.S. power generation is dominated by Coal (panel A). However, with externality surcharges 
included, Coal cost some 9 U.S. cents (busbar) in 2003, while Wind power was amongst the low-
cost sources. Three of the four Swiss generation technologies are comparable to those of the 
United States in terms of unit cost, being in the 2 to 4 U.S. cents/kWh (busbar) range in 2003 
(see panel B of Table 1). By way of contrast, Solar was several magnitudes more expensive both in 
1995 and 2003. 
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Table 1: Shares in generation (percent) and cost levels (U.S. cents/kWh, prices of 2000) 
 
Panel A: United States*)                     Panel B: Switzerland 
Technology Shares 1995 2003  Technology Shares 1995 2003 
 1995 2003     1995 2003   
Coal 57 56 11.44 8.99  Nuclear 39 40 4.97 3.47 
Nuclear 21 21 5.77 3.80  Storage hydro 27 32 2.59 1.91 
Gas 17 18 6.20 7.56  Run of river 32 24 5.69 4.04 
Oil 3 3 11.27 10.10  Solar 2 4 80.76 47.41 
Wind 2 2 5.44 4.35       
*) Excluding hydro (see section 3.4.3)                   Sources: SFOE (2004), IEA (2005) 
 
    However, note that cost levels are not relevant for investors in the capital market, who are not 
concerned about the price of a share. An expensive share that has the potential to still go up in 
the future can be part of an efficient portfolio. In full analogy, a utility, acting as an investor, 
would have wanted to buy into Swiss Solar in 1995 regardless of its initial unit cost because of the 
rapid decrease in the course of nine years. From an investor point of view, Swiss Solar should 
therefore figure prominently in an efficient portfolio unless it has extremely unfavorable 
diversification properties. 
    Utilities do adopt a current user view when deciding e.g. whether to buy more or less gas for 
fueling existing plant. However, when the choice of a technology is involved, the investor rather 
than the current user view is appropriate. Thus this paper seeks to answer the question, How 
should utilities (and policy makers) have started restructuring the electricity-generating portfolio 
in the 1980s (assuming they knew the cost changes occurring until 2003) in order to arrive at the 
MER or the MV portfolio by 2003, depending on their risk preferences?  
 
3.4.3 Current U.S. and Swiss generation portfolios 
    To establish the respective benchmarks, the actual electricity portfolios of the United States 
and Switzerland (as of 2003) are presented in this section. As shown by panel A of Table 1 again, 
the U.S. mix predominantly consists of fossil fuels (56 percent Coal, 21 percent Nuclear, 18 
percent Gas, and 3 percent Oil), with Nuclear accounting for another 21 percent of production. 
Wind is negligible. These shares are overestimates because no data was available for hydro power, 
which contributed an estimated 6 to 10 percent to total U.S. power generation between 1995 to 
2003. Nevertheless, more than 90 percent of U.S. capacity is covered in this analysis, going 
beyond earlier work that was limited to three technologies (Awerbuch, 2006; Humphreys and 
McClain, 1998). The actual (2003) Swiss portfolio relies heavily on hydro (32 percent Storage hydro, 
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24 percent Run of river); Nuclear accounts for 40 percent, Solar (a proxy of all renewable and 
conventional thermic technologies), for a mere 4 percent (panel B of Table 1). Here, the data 
cover more than 90 percent of capacity. 
 
 
3.5 Efficient frontiers for U.S. and Swiss power generation 
 
3.5.1 Time series analysis 
 
3.5.1.1 Preliminary testing 
 
   The objective is to obtain a stable estimate of the covariance matrix Ω  of equation (10). In 
order to be able to filter out the systematic (trend stable) component of Ω , changes in 
generation cost must form stationary time series. Given nonstationarity, the estimate of Ω  would 
shift over time, precluding the estimation of a reasonably stable efficient frontier [Wooldridge 
(2003), ch. 11].  
    To test for stationarity the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was applied. Results indicate 
at the one percent significance level that all cost changes in the U.S. and Swiss data sets are 
stationary. To determine the correct lag order for the SURE regressions, several tests were 
applied, viz. Akaike's information criterion (AIC), Hannan & Quinn’s information criterion 
(HQIC), Schwartz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and the likelihood ratio test (LR) (Al-
Subaihi, 2002; Liew, 2004). The results for the U.S. data suggest five lags for Oil, three lags for 
Gas, and one lag for Coal. One lag was used for Wind and Nuclear, based on considerations of 
goodness of fit in SURE (see Table 4). The results for the Swiss data suggest four lags for Nuclear, 
while in the case of Storage hydro and Run of river, one lag suffices (see appendix, Table A1). Tests 
are inconclusive for Solar.  
    However, Liew (2004) shows that lag selection tests may lack validity if the sample is small. 
Using a sample size of 25 he finds that the probability of correctly estimating the true order of an 
autoregressive process ranges between 58 percent (SBIC) and 60 percent (HQIC). In view of the 
inconclusive evidence and the fact that the coefficients on the autoregressive variables used in the 
SURE procedure are significant without exception, four lags were applied throughout in the case 
of Swiss for Solar.    
 
 
3.5.1.2 Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) results 
 
    Having established the specification of the different equations, the possible presence of 
correlations across equations can be tested for. Panel A of Table 2 does indicate some negative 
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correlations in the SURE residuals for the United States, with that between Wind and Coal 
attaining a value of -0.4246. Panel B of Table 2 tests whether OLS residuals would also have 
suggested SURE. While the estimated correlation coefficient for Wind and Coal would have been 
similar with –0.4062, correlation coefficients between Nuclear and Coal are less marked than their 
SURE counterparts. A striking difference can be seen in the case of Gas and Wind. The 
correlation in the SURE residuals is positive, while that between OLS residuals is negative.  
        
Table 2: Correlation matrices for the United States 
 
Panel A: Partial correlation coefficients for ti ,εˆ  residuals from system (9), (1982-2003) using SURE 
 Coal Nuclear Gas Oil Wind 
Coal  1     
Nuclear -0.1140  1    
Gas  0.7605  0.0113  1   
Oil -0.3317  0.4461 -0.2621  1  
Wind -0.4246 -0.2520  0.1150 -0.1492  1 
 
Panel B: Partial correlation coefficients for ti ,εˆ  residuals from equation (6), (1982-2003) using OLS 
 Coal Nuclear Gas Oil Wind 
Coal  1     
Nuclear -0.0329  1    
Gas  0.7050 -0.0004  1   
Oil -0.2835  0.3670 -0.1362  1  
Wind -0.4062 -0.1644 -0.2073  0.0998  1 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrices for Switzerland 
 
Panel A: Partial correlation coefficients for ti ,εˆ  residuals from system (9), (1986-2003) using SURE 
 Nuclear Storage hydro Run of river Solar 
Nuclear  1    
Storage hydro -0.4644  1   
Run of river -0.2685  0.5054  1  
Solar  0.5933  0.0367 -0.5907  1 
 
Panel B: Partial correlation coefficients for ti ,εˆ  residuals from equation (6), (1986-2003) using OLS 
 Nuclear Storage hydro Run of river Solar 
Nuclear  1    
Storage hydro  0.3111  1   
Run of river -0.0550  0.5066  1  
Solar  0.7201  0.2056 -0.3824  1 
 
    In the case of Switzerland (Table 3), the highest partial correlation coefficient between SURE 
residuals (Panel A) is obtained for Solar and Nuclear (0.5933), followed by Run of river and Storage 
hydro (0.5054). In the latter case, the common unobserved shock clearly is weather conditions, in 
particular the amount of precipitation. The pertinent correlation coefficient between OLS 
residuals (Panel B) is somewhat larger with 0.7201 for Solar and Nuclear and about the same for 
Run of river and Storage hydro with 0.5066.  
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Table 4: Results of SURE regressions, United States (1982-2003) 
 
R  St.D. 
 
 Const. 
 
   Rt-1 
 
   Rt-2 
 
   Rt-3 
 
   Rt-4 
 
   Rt-5  Trend Obs R2 
Coal 5.2   2.0 -0.09***   0.02          0.003*** 17 0.67 
Nuclear 5.8   1.8 -0.05*   0.38**          0.001 17 0.07 
Gas 3.9 11.7 -0.32***   0.10  -0.89***   0.12      0.018*** 17 0.67 
Oil 2.5 10.4 -1.05***  -0.96***  -1.35***  -1.17***  -1.21***  -0.622**  0.050*** 17 0.67 
Wind 5.4   6.9 -0.03   0.73***          0.001 17 0.51 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
 
The SURE and OLS regressions underlying these calculations are displayed in Tables 4 and 5 for 
the United States (for Switzerland, see appendix). The contrasts are sometimes striking. Notably, 
the SURE results of Table 4 (col. “Const.”) suggest a cost-increasing drift of 5 percent p.a.11
 
 in 
Nuclear, while according to the OLS estimate of Table 5, the hypothesis of no drift cannot be 
rejected. In the case of Wind, it is the other way round.  
 
Table 5: Results of OLS regressions, United States (1982-2003) 
R  St.D. 
 
 Const. 
 
   Rt-1 
 
   Rt-2 
 
   Rt-3 
 
   Rt-4 
 
   Rt-5  Trend Obs R2 
Coal   4.8   1.5 -0.06***   0.22***          0.002** 21 0.36 
Nuclear   4.8   2.3 -0.01   0.30         -0.002 21 0.21 
Gas   3.6 10.5 -0.26**   0.13  -0.78***   0.23      0.015** 19 0.69 
Oil   2.5   9.7 -0.91**  -0.85**  -1.21***  -0.94*  -1.10**  -0.43  0.043** 17 0.62 
Wind   4.1   2.6 -0.05**   0.21**          0.002 21 0.72 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
 
In the Swiss regressions (see appendix, Tables A1 and A2), Solar exhibits the expected downward 
cost shift in the SURE estimation, which would have not been recognized as significant in the 
OLS alternative. On the whole, the SURE results are quite satisfactory and are preferred since 
they use more information than their OLS counterparts, taking into account correlations in 
unobserved shocks.  
 
 
3.5.2 Construction of efficient electricity portfolios 
 
In this section, theory and data are combined for the construction of efficient portfolios of 
electricity-generating technologies, or efficient electricity portfolios for short. The theory for this 
                                                 
11 A positive value indicates a cost decrease, a negative value a cost increase (see Figure 1). 
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is given by equations (2) and (3). It calls for an estimate of expected returns )( iRE  for each 
technology i that potentially is part of the efficient portfolio, of its standard error iσ , and its 
covariances ijσ . Estimates of these quantities come from the SURE results shown in Table 4 (for 
the United States) and Table A1 in the appendix (for Switzerland). The expected rate of return of 
the efficient portfolio )( pRE  as well as the shares of the technologies entering that portfolio can 
be calculated for an arbitrary year t. In the following, only efficient frontiers for t = 2003 will be 
derived, defining the current efficient portfolios. 
 
3.5.2.1 Current (2003) efficient electricity portfolios for the United States 
 
    Figure 2 displays the efficiency frontier for the United States without any constraints. If 
utilities’ sole interest were to maximize expected return (thus maximizing the expected decrease 
of power generation costs), they would choose the MER (maximum expected return) portfolio, 
which contains Nuclear exclusively. If they wish to minimize risk, opting for the MV (minimum 
variance) portfolio, then a mix of 56 percent Nuclear and 44 percent Coal would be optimal.  
 
Figure 2: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United States 
(2003, SURE-based, no constraints) 
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Therefore, the degree of risk aversion characterizing U.S. utilities clearly matters. However, risk 
aversion has its price because opting for MV rather than MER would entail a cost reduction of 
5.5 rather than 5.76 percent p.a. Still, the MV portfolio with its annual volatility of 1.46 percent 
  AP2003 MER MV 
ER 5.00 5.76 5.50 
Risk 3.10 1.80 1.46 
        
Coal 56%   44% 
Nuclear 21% 100% 56% 
Gas 18%     
Oil 3%     
Wind 2%     
 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier 
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beats the actual one whose cost reduction is 5 percent only, associated with an annual volatility of 
3.10 percent.  
    Yet a share of Nuclear amounting to 100 rather than 21 percent in the MER portfolio (or 56 
rather than 21 percent in the MV portfolio) must be deemed unrealistic for the United States of 
2003. Therefore, Figure 3 shows an efficient frontier that takes into account that the current 
portfolio could be adjusted at considerable cost only. Since adjustment costs are unknown, upper 
limits are imposed on the individual shares for simplicity to reflect technical feasibility. For 
example, the share of Wind cannot exceed 5 percent by assumption (see insert below Figure 3).    
 
Figure 3: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United States 
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints) 
Standard Deviation (Risk)
Expected Return
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    In the MER_C (with “C” for constrained) portfolio, the generation mix now contains 60 
percent Coal, 25 percent Nuclear, 10 percent Gas, and 5 percent Wind, indicating that this last 
constraint is binding. Compared to the actual portfolio, the cost decrease would still speed up 
(from 5.00 percent p.a. to 5.20 percent p.a.), while volatility would be reduced from 3.10 to 2.32 
percent p.a.  
Constraints imposed:  
Coal ≤ 60%, Nuclear ≤ 25%, Oil ≤ 10%, Wind ≤ 5% 
  AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER 5.00 5.20 5.07 
Risk 3.10 2.32 2.03 
      
Coal 56% 60% 60% 
Nuclear 21% 25% 25% 
Gas 18% 10%  1% 
Oil 3%    9% 
Wind 2% 5%  5% 
 
 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier 
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    In the MV_C alternative, the highest share is again allocated to Coal (60 percent, binding 12
    If correlated shocks affecting generation costs would not have been taken into account (as in 
past studies), the results would have been very different, quite possibly misleading investors. 
Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix display the OLS-based frontiers for the United States. 
Without constraints (Figure A1), the MER portfolio would have contained 100 percent Coal
, up 
from 56 percent in the actual portfolio), followed by Nuclear (25 percent, binding, up from 21 
percent), Oil (9 percent, up from 3 percent), and Wind (5 percent, again binding, up from 2 
percent). The only technology to lose market share is Gas (a mere 1 percent, down from 18 
percent). The rate of cost reduction would still attain 5.07 percent p.a. rather than 5.00 as in the 
actual portfolio, while risk declines to 2.03 from 3.10. One explanation of why Gas is almost 
phased out is its weak diversification effect, the correlation of its SURE residuals with Coal 
attaining 0.7605, the maximum value of Table 2. Therefore, current U.S. power generation is 
inefficient from an investor point of view. It could be made more efficient by substituting Gas by 
Coal, Nuclear, Oil (not in the MER_C portfolio), and Wind. 
13
3.5.2.2 Current (2003) efficient electricity portfolios for Switzerland     
 
 
(rather than 100 percent Nuclear as in the SURE-based case, see Figure 2). The MV alternative, on 
the other hand, would have called for a portfolio with 63 percent Coal, 27 percent Nuclear, and 10 
percent Wind, quite different from the SURE-based solution that excludes Wind while allocating 
56 percent (rather than 27 percent) to Nuclear. Moreover, investors would have little incentive to 
adjust their technology mix because OLS-based expected returns are at least 0.5 percentage 
points lower and volatilities are only slightly below the SURE-based estimates, regardless of 
whether or not feasibility constraints are imposed. With constraints imposed, however, OLS-
based estimates would have resulted in efficient portfolios that practically coincide with the 
SURE-based ones (compare Figures A2 and 3). This was to be expected since most constraints 
are binding in both alternatives.  
 
    Figure 4 displays the efficient electricity portfolios again (as of 2003) for Switzerland. Here, it is 
Solar rather than Nuclear (as in the United States) that dominates the MER portfolio with a 100 
percent share. Opting for the MER portfolio, one would achieve a cost reduction of 6.67 percent 
p.a. (rather than the 2.00 percent p.a. cost increase with the actual portfolio), with volatility down 
from 10.00 to 1.05 percent p.a. The MV portfolio consists of 98 percent Solar and 2 percent 
Nuclear, expected return being 6.43 percent p.a. and risk, a mere 1.00. Clearly, in both countries 
                                                 
12  Using portfolio theory for three U.S. generating technologies, Berger et al. (2003) also concluded that Coal 
dominates the MV portfolio with a share of 77 percent. 
13 Berger et. al. (2003), who do not control for correlation between unobserved shocks, also arrive at 100 percent 
Coal. 
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non-CO2 emitting technologies (Nuclear in the United States and Solar in Switzerland) play a 
dominant role in the unconstrained efficient portfolios. 
However, shares of Solar close to 100 percent must be deemed unrealistic for Switzerland. 
Therefore, Storage hydro, Run of river, and Solar are constrained to their actual shares in 2003 (32, 24 
and 4 percent p.a., respectively, see insert below Figure 5), leaving only Nuclear unconstrained. 
This can be justified by noting that Storage hydro and Run of river are already being utilized to full 
capacity (Laufer et al., 2004), while a share of Solar electricity of 4 percent constitutes the limit of 
what could have been achieved. The corresponding efficient frontier is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for Switzerland 
(2003, SURE-based, no constraints) 
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The MER_C portfolio calls for a complete substitution of Run of river (actual share 24 percent) by 
Nuclear (64 percent), Storage hydro (32 percent, binding), and Solar (4 percent, binding). This 
surprising result is due to the fact that Run of river is highly correlated with Storage hydro, indicating 
that it has no diversification potential (see the correlation coefficient of 0.5054 in Table 3). At the 
same time, this technology has been subject to cost increases. 
    In all, Figure 5 suggests that if “realistic” constraints are respected, Swiss power generation 
could be made more efficient by allowing the share of Nuclear to substantially increase and 
abandoning Run of river. Generation cost would accelerate slightly, from 2.00 (actual) to 2.42 
percent p.a., regardless of choice between MER and MV portfolios, but volatility would drop 
from 10.00 (actual) to 8.89. 
  AP2003 MER MV 
ER -2.00 6.67 6.43 
Risk 10.00 1.05 1.00 
        
Nuclear 40%   2% 
Storage hydro 32%     
Run or river 24%     
Solar 4% 100% 98% 
 
 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier 
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    Results based on OLS-estimated efficient frontiers are displayed in the appendix (Figures A3 
and A4). Acting on OLS-based estimates, investors would have expected marked cost decreases 
rather than the cost increases implied by SURE, at the same time severely underestimating 
volatility. Finally, they would have wrongly slashed the share of Storage hydro from 32 percent to 0 
percent (MER_C) or 8 percent (MV_C), respectively. Therefore, the choice of statistical 
specification may again well matter for decision-making by utilities. 
 
Figure 5: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for Switzerland 
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints) 
Standard Deviation (Risk)
Expected Return
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3.5.2.3 United States and Switzerland compared     
 
    This section is devoted to a comparison of results obtained for the two countries as of the year 
2003, using SURE-based estimates. Starting with no constraints imposed (Figures 2 and 4), the 
United States could have achieved an average cost reduction of 5.76 p.a. by adopting the MER 
portfolio, Switzerland even 6.67 percent p.a. However, both countries would have had to 
completely change the composition of their portfolios, to 100 percent Nuclear (United States) and 
100 percent Solar (Switzerland), respectively. Turning to the MV alternative, the volatility 
reduction achieved amounts to 1.54 percentage points (3.10 – 1.46) for the United States, much 
less than for Switzerland with its 9 percentage points (10.00 – 1.00). The implications in terms of 
portfolio composition are quite different for the two countries as well. Whereas opting for the 
  AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER -2.00 -2.42 -2.42 
Risk 10.00 8.89 8.89 
        
Nuclear 40% 64% 64% 
Storage hydro 32% 32% 32% 
Run or river 24%     
Solar 4% 4% 4% 
 
 
 
Constraints imposed:  
Storage hydro ≤ 32%, Run of river ≤ 24%, Solar ≤ 4% 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier,  
Single Point 
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MV alternative calls for 56 percent (rather than 100 percent) Nuclear in the case of the United 
States, it would leave Solar at almost 100 percent in the case of Switzerland.  
    Since shares close to 100 percent are far from reality in either country, constraints on 
admissible shares of technologies were imposed in Figures 3 and 5. This causes the existing 
amount of diversification to diminish in both countries, with Coal (United States) and Nuclear 
(Switzerland) becoming the principal energy sources. However, only the Swiss expected rate of 
return drops (from a 6.67 percent cost reduction to a 2.42 percent p.a. cost increase), associated 
with a marked surge in volatility.       
    On the whole, it appears that the U.S. electricity industry, while respecting feasibility 
constraints, would have gained by substituting Gas by Coal, Nuclear, and Wind technologies by 
2003, regardless of the choice between the MER_C and the MV_ C portfolio. Swiss utilities 
would have stood to gain as well by adopting more Nuclear to the detriment of Run of river, an 
important source of primary energy until recently. Divergences of U.S. and Swiss investor’s actual 
choices and efficient choices arose in past since generating technologies have been selected solely 
on an individual, case-per-case basis, failing to consider their contribution to overall portfolio 
performance.  
    Both industries at present fall short of their respective efficiency frontiers. In the United 
States, the gap amounts to a foregone 0.07 to 0.20 percentage points reduction of cost and 0.78 
to 1.07 points volatility reduction (see Figure 3). In Switzerland, the estimates amount  to a 
foregone 0.42 percentage points p.a. of cost and 1.11 points reduction of risk (see Figure 5). 
Therefore, there is some evidence suggesting that the more heavily regulated (Swiss) industry is 
characterized by a higher degree of inefficiency in the allocation of generating technologies than 
its largely deregulated U.S. counterpart.   
 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
    The objective of this contribution was to apply portfolio theory to determine the current 
(2003) efficient frontiers for power generation in the United States (traditionally fossil-based) and 
Switzerland (traditionally hydro- and nuclear-based). The observation period covers 1982 to 2003 
(United States) and 1986 to 2003 (Switzerland), respectively. Because the error terms proved to 
be correlated across equations, Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) was adopted 
for estimating the covariance matrix used in determining efficient portfolios.  
    Interestingly, the maximum expected return (MER) portfolios of both countries boil down to 
one non-CO2 energy source (Nuclear in the United States and Solar in Switzerland). When 
constraints limiting changes from the status quo are imposed to reflect the high cost associated 
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with adjusting the technology mix, the MER_C portfolio for the United States contains 60 
percent Coal (up from 56 percent) and for Switzerland, 64 percent Nuclear (up from 40 percent). 
    However, one could argue that for populations as risk-averse as the American and the Swiss 
(Szpiro, 1986), the minimum variance portfolio (MV) is appropriate. Adopting the MV criterion 
and imposing the same constraints, U.S. utilities would still want to assign 60 percent of their 
portfolio to Coal, almost entirely replacing Gas. The unit cost changes and hence returns of Gas 
are not only highly volatile but also strongly correlated with that of other technologies, depriving 
it of a possible diversification effect. At the same time, Coal-generated electricity became cleaner, 
causing (initially high) external costs to fall and making Coal very attractive from an investor point 
of view. In the Swiss MV_C portfolio, Nuclear accounts for even 64 percent while Run of river 
drops out (down from 24 percent). One is therefore led to conclude that both the current U.S. 
and Swiss technology mixes are inefficient even if “realistic” constraints are respected. While U.S. 
utilities are currently closer to their efficiency frontier than their more heavily regulated Swiss 
counterparts, they still may reap efficiency gains by investing more in Coal and moving away from 
Gas.  
    In contrast, efficiency frontiers estimated by OLS would tend to underestimate both expected 
returns and risk reduction potential in the case of the United States but overestimate achievable 
expected returns and underestimating risk reduction in the case of Switzerland. These 
discrepancies largely vanish, however, when feasibility constraints are imposed. Still, failure to 
account for correlation between unobserved shocks impinging on the different generation 
technologies using SURE does run the risk of opting for an inefficient solution. This finding 
contrasts with Berger et al. (2003), who concluded that the outcome of portfolio analysis is 
insensitive to econometric estimation techniques. However, the present study agrees with earlier 
ones in suggesting that utilities and policy makers, by adopting a single-technology approach, fail 
to take account of correlations between risky generating technologies. The consequence is a 
portfolio of generating technologies that is inefficient, achieving a too low expected rate of return 
and/or suffering from excessive volatility. 
    These statements are based on an investor view. To the extent that utilities are able to change 
their technology mix at low cost, the user view may be justified, emphasizing cost levels rather 
than cost changes over time. Future contributions therefore may compare the two views. They 
could also emphasize prediction rather than postdiction, examining whether emergent new 
technologies are part of future efficient frontiers. Finally, the strong assumption of a once-and-
for-all decision regarding the choice of technology needs to be relaxed. A real options approach 
could be used to account for the irreversibility often inherent in the decision to adopt a 
technology. Deferring adoption may become the preferred choice in the face of stochastic cost 
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changes caused e.g. by a liberalization of energy markets – or its failure to materialize as expected. 
Still, the present study provides first indications of where to go in the future in an attempt to 
reach the efficient mix of power-generating technologies in countries that are as diverse as e.g. 
the United States and Switzerland.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Results of SURE regressions, Switzerland (1986-2003) 
 
R  St.D. 
 
 Const. 
 
   Rt-1 
 
   Rt-2 
 
   Rt-3 
 
   Rt-4 
 
 Trend Obs R2 
Nuclear  3.6 12.9  0.04  -0.74***  -0.93***  -1.22***  -1.37***  -0.18*** 9 0.74 
Run of river  4.1 18.6  0.33  -0.70***        -0.20 9 0.51 
Storage hydro  1.2 12.0  0.25  -0.72***        -0.02 9 0.22 
Solar -6.7   1.0 -0.34***  -0.73***  -0.56**  -0.61*  -0.55**   0.01*** 9 0.63 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
 
 
Table A2: Results of OLS regressions, Switzerland (1986-2003) 
 
  R  St.D. 
 
 Const. 
 
  Rt-1 
 
   Rt-2 
 
    Rt-3 
 
   Rt-4 
 
 Trend Obs R2 
Nuclear -4.3 2.2 -0.10*  -0.03  -0.29  -0.14  -0.38*   0.001 14 0.38 
Run of river  1.6 1.6  0.11  -0.64**        -0.01 10 0.44 
Storage hydro  0.8 9.1  0.20  -0.54        -0.01 10 0.35 
Solar -6.7 1.0 -0.32  -0.69  -0.60  -0.58  -0.40   0.01 9 0.64 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
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Figure A1: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United States 
(2003, OLS-based, no constraints) 
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Figure A2: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United States 
(2003, OLS-based, with constraints) 
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  AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER 5.00 4.63 4.55 
Risk 3.10 1.91 1.70 
      
Coal 56% 60% 60% 
Nuclear 21% 25% 25% 
Gas 18% 10%  2% 
Oil 3%    8% 
Wind 2%  5%  5% 
 
 
Constraints imposed:  
Coal ≤ 60%, Nuclear ≤ 25%, Oil ≤ 10%, Wind ≤ 5% 
  AP2003 MER MV 
ER 4.50 4.80 4.72 
Risk 2.40 1.50 1.35 
        
Coal 56% 100% 63% 
Nuclear 21%   27% 
Gas 18%     
Oil 3%     
Wind 2%   10% 
 
 
(Cost decrease) 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier 
Efficient Frontier 
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Figure A3: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for Switzerland 
(2003, OLS-based, no constraint) 
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Figure A4: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for Switzerland 
(2003, OLS-based, with constraints) 
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  AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER 1.00 4.41 3.98 
Risk 6.00 2.12 1.95 
        
Nuclear 40% 96% 88% 
Storage hydro 32%   8% 
Run or river 24%     
Solar 4% 4% 4% 
 
 
Constraints imposed:  
Storage hydro ≤ 32%, Run of river ≤ 24%, Solar ≤ 4% 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier 
  AP2003 MER MV 
ER 1.00 6.67 6.67 
Risk 6.00 1.00 1.00 
        
Nuclear 40%   
Storage hydro 32%    
Run or river 24%     
Solar 4% 100% 100% 
 
 
Efficient Frontier 
(Cost decrease) 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Impact of Liberalization on the Scope of 
Efficiency Improvement in Electricity-
Generating Portfolios for the United States and 
Switzerland  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This study applies Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory to calculate efficient electricity- 
generating frontiers for the United States and Switzerland. Along the efficient electricity frontier, 
the expected return of a generating portfolio is maximized for a given amount of volatility or 
alternatively, the portfolio risk is minimized for a given expected return. The gap between the 
actual portfolio (AP) and the efficient frontier indicates the scope of efficiency improvement of 
the generating technology portfolio. Two perspectives are considered, an investor view (where 
expected return is defined as (the inverse of) cost changes, viz. percentage change of kWh/USD) 
and a current user view (where expected return is (inversely) defined as kWh/USD in levels). A 
comparison of the gaps between AP and efficiency frontier may show whether U.S. deregulation 
paid off in terms of more expected return or less risk, or both. The main benefit of deregulation 
is to increase competition and choice. Before the U.S. electricity markets were liberalized more 
than a decade ago, consumers were forced to buy electricity from local utilities while utilities had 
no control over pricing. By way of contrast, Switzerland has just recently started to give large 
users (in excess of 100,000 kWh/year) the free choice of provider. However, electricity markets 
will not be fully liberalized until 2014.  
    Mean-variance portfolio analysis has been applied to real asset portfolios in energy, among 
others, by Bar-Lev and Katz (1976), Adegbulugbe et al. (1989), Humphreys and McClain (1998), 
Awerbuch (2000), Awerbuch and Berger (2003), Awerbuch et al. (2004), Berger et al. (2003), Yu 
(2003), and Krey and Zweifel (2009). Yet, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the investor and 
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the current user view were never juxtaposed and the gaps between the APs and the efficiency 
never related to regulation in a cross-country comparison. 
This study is structured as follows, section 4.2 provides some background information on the 
electricity markets of the United States and Switzerland, section 4.3 presents the methodology, 
while section 4.4 presents the efficiency frontiers for the United States and Switzerland. 
Conclusions are offered in section 4.5.  
 
 
4.2 Background information  
 
4.2.1 United States 
 
In 2003 the United States generated approximately 4000 TWh electricity for its 290 million 
inhabitants by using (i) Coal, (ii) Nuclear, (iii) Gas, (iv) Oil, and (v) Wind technologies (due to data 
limitations, hydro power is not considered in this study, which contributed an estimated 9 
percent to the U.S. electricity generation mix).  
 
               Table 1: Actual portfolio technology shares of the United States and Switzerland1 
 
Panel A: United States                       Panel B: Switzerland 
Technology Share in percent  Technology Share in percent 
 1985 
(Before liberalization) 
2003   1985 2003 
(No liberalization) 
Coal 64 56  Nuclear 39 40 
Nuclear 18 21  Storage hydro 34 32 
Gas 13.5 18  Run of river 25 24 
Oil 4.49 3  Solar 2 4 
Wind <0.01 2     
  
Between the 1990s and early 2000, deregulation swept through 24 states2 affecting more than 180 
million consumers. Most states did exceptionally well after deregulation, most notably Michigan, 
Ohio, and Texas3, where average retail electricity prices fell below the U.S. average of 6.7 U.S. 
cents per kilowatt-hour4
                                                 
1 Sources: SFOE (2004); IEA (2005) 
2  These are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Washington D.C. 
3 California went into a crisis in 2001, when blackouts and the insolvency of PG&E, the major public utility, shocked 
the U.S. market. Insufficient capacity investments and bad contracting during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were 
responsible for the crisis (Borenstein/Bushnell (2000), pp. 47-48). 
4 Borenstein/Bushnell (2000), p. 47. 
. Compared to 1985 (prior to deregulation), the electricity-generating 
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portfolio of 2003 shows an increase in the shares of Nuclear, Gas, and Wind technologies at the 
expense of Coal and Oil (see Table 1, Panel A).     
                        
4.2.2 Switzerland 
 
Switzerland is a federal state consisting of 26 cantons, inhabited by about 7.5 million citizens. In 
2003, Switzerland generated 65 TWh electricity, using (i) Nuclear, (ii) Run of river, (iii) Storage hydro, 
and (iv) Solar (which in this study comprises all renewables plus conventional thermic power 
plants and other sources). Neither industry nor households had a choice of provider. Generation, 
transmission, and distribution were highly regulated. Since January 2008, large users (in excess of 
100,000 kWh/year) have the right to choose their electricity supplier. This is the first of many 
steps designed to deregulate the Swiss electricity market, which is planned to be fully liberalized 
by 2014, subject to a public referendum however. As can be seen in Table 1 (Panel B), the 
technology mix has been very stable over the last few decades, comprising between 39 to 40 
percent Nuclear and 56 to 59 percent hydro power (Run of river and Storage hydro combined).  
 
 
4.3 Methodology  
 
4.3.1 Portfolio theory 
 
Holders of a portfolio of assets seek to minimize risk given its expected return or alternatively 
maximize its expected return at a given level of risk. In the present context, the portfolio consists 
of electricity-generating technologies. Its expected return depends on the expected returns of the 
individual technologies, weighted by their shares. The risk of the portfolio depends on the 
covariance or correlation matrix of the individual returns.  
The expected return of a portfolio ( )pRE  consisting of s risky assets is given by 
 
            ( ) ( )∑
=
=
s
i
iip REwRE
1
,    with ,1=∑
s
i
iw         (1) 
 
where ( )iRE  is the expected return of technology i and iw  is the share (weight) of technology i 
in the portfolio. For example, a portfolio comprising three generating technologies would have 
 
                                    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )332211 REwREwREwRE p ++= ,                                  (2) 
 
with 
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i wwww .                                               (3) 
 
The volatility of the portfolio's expected return involves both the respective variances and 
covariances of the individual returns. The standard deviation )( pσ  is a common measure of risk. 
For a portfolio containing s  technologies, it is given by  
 
                                              ∑ ∑
= ≠
+=
s
i ji
jiijjiiip www
1
22 2 σσρσσ ,         (4)
  
where iσ  and jσ  are individual standard deviations of the returns of technology i and 
technology j, and ( ) 31,/cov ,...,i,j    jiijij == σσρ , are correlation coefficients. Using the same 
three technology example as before, the portfolio standard deviation can be computed from 
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The set of efficient portfolios is the solution of two equivalent problems,  
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σ           (7) 
 
Equation (6) says that the expected return of the portfolio is to be maximized subject to the 
constraint that volatility must not exceed a limit value σ . Equation (7) says that volatility shall be 
minimized, whereas expected return cannot fall below a limit value R . In this study, the decision 
variables in both equations are the shares iw  that are assigned to the generation technologies of 
the portfolio.    
    Portfolio theory determines an efficient frontier containing a continuum of positive solutions. 
The optimal solution depends on whether the investor or the current user view is adopted and on 
the degree of risk aversion.  
    In Figure 1, the horizontal axis depicts portfolio risk as measured by the standard deviation 
)( pσ , while the vertical axis displays expected return )( pµ . The investor view is presented first. 
In that case, the vertical axis describes the percentage change of expected returns (measured in 
kWh/USD; the more positive, the larger the expected return).  
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Figure 1: Efficient portfolios of electricity generation technologies (GT) 
 
 
To illustrate, let there be only two power electricity generation technologies, GT1 and GT2. By 
assumption, GT1 has little volatility in terms of change in expected returns; on the other hand, 
the expected change in expected return is small (e.g. Coal in the United States). By way of 
contrast, GT2 is more risky, but on expectation has higher return (e.g. Wind in the United States). 
Due to the correlation terms contained in eqs. (4) and (5), the efficient frontier linking GT1 and 
GT2 (i.e. combining the two technologies) is not linear but a segment of an ellipse. Thus, if the 
correlation between two electricity generation technologies is less than perfect )11( 12 ≤≤− ρ , the 
efficient frontier between GT1 and GT2 runs concave from below. The lower the correlation 
coefficient, the stronger this portfolio effect 5
If returns of GT1 and GT2 move in a perfectly opposite way (i.e. 
. This means that by adding GT2 with its high 
volatility but increasing expected return to the portfolio, the investor will profit from a 
diversification effect.    
12
ρ = –1), then a portfolio with 
no volatility at all can be constructed6
    If a third technology (GT3) enters the portfolio, additional opportunities for diversification 
arise. However, to predict the optimal portfolio (to be selected among the efficient ones), 
knowledge of the investor’s preferences would be necessary. This will not be the topic of this 
study per se; nevertheless, Figure 1 is complemented by the graphic representation of preferences 
. Such a portfolio always yields the same expected return, 
since whenever returns of GT2 are higher than expected, returns of GT1 are below expectation 
by an equal amount.  
                                                 
5 Awerbuch (2006) argues that portfolio effects become more pronounced once correlation coefficients are below 
0.6. 
6 Ingersoll (1987), chp. 4 
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using indifference curves, along which expected utility (EU) rather than utility is held constant 
since the presence of risk makes it impossible to attain a fixed level of utility. 
    Risk-averse investors like a higher expected return but dislike volatility. This means that the 
peak of an imagined hill of subjective valuation is way out on the vertical axis (implying a positive 
rate of return, but no volatility). Accordingly, the arrow symbolizing the direction of the peak (the 
so-called preference gradient) points northwest. Evidently, the optimum allocation of assets is 
given by the highest-valued indifference curve that is still compatible (i.e. tangent) with the 
efficient frontier. For the frontier composed of GT1 and GT2, this optimum is depicted by the 
tangency point C*. If GT3 is indeed available, C** becomes the new optimum, with a higher 
increase of the value of the portfolio and at the same time less volatility. Clearly, C** lies on a 
higher-valued indifference curve than C*, demonstrating the contribution to welfare that can be 
expected from the availability of additional energy technologies thanks to improved 
diversification. 
    Now the current user view is adopted, which characterizes decision-makers with a short-term 
planning horizon, arguably regulators and regulated utilities. In this case, the vertical axis 
describes expected returns in levels of kWh/USD (the higher the value, the larger the expected 
return). By assumption, GT1 (e.g. Solar generated power in Switzerland) has a low expected 
return but also a low volatility of expected return. By way of contrast, GT2 has much higher 
expected return but is more risky (e.g. Run of river in Switzerland). As before, a correlation 
between the two generation technologies that is less than perfect makes the efficient frontier run 
concave, resulting in a diversification effect7. In a study assessing the efficient electricity portfolio 
for Scotland, Awerbuch8 showed that by adding Wind generation to the existing technology mix, 
a much lower standard deviation of the portfolio (with returns defined in kWh/USD) can be 
attained. This is because Scottish Wind generation costs (the inverse of returns) do not correlate 
with fossil fuel-intensive technologies, causing it to have a diversification effect9
    In the following, focus will be on two extreme solutions, the minimum variance (MV) 
portfolio and the maximum expected return (MER) portfolio. The MV portfolio, which coincides 
with GT3 in Figure 1, is preferred by strongly risk-averse decision makers. The MER alternative, 
which coincides with GT2 in the example, is the option for (almost) risk-neutral types. These two 
portfolios permit to narrow down the efficient choices of both investors and current users. The 
gap between the actual portfolio AP and these two efficient portfolios indicates the scope of 
efficiency improvement. It also reflects foregone efficiency gains, which are to be related to the 
. 
                                                 
7 Awerbuch/Berger (2003) 
8 Awerbuch (2006) 
9 Awerbuch (2006) also refers to Brealey/Myers (1994), who illustrate that by adding riskless government bonds 
yielding as little as 3 percent to a stock portfolio yielding 8 percent serves to raise the expected return at any level of 
risk.     
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state of liberalization. Specifically, a liberalized electricity market is predicted to be closer to the 
efficiency frontier (smaller gap) than a regulated one, since regulation tend to consider a single 
generation technology at a time, rather than an efficient portfolio mix.  
 
4.3.2 Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) 
 
To derive time-invariant estimates of the covariance matrix (i.e. of iσ  and ijσ ) predicted values 
of each time series of electricity-generating returns without a systematic shift are estimated by 
 
        tititi uRR ,,, ˆˆ −=  .                (8) 
 
As has been shown in detail by Krey and Zweifel10 tiu , shocks in the error term  causing volatility 
in the dependent variable tiR ,  are correlated across technologies for both investors and current 
users. Therefore, the SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation) method is used to 
improve the efficiency of estimation, resulting in sharper estimates of the parameters and 
residuals, and hence of the iσ  and ijσ  making up the covariance matrix of returns. 
    The set of equations making up SURE in the three technology example read 
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where ttt RRR ,3,2,1 ,,  are the returns for technologies i=1,2,3 in year t. ocb ,, 00α  are their 
respective constants, jjj cb ,3,2,1 ,,α  are the coefficients of returns lagged j years, 
jtjtjt RRR −−− ,3,2,1 ,,  are the dependent explanatory variables lagged j years, and ttt uuu ,3,2,1 ,,  are 
the error terms.  
    The crucial assumption of SURE is that the covariance matrix of residuals Ω  is not diagonal,  
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10 Krey/Zweifel (2006) 
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Taking into account the possible correlation of error terms across equations, SURE  
simultaneously estimates the expected returns of all electricity-generating technologies in one set 
of regressions.  
 
4.3.3 Data 
 
U.S. and Swiss data on generating technology costs (the inverse of expected returns) comprise 
fuel costs, costs of current operations, capital user costs and an externality surcharge for 
environmental damage11.  The U.S. data set covers five technologies, Coal, Nuclear, Gas, Oil and 
Wind power for the years 1981 to 2003. The Swiss data set consists of four variables, Nuclear for 
the years 1985 to 2003, Run of river and Storage hydro for 1993 to 2003, and Solar, covering the years 
1991 to 2003. All variables are annual costs in changes (levels, respectively) in U.S. cents12 per 
kWh electricity (inverse of expected returns), deflated by the CPI, with 2000 serving as the base 
year. Only annual aggregated data are available, representing more than 50 percent of capacity in 
both countries. Actual portfolios relate to the observed technology shares as of 2003 (see section 
4.2), obtained from the International Energy Agency (IEA)13 and the Swiss Federal Office of 
Energy (SFOE)14
4.4 Efficient U.S. and Swiss electricity-generating frontiers  
 
. Figures 2 and 4 show the AP2003 for the United States, Figures 3 and 5, that 
for Switzerland. For example, in 2003 Coal was the most prominent U.S. technology, with a share 
of 56 percent;  in Switzerland, it was Nuclear with 40 percent.    
 
 
4.4.1 Efficiency frontier for the United States: Investor view 
 
    Figure 2 displays the feasible efficiency frontier for the United States adopting an investor 
view. To reflect technical feasibility 15
                                                 
11 External cost data for the United States were approximated by data from the United Kingdom, which has a similar 
generation mix and structure (European Commission, (2003)).  
12 A conversion factor of USD 1 = CHF 1.65 was used (2003) 
13 IEA (2005);  IEA (2006) 
14 SFOE (2004) 
15 Over the course of two decades and less, radical changes in the share of any single technology must be deemed 
unrealistic in view of the costs of adjustment implied.  
, upper limits are imposed on technology shares. For 
example, the share of Coal cannot exceed 60 percent by assumption (see insert below Figure 2). 
The MER_C (with “C” for constrained) portfolio contains Coal (60 percent, binding, up from 56 
percent in the actual portfolio), Nuclear (25 percent, binding, up from 21 percent), Gas (10 
percent, down from 18 percent), and Wind (5 percent, binding, up from 2 percent). Compared to 
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the actual portfolio (AP 2003), the cost decrease would speed up (from 5.00 percent p.a. to 5.20 
percent p.a.), while volatility would decline from 3.10 to 2.32 percent p.a.  
    
Figure 2: Efficiency frontier for the United States 
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints, investor view) 
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In the MV_C alternative, the highest share is allocated to Coal16
4.4.2 Efficiency frontier for Switzerland: Investor view    
 
 (60 percent, binding), followed 
by Nuclear (25 percent, binding), Oil (9 percent, up from 3 percent), and Wind (5 percent, again 
binding). The only technology to lose market share is Gas (to a mere 1 percent, down from 18 
percent). The rate of cost reduction would still attain 5.07 percent p.a. rather than 5.00 as in the 
actual portfolio, while risk declines to 2.03 from 3.10. Therefore, two important conclusions can 
be drawn. First, current U.S. power generation is inefficient from an investor point of view. 
Second, it could be made more efficient by substituting Gas by Coal, Nuclear, Oil (not in the 
MER_C portfolio), and Wind. 
 
    Figure 3 shows the efficient MER_C and MV_C electricity portfolios adopting an investor 
view for Switzerland. This time, Storage hydro, Run of river, and Solar are constrained to their actual 
shares in 2003 (32, 24, and 4 percent p.a., respectively, see insert below Figure 3), leaving only 
                                                 
16  Using portfolio theory for three U.S. generating technologies, Berger et al. (2003) also concluded that Coal 
dominates the MV portfolio taking a share of 77 percent. 
Constraints imposed:  
Coal ≤ 60%, Nuclear ≤ 25%, Oil ≤ 10%, Wind ≤ 5% 
  AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER 5.00 5.20 5.07 
Risk 3.10 2.32 2.03 
      
Coal 56% 60% 60% 
Nuclear 21% 25% 25% 
Gas 18% 10%  1% 
Oil 3%    9% 
Wind 2% 5%  5% 
 
 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier 
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Nuclear unconstrained. This can be justified because Storage hydro and Run of river are already 
utilized to full capacity 17
Standard Deviation (Risk)
Expected Return
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, while a share of Solar electricity (a proxy for all renewables plus 
conventional thermic power plants and other sources) of 4 percent constitutes the limit of what 
could have been achieved.  
    Because the feasible efficient frontier shrinks to a single point, both MER_C and MV_C 
portfolios call for a complete substitution of Run of river (actual share 24 percent) by Nuclear (64 
percent, up from 40 percent), Storage hydro (32 percent, binding), and Solar (4 percent, binding). 
Run of river has been subject to cost increases, which, combined with its poor diversification  
effect due to high correlations with other technologies, makes it an unattractive choice for an 
investor. 
    In all, Figure 3 suggests that even if “realistic” constraints are respected, Swiss electricity 
generation could be made more efficient (thus the 2003 mix is inefficient) by allowing the share 
of Nuclear to substantially increase while abandoning Run of river. Returns would fall at a slightly 
higher rate, from -2.00 (actual) to -2.42 percent p.a., regardless of choice between MER_C and 
MV_C portfolios, but  volatility would drop from 10.00 (actual) to 8.89. 
 
Figure 3: Efficiency frontier for Switzerland 
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints, investor view) 
 
 
    
 
                                                 
17 Laufer/Grötzinger/Peter/Schmutz (2004)  
  AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER -2.00 -2.42 -2.42 
Risk 10.00 8.89 8.89 
        
Nuclear 40% 64% 64% 
Storage hydro 32% 32% 32% 
Run or river 24%     
Solar 4% 4% 4% 
 
 
 
Constraints imposed:  
Storage hydro ≤ 32%, Run of river ≤ 24%, Solar ≤ 4% 
(Cost decrease) 
Efficient Frontier,  
Single Point 
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4.4.3 United States and Switzerland compared: Investor view     
 
    According to the feasible efficient portfolios, Coal in the United States and Nuclear in 
Switzerland are the principal sources for electricity generation. It appears that the U.S. electricity 
industry, while respecting feasibility constraints, would have gained by substituting Gas by Coal, 
Nuclear, and Wind technologies by 2003, regardless of the choice between the MER_C and the 
MV_ C portfolio. Swiss utilities would have stood to gain as well by adopting more Nuclear to the 
detriment of Run of river, an important source of primary energy until recently. 
    Therefore, both industries at present fall short of their respective efficiency frontiers. In the 
United States, the gap amounts to a foregone 0.07 to 0.20 percentage points p.a. of cost and 0.78 
to 1.07 points volatility reduction (see Figure 2). In Switzerland, the estimates amount to a 
foregone 1.11 points reduction of risk (see Figure 3), which is larger than in the United States 
(between 0.78 and 1.07). However, the reduction in risk comes at the cost of a loss in expected 
return of 0.42 percentage points (in the United States, unit cost USD/kWh is falling and hence 
kWh/USD increasing). Therefore, a risk-averse U.S. investor would have gained by adopting the 
MV_C portfolio, a Swiss investor, possibly so. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that the scope 
of reducing risk in the more heavily regulated Swiss industry is bigger than in its largely 
deregulated U.S. counterpart.   
 
4.4.4 Efficiency frontier for the United States: Current user view  
 
For a current user of a technology, it is the return of a portfolio defined in kWh/USD that 
matters, and not its relative change (see section 4.3). Therefore, Figure 4 below displays the 
efficiency frontier for the United States in terms of levels. As before, constraints reflecting 
technical feasibility are imposed (see insert below Figure 4). The estimated MER_C mix contains 
Gas (70 percent, up from 18 percent), Nuclear (25 percent, binding, up from 21 percent), and 
Wind (5 percent, binding, up from 2 percent), leading to a large increase in expected return to 
13.47 kWh/USD (rather than 10.53 in the AP2003) but also to higher risk (3.42 vs 3.13 
kWh/USD). The MV_C portfolio on the other hand calls for Coal (60 percent, binding, up from 
56 percent), Gas (30 percent) and Oil (10 percent, binding, up from 3 percent). This time, return 
falls from the AP2003 (10.53 kWh/USD) to 9.29. Risk is also reduced, from 3.42 to 2.26 
kWh/USD. As can also be gleaned from Figure 4, the reduction in risk comes at the expense of a 
lower expected return. 
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Figure 4: Efficiency frontier for the United States  
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints, current user view) 
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4.4.5 Efficiency frontier for Switzerland: Current user view 
 
Figure 5 displays the set of efficient power-generation portfolios for Switzerland defined in terms 
of kWh/USD. The same feasibility restrictions are imposed on the technology shares as in 
section 4.4.2 above.  
    Absent risk aversion, the MER_C portfolio would be preferred, containing Nuclear (44 percent, 
up from 40 percent), Storage hydro (32 percent, binding), and Run of river (24 percent, binding). 
Expected return is 27.82, compared to 24.78 kWh/USD in AP2003, while risk increases slightly 
from 3.28 to 3.72. The MV_C portfolio coincides with AP2003, with 40 percent Nuclear, 32 
percent Storage hydro, 24 percent Run of river, and 4 percent Solar. Interestingly, it exhibits slightly 
more risk than AP2003 (3.54 as compared to 3.28 kWh/USD), which is due to the use of 
stabilized correlations in this particular instance. However, it has 2.3 percentage points more 
expected return (27.07 vs. 24.78), making it an attractive choice.  
 
 
 
  
Constraints imposed:  
Coal ≤ 60%, Nuclear ≤ 25%, Oil ≤ 10%, Wind ≤ 5% 
 AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER 10.53 13.47 9.29 
Risk  3.13 3.42 2.26 
    
Coal 56%  60% 
Nuclear 21% 25%  
Gas 18% 70% 30% 
Oil 3%  10% 
Wind 2% 5%  
    
 
MV_C 
MER_C 
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Figure 5: Efficiency frontier for Switzerland  
(2003, SURE-based, with constraints, current user view) 
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4.4.6 United States and Switzerland compared: Current user view    
  
    As before (investor view, see section 4.4.3) Coal takes the largest share in the U.S. MV_C 
portfolio. The big change is in the current user MER_C portfolio where now Gas dominates, 
while Coal is phased out. By way of contrast, Nuclear remains the principal source for Swiss 
electricity generation in both MER_C and MV_C portfolios. Once more, both countries fall 
short of their respective efficiency frontier. The United States faces a gap amounting to a 
foregone expected return increase of 2.94 kWh/USD in the MER_C portfolio and a foregone 
risk reduction of -0.87 in the MV_C mix (see Figure 4). In Switzerland, the estimates amount to a 
foregone expected return increase of 3.04 kWh/USD in the MER_C portfolio (0.10 kWh/USD 
more than in the United States). However, the larger increase in expected return comes at the 
price of an increase in risk in both MER_C and MV_C portfolios (see Figure 5). Risk-neutral 
current users would gain by adopting the MER_C portfolio in the United States. In Switzerland, 
they again stand to gain even more. This differential confirms the hypothesis that liberalization 
serves to enhance efficiency since Swiss electricity markets continue to be heavily regulated. 
However, this confirmation is incomplete because it is in the United States rather than 
Switzerland that risk-averse current users would benefit from adopting a feasible MV_C 
portfolio.  
Constraints imposed:  
Run of river ≤ 24%, Storage hydro ≤ 32%, Solar ≤ 4% 
MV_C 
MER_C 
 AP2003 MER_C MV_C 
ER 24.78 27.82 27.07 
Risk  3.28 3.72 3.54 
    
Nuclear 40% 44% 40% 
Storage hydro 32% 32% 32% 
Run of river 24% 24% 24% 
Solar 4%  4% 
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4.5 Conclusions  
 
This paper employed Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory to determine efficiency frontiers 
for electricity-generating technologies in the United States and Switzerland. Two perspectives 
were adopted. According to the investor view, expected returns are defined as changes in 
kWh/USD, while according to the current user view, they are defined as kWh/USD in levels. The 
observation period covers the years 1981 to 2003 (United States) and 1985 to 2003 (Switzerland).  
    The Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) method was used to estimate a 
reasonably time-invariant covariance matrix. Since shocks in generation costs per kWh (the 
inverse of returns) are correlated, SURE serves to filter out the systematic components of the 
covariance matrix. Results suggest that the actual portfolios of generating technologies of the 
United States and Switzerland are off their respective efficiency frontiers. Both countries (but in 
particular Switzerland) could do better by rearranging their current portfolios.  
    Adopting the investor view, the United States are best advised to use more Coal and Nuclear. 
However, changes since 1985 have been in the right direction, likely fostered by early 
liberalization of electricity markets. As can be gleaned from Table 1 (Panel A), the share of 
Nuclear increased from 18 percent in 1985 to 21 percent in 2003, whereas the efficient value for 
risk-averse investors is 25 percent (see MV_C portfolio in Figure 2). In addition, the share of 
Wind increased from less than 0.01 percent in 1985 to about 2 percent in 2003 (the efficient value 
is 5 percent). However, the share of Gas did grow from 13.5 to 18 percent by 2003 while a mere 
1 percent would be regarded efficient in this study. The observed value is much more in line with 
the current user view, which would prescribe 30 or even 70 percent (see Figure 4). 
    This should be contrasted with the Swiss experience. The share of Nuclear remained very stable 
between 39 to 40 percent between 1985 and 2003 (see Table 1, Panel B), whereas from an 
investor point of view (regardless of risk aversion, see Figure 3) it should be 64 percent. Like- 
wise, the share of Run of river stayed between 24 and 25 percent whereas efficiency would have 
called for a phase-out. This continuity looks only efficient if the static current user view 
combined with tight feasibility constraints is adopted (see Figure 5). Of course, it is precisely this 
view that is typically compatible with regulation. The evidence therefore tends to support the 
hypothesis that U.S. producers and consumers of electricity benefited from liberalization, while 
their Swiss counterparts have to wait for a few more years to reap its benefits.   
    Future research may try to analyze more generating technologies, also taking into account 
imports of electricity, which can be considered as an additional component of the efficient 
technology portfolio. It would also be interesting to include more countries, among them a fully 
liberalized one, such as the United Kingdom.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Scope of Electricity Efficiency Improvement in 
Switzerland until 2035  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In this study, Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory is applied to determine which electricity-
generating technologies in Switzerland should be part of an efficient portfolio in 2035 in terms of 
maximizing expected return for any given level of risk or minimizing risk for any given level of 
expected return. By adopting a user view (“return” defined as kWh/CHF in levels), efficient 
technology mixes in 2035 are compared with the actual portfolio as of 2000 (AP2000) 1
    Switzerland is expected to experience an electricity supply shortage between 20-40 percent by 
2020, assuming a demand increase of 15-30 percent over 2000 (Gantner et al. 2000). As the 
government wishes to avoid an increased dependence on power imports, the options left are to 
generate more Nuclear electricity, introduce Gas-fired or new renewable technologies (such as 
Solar, Smallhydro, Wind, Biomass, and Biogas), or some mix of all these options. In fact, electricity 
suppliers such as Axpo and BKW but also organizations such as Avenir Suisse (an independent 
think tank for economic and social issues) in Switzerland are in favor of introducing new Nuclear 
power stations (see Meister, 2008), while Gas generated electricity (which has not been in use in
. The gap 
between the two indicates the scope for efficiency improvement in terms of increasing expected 
return and/or reducing risk. In contrast, the European Union Energy Efficiency Action Plan 
(EEAP), which has been adopted in March 2007, uses a different efficiency improvement 
measure, viz. the maximum energy output for each unit of energy input. This approach, however, 
does not take any account of fluctuations in generation returns (risk), which arise due to volatile 
fuel costs and technological change. Therefore the adoption of a Markowitz mean-variance 
approach offers some additional insights. 
                                                 
1 Some contributions in this field of research adopt an investor view following the lead of Humphreys and McClain 
(1998). An investor is concerned about changes in value over time, viz. the percentage increase of expected return. 
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Switzerland so far) also enjoys some support. Other technologies, that are expected to contribute 
to the 2035 electricity mix, but which hold shares of less than 1 percent in the 2000 electricity 
mix, are Smallhydro, Wind, Biomass, Incineration, and Biogas.   
    In this study, efficient portfolios such as the maximum expected return (MER), same variance 
(SV), same expected return (SER), and minimum variance (MV) are also evaluated in terms of 
supply security, using Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices. In addition, to select 
the best efficient portfolio amongst the four choices the Sharpe ratio is calculated, which 
measures return-to-risk ratios. Several future scenarios are considered, placing some emphasis on 
what seems politically and geologically feasible. Finally, SURE-based portfolios will be compared 
with portfolios that were calculated with OLS.      
    Results indicate that the feasible minimum variance (MV) portfolio displays the highest return-
to-risk ratio, and should therefore be preferred over all other efficient portfolios. Risk-averse 
users are thus best advised to adopt a future (MV) portfolio mix containing 9 percent Nuclear, 20 
percent Run of river, 13 percent Storage hydro, 5 percent Solar, 28 percent Gas, and 5 percent each of 
Smallhydro, Wind, Biomass, Incineration, and Biogas. In addition, OLS-based econometric model 
specifications generate different expected return and risk values for the actual portfolio (AP2000) 
than the SURE-based procedure. This indicates that the adoption of the right model specification 
is important.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents literature dealing with multiple generating 
technology portfolios and introduces key concepts of Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory. 
This is followed by section 5.3 that describes the econometric methodologies applied to time 
series of generation returns. The data is presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 displays the main 
results and considers two measures of supply security, viz. Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-
Hirschman indices. Conclusions are offered in section 5.6.  
 
 
5.2 Measuring multiple electricity-generating technology 
portfolios 
 
An increasing number of studies have been published in the field of multi technology electricity-
generating portfolios over the last few years. These studies can be broadly separated in three 
groups, stochastic optimization, maximum diversity portfolios and a much wider branch of 
literature dealing with Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory. This section presents two 
studies in the field of stochastic optimization and maximum diversity portfolios. Section 5.2.1 
explains the concept of Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory in more detail.  
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    Roques et al. (2006) use stochastic optimization to model dynamic power investment choices 
in the U.K. They use long-run stochastic trends in electricity, gas, and carbon prices based on 
current projections, where expected parameters are based on historical data and British and U.S. 
forecasts. Random trajectories for the electricity, gas, and carbon prices were drawn from a series 
of Monte Carlo simulations. Stochastic optimization was then used to estimate the option value 
to the generating company of keeping open the choice between nuclear and gas technologies. 
Roques et al. conclude, that for the higher discount rates (10 percent real) that could be expected 
for most private new nuclear plant constructions, nuclear option value represents 9 percent of 
the expected net present value cost of a nuclear plant investment when there is no correlation 
between electricity, gas, and carbon prices, but that this value falls sharply with increasing 
correlation between these prices. The nuclear option value is close to zero for the correlations 
observed in the U.K. in early 2000. According to Roques et al. (2006) these results imply that 
there is little value to electricity-generating companies in retaining the nuclear option in risky 
European electricity markets with the consequent high discount rates, given strong correlations 
between electricity, gas and carbon prices. Amongst others, Hlouskova et al. (2002) argue that 
stochastic optimization is very demanding in terms of computing with Roques et al. looking at 
only a 5-plant portfolio. 
    One way to overcome the computational limitations of stochastic optimization is to measure 
the best mix of electricity-generating technologies using so-called maximum-diversity portfolios 
as outlined by Stirling (1998). These portfolios take account of several performance criteria, 
disparity attributes, interactions, and constraints, where specific attributes such as political 
popularity are subjectively determined by the modeller. Performance criteria and disparity 
attributes are measured in ordinal categories (low, medium and high) which are again based on 
subjective opinions. In an application to the U.K. Stirling presents a maximum-diversity portfolio 
that suggests a mix containing a large share of gas, followed by coal and nuclear power. While the 
model appeals in terms of its complexity but ease of calculation, it clearly lacks in terms of 
objectivity. For example, Stirling claims that gas generated electricity in the U.K. is of high 
popularity to users, however, current market developments clearly speak against this view. In fact, 
sky-rocketing gas prices in the U.K. (an increase of more than 500 percent between January 2002 
to January 2008, see Energy & Metals Consensus for Forecasts, 2008) underline the concern that 
the popularity of specific electricity generation technologies is subject to ongoing changes1
                                                 
1Note, for example, that nuclear power after facing wide opposition for decades starts to enjoy an increasing 
popularity in Switzerland, which can be partly explained by increasing concerns about climate change, high fossil fuel 
and energy costs.  
.    
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This paper therefore argues in favor of using Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory, since it 
remedies all of the above-stated limitations, viz. it is straightforward to compute, takes account of 
all expected major generating technologies as of 2035, and covers the entire country’s generation 
capacity using forecasted data. 
     
 
5.2.1 Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory     
    Mean-variance portfolio analysis, an established part of modern finance theory, is based on the 
pioneering work of Markowitz (1952), Varian (1993) and Fabozzi et al. (2002). In addition to its 
widespread use for financial portfolio optimization, mean-variance portfolio analysis has been 
applied to valuing offshore oil leases [Helfat (1988)], real asset portfolios in electricity generation 
[among others, Bar-Lev and Katz (1976), Adegbulugbe et al. (1989), Humphreys and McClain 
(1998), Awerbuch (2000), Awerbuch and Berger (2003), Berger (2003), Yu (2003), Awerbuch et 
al. (2004), Wenk and Madlener (2007), and Krey and Zweifel (2009)], and quantifying climate 
change mitigation risks [Springer (2003)]. This section outlines in more detail the theory of 
Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory, and explains its use in this contribution.  
    In this study, mean-variance portfolio theory is used to locate efficient portfolios of electricity-
generating technologies similar to Awerbuch et al. (2004). Risk is defined as the year-to-year 
variability (standard deviation) of expected return (kWh/CHF). Along the efficiency frontier, 
which will be explained in more detail in section 5.2.2, a Pareto improvement is not possible, 
since higher expected returns cannot be obtained without increasing the risk level, or, less risk 
cannot be generated without a reduction in expected returns. Efficient generating portfolios are 
thus defined by a twin property: they maximize expected return for any given level of risk or 
minimize expected risk for every level of expected return.  
    The following discussion of portfolio theory is based on a two-asset portfolio, presented in the 
context of portfolio return, viz. the inverse of generation costs. 
    Expected portfolio return E(Rp) is the weighted average return of the generation mix 
components. For a two-technology generating mix, expected return is the weighted average of 
the individual expected returns of two technologies: 
 
                                Expected portfolio return: ( ) ( ) )( 2211 REXREXRE p ⋅+⋅= ,                  (1) 
 
where X1 and X2 are the shares2
                                                 
2 here, X1+X2=1. 
 of the two technologies in the mix and E(R1) and E(R2) are their 
expected electricity-generating returns.  
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    Portfolio risk, σp, is also a weighted average of the return variances of individual technologies: 
 
                             Portfolio risk: 211221
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1 2 σσρσσσ XXXXp ++= ,                             (2) 
 
where X1 and X2 are the shares of the two technologies in the mix, 1σ  and 2σ  are the standard 
deviations of the expected return of the annual costs of technologies 1 and 2, and 12ρ  is the 
correlation coefficient of technologies 1 and 2.  
    Correlation affects the degree of diversification and hence the portfolio’s overall risk. As can 
be seen in equation (3), if the correlation 12ρ  of the two technology example is zero, then 
expected total portfolio risk will always be lower than the same portfolio with identical 
technology shares and returns but with a positive correlation coefficient (see eq. 2). Obviously, 
once the correlation turns negative, risk can even be further reduced. In fact, if the correlation is  
-1, both technologies are perfectly negatively correlated, which implies that in a two technology 
portfolio where both technologies take the same shares, risk is completely diversified.   
 
                                      Portfolio risk: 22
2
2
2
1
2
1 σσσ XXp += ,  if 012 =ρ .                             (3) 
 
    To estimate the expected portfolio return and risk one therefore needs the individual expected 
returns E(Ri), the individual standard deviations iσ , the correlation coefficients between two 
technologies ijρ , and finally the technology shares Xi of each individual technology in use. The 
individual expected returns and standard deviations on their own are not sufficient to determine 
their shares in the efficient portfolio. Therefore, technologies with low returns (viz. technologies 
with high costs3
5.2.2 Efficiency frontier 
) can be part of an efficient mix if they diversify well.  
 
Figure 1 displays the theory as outlined in section 5.2.1, graphically (using data points based on 
the results presented in section 5.5). Expected return and risk of each generating technology are 
indicated by dots. For example, Biogas has a low expected return and low risk compared to 
Nuclear, which has a high expected return and high risk. Mean-variance portfolio theory is used to 
calculate the electricity-generating technology mix that is efficient. To do this all individual 
returns, standard deviations and their respective correlations between each technologies are taken 
into account (see eq. 1 and 2 for a two technologies example). There are infinite numbers of 
efficient portfolios, making up the efficiency frontier. Figure 1 displays a feasible efficiency 
frontier, feasible in the sense that no single technology can be the sole contributor to an efficient 
                                                 
3 Generation costs are the inverse of returns 
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portfolio due to pre-defined constraints. It seems unrealistic from a technological, political, and 
supply security view to assume that one single technology is the sole contributor of electricity in 
Switzerland. Thus, Nuclear and Biogas are not part of the feasible efficiency frontier, although they 
generate the highest expected return or lowest risk, respectively, on a stand alone basis.  
    This study focuses on four efficient portfolios in particular, the maximum expected return 
(MER) portfolio, the same variance (SV) portfolio, the same expected return (SER) portfolio, and 
the minimum variance (MV) portfolio. These four efficient portfolios are chosen, because the 
risk preference of the Swiss population is unknown. As can be seen by the indifference curves, 
risk-neutral users opt for the MER portfolio, while risk-averse users would prefer the MV 
portfolio. In fact, there are an infinite amount of efficient portfolios located along the efficiency 
curve, but to simplify the analysis only MER, SV, SER, and MV portfolios are considered.  
    The MER portfolio in 2035 contains only those technologies that maximize expected return, 
while risk is relatively high. Note that the efficient MER mix in Figure 1 generates considerably 
more expected return than the AP2000, however, this comes with relatively more risk. The SV 
portfolio in 2035 holds the technology mix that leads to the same risk as in 2000, but with more 
expected return (the gap between Exp. Return 0 and Exp. Return 1 on the vertical axis shows 
how much expected return can be gained by switching from the actual portfolio in 2000 to the 
efficient portfolio while holding the level of risk constant). The SER portfolio in 2035 generates 
the same expected return as in 2000, but with less risk (here the gap between Risk 0 and Risk 1 
on the horizontal axis measures how much risk can be reduced if one switches from the actual 
generation mix to the efficient one while keeping expected returns constant).     
 
           Figure 1: Efficiency Frontier for Switzerland 
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For a country like Switzerland, where inhabitants are widely regarded as being risk-averse (Szpiro, 
1986), the MV mix might be of greatest interest. The MV portfolio contains those technologies 
that minimize the standard deviation of the expected return (risk). Along an indifference curve, 
expected utility (EU) is held constant. The more the preference gradient points towards the 
expected return and away from the risk axis, the more marked is the user’s risk aversion. 
Therefore, a risk-averse user would prefer the MV portfolio (EUI), while a risk-neutral user 
would opt for the MER portfolio (EUII). 
 
5.2.3 Measures of return-to-risk 
The Sharpe ratio (SR) is a measure of return-to-risk and can be used as an additional criterion to 
choose the best portfolio mix, viz. the one with the highest return-to-risk ratio. In this study, the 
SR is used to determine the best efficient portfolio within specific scenarios (see section 5.5.2). 
The ratio is defined as 
 
                      ppERSR σ/= ,                                                        (4) 
 
where pER  is the expected return of the efficient portfolio (eq. 1) while pσ  represents the 
volatility (measured as standard deviation of the expected return) of the efficient portfolio (eq. 2). 
A higher value of the Sharpe ratio (SR) is preferred over a lower one.  
     
 
5.3 Econometric analysis 
 
One important criterion to calculate efficient portfolios is the estimation of a stable 
variance/covariance matrix. If this is not the case the measure of risk, which is a main 
component to calculate efficient portfolios, will be erroneous. OLS and SURE specifications 
have been tried in this study, however, only the latter appears suitable to estimate the expected 
returns and standard deviations for the future portfolios for 2035 and the actual portfolio in 2000 
(AP2000). First, a simple OLS specification was used. Consider equation 5, where generation 
costs tiY ,  are explained by a constant 0,iβ , autoregressive dependent variables jtiY −, , a time 
trend iTrend  and the disturbance term tiu ,     
 
               tii
m
j
jijtiiti uTrendYY ,
1
,,0,, +++= ∑
=
− ββ .                                (5) 
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Shocks tiu ,  causing volatility in tiY ,  are correlated across technologies. As a consequence the 
error variance/covariance matrix of the generation technologies is not orthogonal, which leads to 
biased estimation results of risk 2σ  (Wooldridge, 2003, p. 335).  
    SURE therefore appears to be superior to OLS because it takes account of error spillovers 
across equations.  
 
 5.3.1 Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE)  
The SURE approach provides estimates of the covariance matrix that are time-invariant. In each 
time series of electricity generation returns this calls for the estimation of predicted values 
 
                                                                tititi uRR ,,, ˆˆ −= ,                                 (6) 
 
that do not contain a systematic shift. However, such values cannot be calculated from eq. 5, 
since shocks in tiu ,  causing volatility in tiR , are correlated across technologies. As found by Krey 
and Zweifel (2006), if error terms are correlated, SURE offers a method to improve the efficiency 
of the estimation. The set of equations making up SURE in a four technology example, such as 
the actual portfolio for the year 2000, reads 
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  ,                               (7) 
 
where tR ,1  to tR ,4  are the returns for technologies i=1,2,3,4 in year t. 0a  to 0d  are their 
respective constants, ja ,1  to jd ,4  are the coefficients of returns lagged j years,  R jt −,1 to jtR −,4  are 
the dependent explanatory variables lagged  j  years, and tu ,1  to tu ,4  are the error terms.  
    The crucial assumption that is specific to SURE is the non-diagonality assumption in the 
covariance matrix (see eq. 8), since it simultaneously estimates expected returns for all power 
generating technologies. This approach typically generates results that offer reliable estimates of 
the parameter ji ,β , residuals tiu , , and hence of the iσ  and ji ,σ  (covariance matrix).  
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5.3.2 Measures of supply security 
Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices are calculated to evaluate the degree of 
diversification that is predicted by the efficient power generating portfolios. These indices shed 
light on the question whether the future supply of the efficient power generating portfolio mix as 
of 2035 is secure. In addition, Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices show the 
trade-off between efficiency and security of supply that might arise. A system that relies on only a 
few technologies is exposed to collusion and monopoly. One measure of diversity is entropy, and 
can be calculated by the Shannon-Wiener Index 
 
                                                           ∑
=
−=
m
i
ii ppSW
1
)ln( ,           (9) 
 
where ip  is the share of technology i in the efficient power generation portfolio. The weights of 
all technologies in the portfolio are considered (i=1,…,m). If the index exceeds the value of 1.00 
the system is assumed to be well diversified and the risk of collusion or monopoly is low.   
    Alternatively, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index can be calculated. It is an alternative measure of 
security of supply and looks at the degree of concentration, in formal terms 
 
             ∑
=
=
m
i
iPHH
1
2 ,           (10) 
 
where iP  is the share (in percent) of technology i in the efficient portfolio (i=1,…,m). No 
concentration, and thus security of supply is assumed if the values of HH<1800 basis points 
(bps) (Grubb et al., 2005).  
 
 
5.4 The data 
 
This study uses observed and predicted annual generation cost data4
                                                 
4 To obtain annual data, cubic spline interpolation was applied where necessary (Ingersoll, 1987). 
, covering the periods 1991 
to 2000 (to calculate the AP2000) and 2005 to 2035 (to estimate all future portfolios). Data were 
mainly obtained from Hirschberg (1999, 2005) and Oettli (2004) and relate to the returns of 
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Nuclear5, Run of river6, Storage hydro7, Solar power8, which were used to estimate the AP2000 and the 
future efficiency frontier, and Gas9, Biogas, Biomass, Incineration, Smallhydro and Wind as additional 
technologies for the future 10
    The data set for the period 2005 to 2035 was computed by Infras and is based on several 
assumptions, such as a constant population of 7.4 million people in Switzerland, economic 
growth of 1.5 – 2 percent per annum, a convergence of Swiss wages with the European average 
by 2025, and a real interest for capital costs of 2.5 percent (see Oettli et al., 2004). Generation 
costs, the inverse of expected returns, are predicted by using different scenarios
 efficiency frontier estimation. All observations of electricity 
generation returns (kWh/CHF) are measured in levels (user view). Throughout, expected returns 
(the inverse of generation costs) comprise (i) fuel costs, (ii) costs of current operations, and (iii) 
capital user costs including depreciation. In the case of Nuclear, estimated decommissioning and 
waste disposal costs are also included. Externality surcharges are included since electricity 
generation causes hazards and environmental damage. Generation cost data for the period 1991 
to 2000 is based on observed costs, and covers about 80 percent of all Nuclear power, and more 
than 60 percent of hydro power (Run of river and Storage hydro) capacities in Switzerland.  
11
5.5 Portfolio estimation and discussion 
 
 to estimate cost 
components such as fuel and fixed costs (including capital user costs). If different scenarios led to 
different cost predications, the higher priced generation cost components were chosen 
(conservative approach). Concerns may be raised about the predicted real interest rate for capital, 
since minor variations lead to great fluctuations in generation costs. The data set takes account of 
learning curve effects thus new-renewable technologies such as Smallhydro and Wind generate 
increasingly more expected return over time.  
    External costs are included and relate to health and global warming, which were obtained from 
Hirschberg and Jakob (1999). However, no data are available for some other categories, such as 
costs related to agriculture, forestry, and emission trading.    
 
 
This section presents the econometric results and predicted efficient electricity portfolios for 
Switzerland in 2035. For brevity, only the econometric results for the future portfolios are shown. 
                                                 
5 Data sources: KKL (2005), KKG (2005), Hirschberg (2005, ch. 7) and Hirschberg and Jakob (1999, pp. 2-19). 
6 Data sources: personal correspondence, Hirschberg et al. (2005, ch. 4) and Hirschberg and Jakob (1999, pp. 2-19). 
7 Data sources: personal correspondence, Hirschberg et al.(2005, ch. 4) and Hirschberg and Jakob (1999, pp. 2-19). 
8 RWE Schott Solar (2005); The average exchange rate of 2000 was used to convert Euro into CHF (source: SNB). 
RWE Schott solar data from Germany is used as a proxy for Swiss solar electricity, since solar generation 
technologies are similar. 
9 At present Switzerland does not generate electricity with gas. 
10 By Infras, see Oettli et al. (2004). 
11 Scenarios looked at different degrees of electricity demand and electricity generation. 
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Correlation tables and regression results of the AP2000 estimation are presented in the appendix. 
The analysis compares the risk-return properties of the de facto 2000 generation mix to a set of 
efficient portfolios in 2035 using different scenarios. First, the discussion focuses on those 
portfolios that used correlations and a stable variance/covariance matrix estimated by SURE. 
Later, some results are compared with generated portfolios using correlations, expected returns 
and risk estimates obtained from OLS to see whether different model specifications lead to 
different efficient portfolio returns and risks and therefore generating technology shares. 
 
5.5.1 Preliminary testing and SURE results 
 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test confirms at the one percent significance level that all 
time series of returns are stationary (for both, the future and actual portfolio estimations). The 
correct lag order for the SURE regressions were obtained by using the following tests: Akaike’s 
information criterion, Hannan & Quinn’s information criterion, Schwarz’s Bayesian information 
criterion and the likelihood ratio test (for details see Al-Sabaihi, 2002 and Liew, 2004). Table 3 
further below displays the chosen lag orders for each technology in the future portfolio, Table A3 
in the appendix shows the equivalent for the actual portfolio in 2000.   
As mentioned before, SURE increases the efficiency of estimation by accounting for 
correlations in unobserved shocks. Table 1 provides evidence that supports this notion, which 
displays partial correlation coefficients that relate to returns (kWh/CHF).  
 
Table 1: Partial correlation coefficients (2005 – 2035) 
 
Technology Nuclear ROR Hydro Sto. Solar Gas 
Nuclear 1.0000 -0.9165 0.1614 0.9628 -0.9463 
Run of river -0.9165 1.0000 -0.4685 -0.9820 0.9636 
Storage hydro 0.1614 -0.4685 1.0000 0.3847 -0.3794 
Solar 0.9628 -0.9820 0.3847 1.0000 -0.9752 
Gas -0.9463 0.9636 -0.3794 -0.9752 1.0000 
Smallhydro 0.8673 -0.9931 0.5620 0.9593 -0.9411 
Wind 0.8668 -0.9930 0.5626 0.9590 -0.9408 
Biomass 0.9675 -0.9872 0.3684 0.9970 -0.9772 
Incineration 0.7199 -0.9345 0.6740 0.8620 -0.8416 
Biogas 0.8597 -0.9915 0.5662 0.9559 -0.9374 
 
Technology Smallhydro Wind Biomass Incin Biogas 
Nuclear 0.8673 0.8668 0.9675 0.7199 0.8597 
Run of river -0.9931 -0.9930 -0.9872 -0.9345 -0.9915 
Storage hydro 0.5620 0.5626 0.3684 0.6740 0.5662 
Solar 0.9593 0.9590 0.9970 0.8620 0.9559 
Gas -0.9411 -0.9408 -0.9772 -0.8416 -0.9374 
Smallhydro 1.0000 0.9999 0.9641 0.9664 0.9995 
Wind 0.9999 1.0000 0.9638 0.9666 0.9995 
Biomass 0.9641 0.9638 1.0000 0.8691 0.9603 
Incineration 0.9664 0.9666 0.8691 1.0000 0.9713 
Biogas 0.9995 0.9995 0.9603 0.9713 1.0000 
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The coefficients indicate strong correlations. For example, Incineration and Nuclear exhibit a 
correlation of 0.7199. A very strong and negative correlation can be seen between Run of river and 
Biogas (-0.9915). Here, a one percent increase in returns for Run of river is matched by an almost 
identical drop in Biogas. Both technologies therefore diversify very well. A comparison of the 
same technologies for the time periods 1991-2000 (appendix, Table A1) and 2005-2035 (Table 1) 
reveals that Nuclear continues to diversify well with Run of river (in both time periods the 
coefficient stays negative). A strong negative correlation between these technologies seems 
intuitive, since a reduction in Run of river generated electricity (for example during a heat period) 
will be compensated by an increase in Nuclear generated power (Nuclear does not run on full 
capacity, and therefore has the ability to increase production capacity during times of electricity 
shortages). According to the forecasted data, this effect is expected to increase more than twice 
as much from -0.4945 for the time period 1991-2000 to -0.9165 between 2005-2035.  
    Table 2 contains the correlations of tiu , , i.e. the residuals of eq. (7), which represent the 
components due to unobserved shocks. Correlation coefficients remain high, with no changes in 
signs. For instance, the correlation across the equations of Incineration and Nuclear is 0.7578. 
Partial correlations for the period 1991-2000 clearly differ (appendix, Table A2), here none of the 
coefficients are negative, and all exceed 0.95.  
 
Table 2: Partial correlation coefficients for tiu ,  residuals from eq. (7) (2005 – 2035) 
 
Technology Nuclear ROR Hydro Sto. Solar Gas 
Nuclear 1.0000 -0.9398 0.0123 0.9690 -0.9589 
Run of river -0.9398 1.0000 -0.2844 -0.9848 0.9834 
Storage hydro 0.0123 -0.2844 1.0000 0.2171 -0.2376 
Solar 0.9690 -0.9848 0.2171 1.0000 -0.9854 
Gas -0.9589 0.9834 -0.2376 -0.9854 1.0000 
Smallhydro 0.8915 -0.9914 0.4017 0.9622 -0.9644 
Wind 0.8912 -0.9913 0.4024 0.9620 -0.9642 
Biomass 0.9784 -0.9891 0.1883 0.9962 -0.9886 
Incineration 0.7578 -0.9326 0.5666 0.8746 -0.8785 
Biogas 0.8907 -0.9914 0.4016 0.9639 -0.9649 
 
Technology Smallhydro Wind Biomass Incin Biogas 
Nuclear 0.8915 0.8912 0.9784 0.7578 0.8907 
Run of river -0.9914 -0.9913 -0.9891 -0.9326 -0.9914 
Storage hydro 0.4017 0.4024 0.1883 0.5666 0.4016 
Solar 0.9622 0.9620 0.9962 0.8746 0.9639 
Gas -0.9644 -0.9642 -0.9886 -0.8785 -0.9649 
Smallhydro 1.0000 0.9990 0.9645 0.9704 0.9996 
Wind 0.9990 1.0000 0.9643 0.9706 0.9996 
Biomass 0.9645 0.9643 1.0000 0.8736 0.9647 
Incineration 0.9704 0.9706 0.8736 1.0000 0.9703 
Biogas 0.9996 0.9996 0.9647 0.9703 1.0000 
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Table 3 displays the SURE regression results. As can be seen from the column denoted Exp. 
Return, Nuclear has the largest expected return, amounting to 25.7 kWh/CHF, while Biogas has 
the smallest expected return, at a mere 2.6 kWh/CHF. The standard deviations of all 
technologies vary widely, with Biogas being the least volatile (0.1) and Nuclear the most (4.7). 
Every regression includes a time trend, reflecting technological change, which is positive and 
significant for Nuclear, Storage hydro, Smallhydro, and Wind. These technologies are expected to 
continue to gain from technological progress (particularly learning effects), which lead to 
increases in expected returns over time. However, most of the coefficients are close to zero, 
indicating a slow rate of progress. The coefficients of determination R2 all exceed 0.89 thus 
offering some confidence in the SURE results. 
 
Table 3: Results of SURE regressions, Switzerland (2005 – 2035) 
 
Technology Exp. 
Return 
Std. dev      b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 Trend Obs R2 
Nuclear 25.7 4.7 -0.2*** 2.8*** -2.8*** 0.9*** - 0.001*** 27 0.90 
Run of river 25.6 1.6 1.3** 2.6*** -2.3*** 0.7*** - -0.01** 27 0.89 
Storage hydro 18.4 0.8 0.5*** 3.2*** -4.3*** 2.7*** -0.7*** 0.001** 27 0.89 
Solar 3.1 1.2 -0.003 3.1*** -3.7*** 2.0*** -0.4*** -0.0005 27 0.91 
Gas 11.8 1.3 4.7*** 0.7*** - - - -0.06*** 27 0.90 
Smallhydro 12.7 1.3 1.6*** - -0.8***  0.2 0.004*** 0.3*** 27 0.90 
Wind 12.5 1.1 0.2*** 1.7*** -0.2 -0.75** 0.2 0.003*** 27 0.92 
Biomass 4.6 0.8  -0.02*** 2.7*** -2.5*** 0.8*** - -0.0002 27 0.99 
Incineration 13.2 0.2 0.1 1.4*** -0.4*** - - -0.001*** 27 0.89 
Biogas 2.6 0.1 -0.05 1.3*** -0.25** - - -0.001** 27 0.95 
*Significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level 
 
As can be seen in the appendix (Table A3), Run of river and Storage hydro generate higher expected 
returns in 2000 than Nuclear power (30.1 and 15.1 vs. 14.4 kWh/CHF). One explanation for this 
is the inclusion of external costs (see section 5.4) that are higher for Nuclear power and thus lead 
to lower expected returns. In addition, decommissioning and waste disposal further reduce 
expected return for Nuclear. In addition, Run of river is the most volatile technology (2.7), which is 
due to seasonal variations in the quantity of water that is needed for power generation. The trend 
variable indicates that all four technologies in 2000 face increasing returns over time. With the 
exception of Run of river all R2 results are comfortably high (all exceed 0.65).    
 
5.5.2 Efficient portfolio shares for different scenarios using 
SURE  
 
Three different future scenarios are examined, reflecting different degrees of feasibility 
constraints. Scenario SI contains no constraints, and therefore tends to generate concentrated 
technology portfolio mixes (see section 5.2.2). Along the efficiency frontier more diversified 
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generation mixes are located, as will be seen in the cases of SV and SER portfolios. In scenario 
SII the shares of Nuclear and Gas are set to zero (reflecting a strict aversion to Nuclear power and 
Gas fuel dependency), while the shares of Run of river and Storage hydro cannot exceed 24 and 32 
percent, respectively (this restriction is based on Laufer et al. (2004) who claim that larger shares 
of Run of river and Storage hydro are unlikely in the future due to technical and geological 
restrictions). Finally, scenario SIII presents a technologically feasible generation mix in 
accordance to studies by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFoE, 2005) and Laufer et al. 
(2004). Here Solar, Smallhydro, Wind, Biomass, Incineration and Biogas are constrained to take a 
minimum share of 5 percent each, while Nuclear, Run of river and Storage hydro are constrained at 
maximum shares of 40 percent, 24 percent and 32 percent, respectively. The latter three 
technology constraints reflect the status quo view, where shares are kept the same in 2035 as in 
early 2000.  
 
5.5.2.1 Scenario SI: No constraints imposed 
 
A look at Figure 2 reveals that the actual portfolio (AP2000) is far off the efficiency frontier, 
implying that the AP2000 mix is inefficient if no constraints are imposed (Scenario SI). As 
expected, the MER portfolio is heavily concentrated, containing 100 percent Nuclear, see Table 4. 
Expected return is almost twice the size of the AP2000 (25.74 kWh/CHF vs 13.82 kWh/CHF). 
Keeping risk the same (SV), a shift towards Nuclear (58 percent) and Run of river (42 percent) also 
improves expected returns to 25.67 kWh/CHF, which is only marginally less than the MER 
portfolio. On the other hand, the SER portfolio reveals how much risk can be reduced by 
keeping the expected return the same as in 2000. Using more Run of river (48 percent, up from 27 
percent in AP2000) and Smallyhdro (42 percent, which has not been used before), while reducing 
the shares of Nuclear (7 percent, down from 38 percent) and Storage hydro (3 percent, down from 
31 percent) decreases risk to a mere 0.05 (down from 2.10 in AP2000). Finally, the MV portfolio, 
containing a share of 88 percent Biogas, generates the lowest level of risk (0.01).   
    Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices show that the inefficient AP2000 mix 
diversifies better than all four efficient portfolios. The SW index exceeds 1.00, which indicates 
that the risk of collusion is low. However, the HH index being more than 1800 bps signifies 
some concentration. With the exception of SER, all other portfolios are concentrated, with the 
MER taking the maximum possible HH index of 10000 bps, since the portfolio contains only 
one technology. According to the Sharpe ratio, the MV mix offers the best return-to-risk 
relationship, which is more than seventy times bigger than the AP2000 (529.00 vs. 7.00). 
Therefore, users are best advised to adopt the MV portfolio if they want a generating mix that 
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offers the lowest risk and the highest return-to-risk ratio compared to the AP2000 and all other 
efficient portfolios. 
    If the same technology shares as in the AP2000 are adopted for the predicted year 2035 data 
set, then the portfolio shifts closer to the efficiency frontier as shown by portfolio EP2035 (see 
Figure 2). Here expected return increases from 13.82 in the AP2000 to 21.56 in EP2035. In 
addition, volatilities in returns are expected to decline from 2.10 as in AP2000 to 1.57 in EP2035. 
This shift could be explained by technological progress particularly due to learning curve effects 
(for example, expected return of Solar increases almost three times from 1.1 kWh/CHF in 2000 
to 3.1 kWh/CHF in 2035, see Tables A3 and 3). However, this could also be due to the 
smoothing, which is inherent in forecasts. 
 
Figure 2: Efficient portfolio for Switzerland using SURE procedure in scenario SI 
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However, because the EP2035 is based on the same technology shares as the AP2000 it can only 
be achieved if electricity consumption stays the same between 2000 and 2035, or if an increase in 
electricity demand is proportionately matched by an increase in all technologies. Both cases seem 
unlikely, because demand is expected to increase by at least 15 percent by 2020 (see section 5.1), 
and hydro generated electricity is already being fully utilized (Laufer et al. 2004).  
Critics may also express their concern that scenario SI is generally unrealistic. In particular Nuclear 
and Biogas taking shares of 100 and 88 percent in the MER and MV portfolios, respectively, and 
Run of river exceeding 40 percent in the SER and SV portfolios are deemed unrealistic. Therefore 
the next two subsections discuss two additional scenarios, where so-called feasibility constraints 
are applied. 
SV MER 
SER 
MV 
kWh/CHF 
EP2035 
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Table 4: Efficient Portfolio shares in Scenario SI 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2.2 Scenario SII: No nuclear and gas, restricted shares for hydro power 
 
In scenario SII neither Nuclear nor Gas contribute towards an efficient electricity mix. Users that 
dislike Nuclear power and who strongly oppose any form of Gas dependency opt for this 
alternative. In addition, both hydro technologies are constrained to their technically feasible 
generation shares as predicted by Laufer et al. (2004). As can be seen in Figure 3, the efficiency 
frontier shrinks in size as compared to Figure 2 in 5.5.2.112
                                                 
12 due to the imposed feasibility constraints 
, while the AP2000 is still far off the 
efficiency frontier. Table 5 shows that MER is much less concentrated than in the previous 
section. Run of river and Storage hydro take their binding shares, 24 and 32 percent, respectively. In 
addition, Incineration plays an important role (44 percent). Both expected return and standard 
deviation (risk) speak in favor of MER, since both values are better than the AP2000 ones, where 
expected return is 4 percentage points lower, and risk almost 2 percentage points higher. The 
efficiency frontier shrunk in size due to the imposed constraints. For that reason the SV portfolio 
could not be estimated. The SER portfolio mix contains 24 percent Run of river (binding share, 
down from 27 percent in the AP2000), and 12 percent Smallhydro, 26 percent Biomass, and 38 
percent Incineration, which are all technologies, that if aggregated made up less than one percent 
before 2000. As before in scenario SI, the MV mix places a strong weight on Biogas (almost 80 
percent), which helps to reduce risk to a mere 0.01. As can be seen by the Shannon-Wiener and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices, the SER portfolio displays some remarkable features: although 
Nuclear and Gas are not part of the efficient portfolio, the mix is very well diversified, much better 
than the inefficient AP2000 and all other efficient portfolio mixes. The same applies to the 
  MER SV SER MV AP2000 EP2035 
Nuclear 100% 58% 7% 1% 38% 38% 
Run of river  42% 48% 10% 27% 27% 
Storage hydro   3%  31% 31% 
Solar     4% 4% 
Gas    1%   
Smallhydro   42%    
Wind       
Biomass       
Incineration       
Biogas    88%   
Exp. Return 25.74 25.67 13.82 5.29 13.82 21.56 
Std.Dev. 4.69 2.10 0.05 0.01 2.10 1.57 
SW 0.00 0.68 1.01 0.44 1.21 1.21 
HH 10000 5138 4130 7814 3150 3150 
Sharpe 5.49 12.22 276.41 529.00 7.00 14.00 
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Sharpe ratio, no other portfolio in scenario SII exceeds 691.00. Therefore, in terms of expected 
return, SW, HH and the Sharpe ratio no other portfolio provides better results than the SER mix. 
 
          Figure 3: Efficient portfolio for Switzerland using SURE in scenario SII 
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        Table 5: Efficient portfolio shares in scenario SII  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2.3 Scenario SIII: Restricted shares for nuclear, hydro power, and new-renewables  
 
In scenario SIII Solar, Smallhydro, Wind, Biomass, Incineration and Biogas take a minimum share of 5 
percent each, while Nuclear, Run of river and Storage hydro are constrained to maximum shares of 40 
percent, 24 percent and 32 percent, respectively. Figure 4 displays the efficiency frontier, which as 
  MER SV SER MV AP2000 
Nuclear     38% 
Run of river 24%  24% 12% 27% 
Storage hydro 32%    31% 
Solar     4% 
Gas      
Smallhydro   12%   
Wind      
Biomass   26% 12%  
Incineration 44%  38%   
Biogas    76%  
Exp. Return 17.85  13.82 5.70 13.82 
Std.Dev. 0.37  0.02 0.01 2.10 
SW 1.07  1.31 0.72 1.21 
HH 3536  2862 6067 3150 
Sharpe 48.24  691.00 570.00 7.00 
MER 
MV 
SER 
kWh/CHF 
d 
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before in Scenario SII shrunk in size, due to imposed feasibility constraints. As in the previous 
two scenarios, the AP2000 is off the efficiency frontier, indicating that an efficiency improvement 
is possible.  
    Table 6 shows, that the MER portfolio contains Nuclear (40 percent, constraint binding), Run of 
river (24 percent, constraint binding), Storage hydro (32 percent, constraint binding), and Incineration 
(4 percent). Like in section 5.5.2.2, the MER portfolio generates higher expected returns and less 
risk than the actual portfolio (AP2000). Due to the imposed constraints, both SV and SER 
portfolios are not part of the efficiency frontier, since the frontier shrunk in size. The MV 
portfolio contains all ten generating technologies, where Gas, Run of river, and Storage hydro 
contribute the largest shares, with 28 percent, 20 percent, and 13 percent, respectively. Both, 
expected returns and risk are more favorable in the MV portfolio than in AP2000.    
 
        Figure 4: Efficient portfolio for Switzerland using SURE in scenario SIII 
Standard Deviation (Risk)
Expected Return
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    As expected, the Shannon-Wiener index of the MV portfolio not only exceeds those of 
AP2000 and the efficient MER portfolio, but also those of all other SW indices that were 
previously calculated and displayed in Tables 4 and 5. The HH is below 1800 bps (the first, and 
only time in this study), indicating that this portfolio mix is secure and diverse. The Sharpe ratio 
is more than ten times larger than the MER, indicating that the return-to-risk relationship is best 
utilized with the MV portfolio. Therefore users in scenario SIII are best advised to adopt the MV 
portfolio, since it offers the highest expected return, the lowest risk, the best indices for security 
of supply and the highest return-to-risk ratio, relative to the inefficient AP2000 and the efficient 
MER portfolio. 
MER 
MV 
kWh/CHF 
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                                   Table 6: Efficient portfolio shares in scenario SIII 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
5.5.3 Comparing OLS-based portfolios with SURE in scenario 
SIII 
 
This section compares efficient portfolio technology shares that were determined by using 
different econometric specifications for scenario SIII. Although OLS estimates do not control 
for error spillovers across equations (see section 5.3) maximum expected return portfolios that 
are calculated by OLS (see Table 7) are the same as in scenario SIII where SURE is used (see 
Table 6).  
                                  Table 7: OLS-based scenario SIII  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  MER SV SER MV AP2000 
Nuclear 40%   9% 38% 
Run of river 24%   20% 27% 
Storage hydro 32%   13% 31% 
Solar    5% 4% 
Gas    28%  
Smallhydro    5%  
Wind    5%  
Biomass    5%  
Incineration 4%   5%  
Biogas    5%  
Exp. Return 22.86   15.56 13.82 
Std.Dev. 1.53   0.08 2.10 
SW 1.20   2.06 1.21 
HH 3216   1570 3150 
Sharpe 14.94   194.50 7.00 
  MER SV SER MV AP2000 
Nuclear 40%   10% 38% 
Run of river 24%   22% 27% 
Storage hydro 32%   13% 31% 
Solar    5% 4% 
Gas    25%  
Smallhydro    5%  
Wind    5%  
Biomass    5%  
Incineration 4%   5%  
Biogas    5%  
Exp. Return 22.86   15.93 14.19 
Std.Dev. 1.53   0.08 2.31 
SW 1.20   2.07 1.21 
HH 3216   1545 3150 
Sharpe 14.94   200 6.14 
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    Differences arise in the MV portfolio, where in SIII with SURE more weight is placed on Gas 
and less on Run of river as compared to OLS-based shares. Comparing expected returns of the 
AP2000 portfolios amongst SURE- and OLS-based portfolios reveals some striking differences. 
SURE-based AP2000 displays less expected return than OLS (13.82 vs. 14.19). The same holds 
true for the standard deviation, where SURE results are lower than OLS (2.10 vs. 2.31). The 
differences show that OLS-based portfolios tend to underestimate the scope of efficiency 
improvement, since differences between the future portfolios and the AP2000 are much smaller 
as compared to SURE-based portfolios. Therefore, controlling for the econometric methodology 
is important since correlated shocks in the disturbance term affect estimates of expected return 
and standard deviation.    
 
 
5.6 Concluding comments  
 
   This study applied Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory to determine efficient electricity-
generating portfolios in Switzerland for 2035. These efficient portfolios were compared with the 
actual portfolio as of the year 2000 (AP2000). The gap between the AP2000 and the future 
efficient portfolios indicated the scope of efficiency improvement. OLS- and SURE-based 
econometric procedures were used to estimate a stable covariance/variance matrix of the 
technologies disturbance term. This is important to be able to obtain adequate expected returns 
and to derive reliable standard deviations, which are used to calculate efficient portfolios. 
However, OLS failed to account for error spillovers across equations, which has been remedied 
by using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE).  
Three scenarios were analyzed, with feasibility constraints of different degrees of restrictiveness. 
According to the Sharpe ratio, viz. return-to-risk ratio, the MV portfolios score best in Scenarios 
SI (without constraints) and SIII (where constraints are imposed on Nuclear, Run of river, Storage 
hydro, and all new-renewables). In scenario SII (where both Nuclear and Gas generated electricity 
technology shares are set to zero, while both hydro technologies are restricted to feasible shares) 
the Sharpe ratio scored best with the same expected return (SER) portfolio, containing 24 
percent Run of river, 12 percent Smallhydro, 26 percent Biomass, and 39 percent Incineration. This mix 
would suit users who dislike Nuclear power and any form of Gas fuel dependency.  
    According to Szpiro (1986) the Swiss population is best described as being risk-averse, 
therefore risk-averse (MV) power portfolio holders in 2035 (who do not oppose Nuclear and Gas) 
would be advised to adopt a feasible technology mix containing 28 percent Gas, 20 percent Run of 
river, 13 percent Storage hydro, 9 percent Nuclear, and 5 percent each of Solar, Smallhydro, Wind, 
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Biomass, Incineration, and Biogas, respectively. This portfolio mix improves expected returns by 
more than 12 percent, while keeping risk more than 90 percent lower than the actual portfolio in 
2000. The Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices suggest that this mix is both 
secure and well diversified, and the Sharpe ratio is almost thirty times larger than that of the 
actual portfolio in 2000.  
    However, a share of 28 percent Gas, 5 percent Biomass, 5 percent Incineration and 5 percent 
Biogas, which move users closer to the efficiency frontier, entails additional CO2 emissions. 
Therefore, if Switzerland is able to reposition its Kyoto emission reductions more towards 
transport fuels and away from electricity generation, this portfolio appears feasible. 
    The Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) commissioned a similar application of 
portfolio analysis to the Dutch generating mix for 2030 (Jansen et al., 2006). Although the 
authors did not control for correlated shocks, their results point into the same direction as this 
study. Risk-averse electricity-generating technology portfolio holders in the Netherlands should 
adopt a mix in 2030 that contains 33 percent new-renewable technologies, such as Wind and 
Biomass (up from 6 percent in 2000). This mix comes at the expense of less Nuclear power (down 
to 0 percent from 5 percent in 2000), less Coal (down to 12 percent from 29 percent in 2000), and 
less Gas (down to 55 percent from 60 percent in 2000). Therefore, both countries, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands are advised to put more weight on new renewable technologies for at least 
two reasons: first, it reduces risk. Second, the generation portfolio is more diversified and thus 
serves well to ensure supply security.   
    One limitation of this study concerns the narrow focus on electricity-generating technologies. 
A wider perspective should include data on transportation and long-distance heating, which all 
play an important role in achieving a more efficient use of energy rather than only electricity. 
However, this study shows that Switzerland has scope for electricity-generating efficiency 
improvements by employing a more diversified portfolio mix containing Nuclear and Gas, 
combined with new-renewables.    
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Partial correlation coefficients (1991 – 2000) 
 
Technology Nuclear ROR Hydro Sto. Solar 
Nuclear 1.0000 -0.4945 -0.1488 0.9843 
Run of river -0.4945 1.0000 0.5170 -0.3856 
Storage hydro -0.1488 0.5170 1.0000 0.0169 
Solar 0.9843 -0.3856 0.0169 1.0000 
 
 
Table A2: Partial correlation coefficients for itu  residuals (1991 – 2000) 
 
Technology Nuclear ROR Hydro Sto. Solar 
Nuclear 1.0000 0.9641 0.9812 0.9987 
Run of river 0.9641 1.0000 0.9542 0.9532 
Storage hydro 0.9812 0.9542 1.0000 0.9797 
Solar 0.9987 0.9532 0.9797 1.0000 
 
 
Table A3: Results of SURE regressions, Switzerland (1991 – 2000) 
 
Technology Exp. 
Return 
Std. dev b0 b1 b2 b3 Trend Obs R2 
Nuclear 14.4 2.2     4.8**   0.3 - -    0.36 10 0.75 
Run of river 30.1 2.7   10.2  -0.2     0.2 0.1 1.10** 10 0.44 
Storage hydro 15.1 1.8     8.3*** -0.4**   0.001   -0.2     0.94*** 10 0.68 
Solar 1.1 0.2     0.02   0.4 - - 0.04** 10 0.99 
*Significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level 
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Table A4: Partial correlation coefficients (2005 – 2035) using OLS 
 
Technology Nuclear ROR Hydro Sto. Solar Gas 
Nuclear 1.0000 -0.9399 0.0112 0.9689 -0.9599 
Run of river -0.9399 1.0000 -0.2842 -0.9853 0.9778 
Storage hydro 0.0112 -0.2842 1.0000 0.2167 -0.2239 
Solar 0.9689 -0.9853 0.2167 1.0000 -0.9829 
Gas -0.9599 0.9778 -0.2239 -0.9829 1.0000 
Smallhydro 0.8916 -0.9914 0.4018 0.9628 -0.9567 
Wind 0.8912 -0.9912 0.4025 0.9626 -0.9565 
Biomass 0.9784 -0.9892 0.1876 0.9963 -0.9858 
Incineration 0.7593 -0.9334 0.5662 0.8766 -0.8675 
Biogas 0.8912 -0.9915 0.4012 0.9647 -0.9577 
 
Technology Smallhydro Wind Biomass Incin Biogas 
Nuclear 0.8916 0.8912 0.9784 0.7593 0.8912 
Run of river -0.9914 -0.9912 -0.9892 -0.9334 0.9915 
Storage hydro 0.4018 0.4025 0.1876 0.5662 0.4012 
Solar 0.9628 0.9626 0.9963 0.8766 0.9647 
Gas -0.9567 -0.9565 -0.9858 -0.8675 -0.9575 
Smallhydro 1.0000 0.9988 0.9646 0.9710 0.9996 
Wind 0.9988 1.0000 0.9643 0.9712 0.9996 
Biomass 0.9646 0.9643 1.0000 0.8748 0.9650 
Incineration 0.9710 0.9712 0.8748 1.0000 0.9706 
Biogas 0.9996 0.9996 0.9650 0.9706 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
110 
 
 
 
 
  
 
111 
 
Russian Gas to Western Europe: 
A Game-theoretic Analysis 
 
 
 
Peter Zweifel, Boris Krey and Sandro Schirillo* † 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    *The authors benefited from comments and criticisms by participants in the Industrial Economics Group 2008 
meeting in Karlsruhe (Germany). 
    †Submitted to the Journal of Resource and Energy Economics  
 
  
 
112 
 
 
 
 
  
 
113 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Russian Gas to Western Europe: A Game-
theoretic Analysis 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Russia is the most important supplier of gas worldwide and especially for Europe. At the time of 
the Soviet Union, transportation and routing was not an issue, since there was no third party 
involved. This changed when the Soviet Union collapsed. Newly independent states became 
indispensable parts of the Eurasian gas chain, causing a dramatic change for Russia. The transit 
countries, Ukraine and Belarus, seek to profit from their geographical location, while Russia 
wants cheap and reliable transport routes to sell its gas to Western Europe. This paper purports 
to determine the bargaining power of the three countries when negotiating over transit fees, 
taking account of new projects such as the Northern European Gas Pipeline (NEGP). However, 
it is also necessary to predict which of the possible coalitions will form. Estimated payoffs allow 
determining whether co-operation or independent optimization is the dominant strategy.  
Early analysis of the gas supply game was performed by Grais & Zheng (1996), who modeled a 
Stackelberg game with Russia as the leader and Ukraine and Czechoslovakia as followers. A 
similar approach, with Belarus replacing Czechoslovakia as a transit country, was pursued by 
Hirschhausen v. et al. (2005), who developed cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios for 
different routes. Finally, Hubert and Ikonnikova (2003) analyzed the strategic behavior of the 
players, determining their bargaining power as indicated by the Shapley value. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. After a description of the Eurasian gas chain and the 
objectives of the players in section 6.2, the transit game is modeled in section 6.3. Cooperative 
scenarios and bargaining power values derived are in section 6.3.1, while section 6.3.2 is devoted 
to non-cooperative scenarios. The data and calibrations follow in section 6.4, again for both the 
cooperative and the non-cooperative module. Optimal strategies for each player are explained 
and justified. The final section 6.5 contains a summary and concluding remarks. 
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6.2 The Eurasian gas chain 
 
6.2.1 Historical development of transport routes 
 
The former Soviet Union started delivering gas to Western Europe during the cold war, 
completing the first pipeline connection to Austria in 1968 and a second one to West Germany in 
1973 (Stern, 2005). At that time, no independent countries stood between the producer and 
consumers. Pipeline Brotherhood went through Ukraine, which was part of the Soviet Union, to 
former Czechoslovakia, which was highly dependent on the Soviet Union (Hubert & Ikonnikova, 
2004). The Soviet gas industry was a government agency whose actions were driven by politics 
(Hirschhausen v. & Engerer, 1998). A new export route in the North, from Belarus through 
Poland and East Germany, would have been economically viable, but Moscow decided that 
Czechoslovakia was politically more reliable than Poland.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in an unfavorable situation because its 
only export route to the West went through the newly independent states Ukraine, Slovakia, and 
Czech Republic, who inherited a quasi-monopolistic position for gas transit. Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic never capitalized on this fact because they were seeking integration into the 
European Union (EU) as reliable partners. Their segments of the pipeline were privatized 
quickly, with the Czech part bought by a consortium of German Ruhrgas, Gaz de France, and 
Russian Gazprom and the Slovakian part, by the German RWE. Ukraine, in contrast, was not a 
candidate for membership in the EU, permitting it to pursue its objectives independently. It 
received an in-kind transit fee and cheap gas from Russia. Problems arose when Ukraine started 
leaving its gas bills unpaid. It was also accused by Russia of stealing gas designated for export to 
Western Europe.  
Both Russia and the EU had strong concerns about Ukraine’s reliability and looked for 
alternative transit routes. The northern corridor through Belarus and Poland to Germany seemed 
to be the solution. Belarus was Russia’s close ally, while Poland was vying for integration with the 
EU. In addition, Gazprom managed to buy into the Polish transit grid EuroPolGaz, on a par 
with Polish PGNiG. This paved the way for building the massive Yamal-Europe pipeline. While 
this project was repeatedly scaled down to become Yamal 1 with 18 bcm/a capacity (see Figure 
1), it contains the option of building a second and third parallel pipeline, Yamal 2 and 3, for a 
total capacity of 56 bcm/a, 84 bcm/a, respectively (Hirschhausen v., 2003).  
Increasing frustration with the transit countries led Russia to develop direct export routes. The 
first to be realized was the Blue Stream pipeline from Russia through the Black Sea to Turkey, 
causing Ukraine to lose its transit monopoly on the route to Southeast Europe. Transmission 
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through Blue Stream started in 2003 with 2 bcm/a, to increase steadily to capacity (16 bcm/a) by 
2010 (Gazprom, 2006). A direct pipeline between Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea is 
the object of a joint venture between Gazprom (51 percent) and the German companies BASF 
(24.5 percent) and E.ON (24.5 percent) called the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) 
(named North Transgas in Figure 1).  Construction works have already started in 2005 on the 
Russian side, with a planned capacity of 55 bcm/a. The first pipeline is expected to go on stream 
in 2010, providing 27.5 bcm/a capacity. Figure 1 shows existing and projected transport routes 
from Russia to Western Europe. The remainder of this section is devoted to a description of the 
players’ objectives.  
 
                Figure 1: Russian gas and oil export routes to Western Europe 
 
          Source: EIA United States 
6.2.2 Russia 
 
Russian and Central Asian gas is landlocked and thus has to be transported by pipeline over long 
distances. The biggest gas fields are along the Ural and in Western Siberia, thousands of 
Russian Gas to Western Europe: A Game-theoretic Analysis 
  
 
116 
 
kilometers away form Western Europe. Other forms of transport, like LNG, CNG or the 
conversion of gas into chemical liquids or electricity are not technically mature. One ton of gas 
occupies more than thousand times the volume of one ton of oil and is therefore much more 
difficult and costly to transport (IFP, 2002).  
Russian gas production is projected to reach 655 bcm in 2010 and 898 bcm by 2030. Russia will 
have to develop several new fields to compensate the production decline of its old giant fields 
while increasing total production. Russia’s neighbors in the Caspian region, mainly Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan, have reserves amounting to some 8 trcm (=8,000 bcm), that are relatively easy 
to recover. Gazprom has already bought over 1 trcm of this gas under long-term deals, helping it 
to postpone the development of costly Russian fields to prevent them from exporting directly to 
Western Europe (IEA, 2004).  
Gazprom is the world’s largest gas company, responsible for over 90 percent of Russian gas 
production and wielding a monopoly for exports. It provides the most important source of 
governmental revenue, accounting for about 25 percent of the federal tax budget (Bruce, 2005). 
Gazprom was privatized in large part, causing it to pursue interests and goals different from 
those of the government. Former Russian president Putin’s government stepped up its share in 
Gazprom and installed managers loyal to Moscow (todays new Russian president Medwedew 
used to be the chairman of the board of directors at Gazprom). Recognizing the importance of 
the transit routes, Gazprom has strived to achieve control over gas transit assets in Ukraine and 
Belarus, using unpaid gas bills and the threat of supply cuts to put pressure on the two countries 
(Bruce, 2005). In spite of this quest for power, Gazprom is hypothesized to pursue the 
maximization of its profits in the following. 
 
6.2.3 Ukraine 
 
Until recently, Ukraine has held a quasi-monopolistic position in the forwarding of Russian gas to 
Western Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey. During the 1990s, it accounted for more than 95 
percent of Russian gas going to Western Europe, with the remainder passing through Belarus and 
Poland using low-pressure pipelines. Total westward transit capacity of Ukrainian pipelines is 
estimated at 100 bcm/a and southward capacity, at 40 bcm/a. Russia pays the transit fee in gas 
rather than money. While Ukraine has been seeking independence from Russia after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, it is unable to maintain and upgrade its pipelines without financial help from 
Russia and western countries. At the same time, it does not want to relinquish control over an 
essential facility that gives the country some power (Tyshchenko, 2002). In 2004, Russia and 
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Ukraine agreed to increase transit capacity by 19 bcm/a by 2010. On the whole, it is safe to 
assume that Ukraine tries to maximize revenue and therefore profits from gas transit. 
6.2.4 Belarus 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus maintained strong ties with Russia. The common 
historical and cultural heritage suggests reunification, which however was never realized. Like all 
former Soviet republics, Belarus received cheap energy from Russia, even at a particularly low 
price that helped its economy but increased its dependency on Russia. In 2003, Belarus imported 
18 bcm of Russian gas at a price of only $30/tcm, whereas Ukraine paid $50/tcm, and Western 
importers, over $100/tcm (Bruce, 2005). Belarus has negligible gas reserves, which makes it even 
more dependent on Russia than Ukraine (ENI, 2005). 
    Although Belarus offers the shortest, and therefore cheapest, reliable way to Western Europe, 
problems arose shortly after the opening of the new Yamal 1 pipeline. Belarus sought to increase 
its revenues from gas transit (Hubert & Ikonnikova, 2005). Moreover, like other transit countries 
it failed to pay fully for its gas from Russia. Russia and Gazprom tried to take control over the 
state company Beltransgaz by offering gas debt swaps, but without success. Accordingly, they lost 
interest in constructing the additional Yamal pipelines as originally planned. Another project, 
connecting the Yamal pipeline from Belarus through Poland and Slovakia in order to bypass 
Ukraine, is even more uncertain (Bruce, 2005). On the whole, assuming that Belarus uses its 
transit fees to maximize revenue seems to be justified. 
 
 
6.3 The model 
 
The crucial assumptions are the following. First, gas is assumed to be a homogeneous 
commodity, neglecting differences in quality e.g. between Russian and Dutch natural gas. Next, 
there is no collusion between Russia and other suppliers such as Norway. Third, for the transit 
countries Russia is the only purchaser of gas transit services. The market structure is thus a 
monopsony with very few suppliers of transit service, justifying the assumption of Cournot 
competition in the case of no cooperation.  
The set of risk-neutral players consists of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, to be symbolized by R, U, 
and B, respectively. The total amount of gas transported from the Russian border to Western 
Europe is denoted by xT  no matter where it comes from. The quantities transported through 
Ukraine, Belarus, and the NEGP are xU, xB and xN respectively, such that xT = xU + xB + xN. 
A linear demand function is assumed, following the lead of other authors (e.g. Hirschhausen v. et 
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al. 2005). Western Europe is modeled as an aggregate of passive consumers in spite of EU 
attempts to organize an import cartel. Thus, its inverse demand function can be written p = α(xT
+xothers) + β. In order to focus on gas from Russia, xothers is viewed as exogenous. Demand 
for gas from suppliers other than Russia is therefore b = a’xothers + β’. In view of the assumed 
homogeneity of the product, α’ = α and β’ = β, resulting in the follogiwng inverse demand 
function for Russian gas, 
 
                      p = axT + b,   with a < 0, b > 0, dxT/dp < 0.                   (1) 
 
Furthermore, let the cost of Russian gas production (including transport to its border) be 
constant at cR. The per-unit cost of transport is also constant at cU and cB respectively, and cN 
through the NEGP. Since the number of players is taken as predetermined, barriers to entry are 
not at issue. Therefore, the costs of past and future pipeline construction are taken as sunk and 
will be neglected.  
 
 
6.3.1 The cooperative module 
 
The assumption is that some coalitions will form. Therefore, players’ conditional payoffs need to 
be determined, which presumably depend on their bargaining power. Shapley values are 
calculated as in Hubert and Ikonnikova (2003), but with different assumptions and for different 
years. Additionally, Banzhaf values will be calculated. Both values are ex ante, predicting payoffs 
before it is known which players will cooperate.  
The total number of players is denoted by n, equal to 3 in all cases considered here. Coalitions K 
≤ n can be formed with k ≤  n players and payoffs v(K). Usually, a coalition's payoff also depends 
on the actions of excluded players. This does not apply here because Russia is an essential player, 
without whom no positive payoff can be realized. A coalition comprising Ukraine and Belarus 
does not form a complete supply chain, since they have no gas production of their own. The 
possible coalitions thus are {R,U,B}, {R,U}, {R,B}, {U,B} and the case where each player stands 
alone. The formula for the Shapley value is 
 
                                         (v)iφ  = ∑∈
−−
Ki n!
k)!(n1)!(k [v(K) - v(K\{i})].        (2) 
 
This formula says that each player receives the average of its marginal contributions  
v(K) - v(K\{i}), with v(K\{i}) denoting the payoff achieved in player is absence. Players join 
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randomly, making the probability of every sequence of players the same. Bargaining power si, is 
then obtained by calculating the relative contribution of a player (see section 6.4),  
 
                                                  si = 
∑
=
 
n
1j
(v)jφ
(v)iφ , with ∑
=
n
1i
i )v(s = 1.                    (3) 
 
The Banzhaf value Zi differs from the Shapley value in the following sense. Rather than assigning 
equal probabilities to sequences of players, it assigns equal probabilities to all possible coalitions. 
This seems more realistic in the present context, as tense political relations between all players do 
not favor any specific coalition. The Banzhaf value is thus given by 
 
                                                     Zi(v) = 1n2
1
− ∑
∈Ki
 {i})]\ v(K- [v(K) .        (4) 
 
Bargaining power hi is calculated in analogy to equation (3), 
 
                                                                  hi = (v)
vZ
i
i
Z∑
)( .                    (5) 
 
Coalitions are assumed to maximize profits in keeping with section 6.3, given by 
 
                                                               ПK = i
k
1i
i x)c-(p∑
=
.                   (6) 
 
Optimal quantities of gas have to satisfy the constraints 0 ≤ x U ≤ CU, 0 ≤ x B≤ CB, and 
0 ≤  xN ≤  CN, where e.g. CU stands for the capacity of Ukrainian transit pipelines. 
In the case of the comprehensive coalition K={R,U,B}, the maximization problem reads, 
 
                 
U B Nx ,x ,x
max B,U,R∏ = [a(xU + xB + xN) + b - cR - cU]xU + [a(xU + xB + xN)  
                                      + b - cR - cB]xB + [a(xU + xB + xN) + b - cN]xN.                 (7) 
 
A coalition with Russia and the Ukraine, K={R,U}, faces the maximization problem, 
 
                  
U Nx ,x
max U,R∏ = [a(xU + xN) + b - cR - cU]xU + [a(xU + xN) + b - cN]xN.      (8) 
 
The corresponding formula for K={R,B} is 
 
                   
B Nx ,x
max B,R∏ = [a(xB + xN) + b - cR - cB]xB + [a(xB + xN) + b - cN]xN.      (9) 
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Russia is the only player who can establish a complete supply chain on its own in the future 
(beginning 2010). Its profit maximization problem then becomes 
 
                                                      
Nx
max ПR = [axN + b - cN]xN.       (10) 
 
The capacity constraints and parameters of the demand functions change over the years, as will 
be shown in section 6.4. 
 
6.3.2 The non-cooperative module 
 
The objective of this section is to predict the payoffs given that players act in a non-cooperative 
manner. The game is super-additive with side payments since coalitions generate more profit than 
the sum of the single players' profits. Players can agree on side-payments, because payoffs, being 
in money (or money equivalents of gas), are transferable. They can choose to cooperate or not to 
cooperate. Thus, a player may not join a coalition but still participate in the game as an 
independent player. The choice variables are the quantities of gas on the different routes (for 
Russia) and the transit fees (for Ukraine and Belarus). For simplicity, the transit fee is paid in 
$/tcm by Russia rather than in gas.  
At the beginning of the year considered, quantities and transit fees are set anew. There is perfect 
information about cost, demand, and bargaining power. With regard to Russia and the cost of the 
transit countries, this assumption is realistic since Russia built these transit pipelines or was 
involved in their construction. Therefore, Russia can act as a Stackelberg leader who takes into 
account the reaction functions of the transit countries. Once the transit fees and gas quantities 
are set, there is no renegotiation during the current period, and all parties fulfill their 
commitments. 
The transit fee is the result of negotiations between Russia and the respective player. Russia's 
bargaining power is used to predict the outcome of the negotiation. Ukraine and Belarus, acting 
as independent, non-cooperative players, have the same type of maximization problem. For the 
Ukraine it reads,  
 
                        
ut
max П U = (t U - cU)x U.       (11) 
 
The FOC is 
 
            x* U + (t U - cU
U
U
t
x
∂
∂
)  = 0 ,       (12) 
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because the amount of x U depends on t U. In the following, define σ:= ∂x  U/∂t U = ∂xB/∂tB < 0, 
interpretable as Russia's bargaining power since σ shows how strongly it is able to respond to the 
respective transit fee. The response functions of Ukraine and Belarus therefore are 
 
     t U* σ
Ux = cU -  and                                        (13) 
 
      t B
*
σ
Bx = cB - .                   (14) 
 
The years considered are 2004, 2010, and 2030. The different constellations of players are 
(R\U\B), ({R,U}\B), ({R,B}\U) and (R\{U,B}), the grand coalition {R,B,U} was analyzed in 
section 6.3.1. 
When deciding about the amount of gas to be exported, Russia presumably takes the marginal 
cost of transit along the different routes, MCU, MCB, and MCN into account. While MCN is 
constant, given by MCN = cN – cR · MCU, marginal transit cost values MCB and MCB vary with xU 
and xB, according to eqs. (13) and (14) unless Ukraine (Belarus, respectively) is in a coalition with 
Russia, in which case the transit country charges its marginal cost only. As the data from section 
6.4 will show, Belarus has the lowest MC for small values of x, which are increasing in x. Thus, 
Russia is predicted to first use the pipelines through Belarus until MCB = MCU, then those of 
Belarus and Ukraine jointly, keeping their marginal costs equal, until MCU = MCB = MCN. At that 
point, Russia shifts to NEGP with its constant marginal cost. If there should still be unmet 
demand beyond NEGP’s capacity, Russia presumably distributes the remaining amount between 
Ukraine and Belarus, again keeping MCU = MCB. With total shipping cost to Russia given by T = 
t* U · xU  , eqs. (13) and (14) imply that the equality of marginal cost MCU = MCB calls for 
 
         cU –  σ
Ux2  = cB – σ
Bx2 .                  (15) 
 
Therefore, one has 
 
                             X*U = 2
x2)cc( BBU +σ− , and x*B = 2
x2)cc( UUB +σ− .     (16) 
 
In the case where none of the players cooperate, (R\U\B), the profit maximization problem for 
Russia is 
 
               
U B Nx ,x ,x
max П R = [a(x U+ x B+ x N)+ b - c R - t U]x U + [a(x U+ x B+ x N)+ b - c R - t B]x B 
                                                 + [a(xU + xB + xN) + b - cN]xN                  (17) 
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Taking the FOCs of (17) and using eqs. (13) and (14), one obtains 
 
                                                  x*U = σ+
−−−+
/2a2
ax2ax2bcc NBUR ;       (18) 
 
                                                x*B = σ+
−−−+
/2a2
ax2ax2bcc NUBR ;       (19) 
 
                                                    x*N = a2
ax2ax2bc BUN −−− .       (20) 
 
In the scenario ({R,U}\B), MCU = c U = 5.14 [see  Hirschhausen v. et al. (2005)] is constant, 
since Ukraine being part of the coalition does not charge a profit-making transit fee. At the end 
of the period, Russia will transfer a certain share of its profits as a side payment, the value of 
which is not determined yet. Thus, Russia's profit maximization problem is 
 
              
U B Nx x ,x
max П U,R = [a(x U+ x B+ x N)+ b - c R - c U]x U + [a(x U+ x B+ x N)+ b - c R - t B]x B 
                                       + [a(xU + xB + xN) + b - cN]xN .       (21) 
 
Determining optimum values remains the same as before. Beyond the point where  
MCB = MCU = 5.14 is reached, Ukraine's pipelines will only be used to their capacity limit in view 
of their constant marginal cost. The FOC of (21) yield the same values for x*B and x*N as in eqs. 
(19) and (20). The only difference is Ukraine's amount, 
 
                                                x**U = a2
ax2ax2bcc NBUR −−−+ .       (22) 
 
In the case ({R,B}\U), it is Belarus that charges Russia a transit fee t B = c B. The decision 
problem for Russia then is 
 
             
U B Nx ,x ,x
max П B,R = [a(x U+ x B+ x N)+ b - c R - t U]x U + [a(x U+ x B+ x N)+ b - c R - c B]x B 
                                    + [a(xU + xB + xN) + b - cN]xN.                  (23) 
 
The transit capacity of Belarus will always be used up to its limit first because its marginal cost is 
lowest. Remaining demand is met through the Ukraine and NEGP. The FOC of (23) result in 
eqs. (18) and (20) for x***U and x***N. For Belarus, one has 
 
         x***B = a2
ax2ax2bcc NUBR −−−+ .       (24) 
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Finally, if the two transit countries form a transit coalition, (R\{U,B}), they charge a uniform 
transit fee, t UB. In turn, Russia decides on its own about the total amount of transit gas through 
these countries, xUB = xU + x B, and the amount of gas through its own NEGP. The transit 
countries then allocate the gas to their pipelines. Knowing marginal costs, it is clear that the two 
transit countries use Belarus' pipelines first. The coalition's maximization problem then is 
 
                                          
U,Bt
max П B,U = (t UB - cU)x U + (t UB - cB)x B.       (25) 
 
By taking the FOC as before, one obtains the new reaction function 
 
                                                   t* UB = σ
−σ+
2
x)cc( UBBU .        (26) 
 
Russia's maximization problem then becomes 
 
                      
UB Nx ,x
max П R = [a(x UB + x N)+ b - c R - t UB]x UB + [a(x UB + xN) + b - cN]xN,    (27) 
 
with FOC given by eq. (20) for x*N and 
 
                                            x*UB= σ+
−−++
/1a2
ax2b2/)cc(c NBUR        (28) 
 
The use of the different pipelines follows the same logic as above, with the capacity of the transit 
countries and to the point where MCUB = MCN, followed by a shift to NEGP. 
 
 
6.4 Data and results 
 
It is very difficult to obtain consistent and reliable data. Most figures, such as marginal transport 
cost and the demand function, are based on estimations. Even easily measured quantities such as 
transit capacities or volumes shipped do not seem to be known exactly in view of the wide range 
of figures published by analysts as well as the pertinent companies and institutions. In this 
situation, maximum values were retained.  
    Maximum effective pipeline capacities are presented in Table 1. The data for Ukraine refer to 
the total capacity of routes to Western Europe. Foreign investors are assumed to stay out; the 
increase in capacity between 2004 and 2030 therefore comes from upgrades, i.e. replacing old 
compressors by new ones. The data for Belarus contain the Yamal 1 pipeline (which as of 2008 
has 18 bcm/a capacity) and low-pressure pipelines whose capacity is estimated at a constant 2 
bcm/a. Expansion of Yamal 1 to 28 bcm/a can be expected by 2010, resulting in a total of 30 
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bcm/a. Depending on relationships with Russia, the development of alternative transport routes, 
and Western demand, Yamal 2 and 3 could be accomplished by 2030. At least Yamal 2 is likely to 
be constructed by 2030 because Belarus seeks to increase revenue from transit fees. Yamal 3 is 
also possible, provided foreign investors can be found. Both variants are entered in Table 1. 
Finally, NEGP will start in 2010 with a first pipeline. The second one can be expected to be 
ready by 2030, doubling capacity. 
 
Table 1: Maximum westbound transit capacities in bcm/a 
Pipelines 2004 2010 2030 
Ukraine 100 120 120 
Belarus 20 30 58/86 
NEGP - 27.5 55 
Sources: Hirschhausen v. et al. (2005), Opitz & Hirschhausen v. (2000), NEGP (2006), Hubert & Ikonnikova (2005), Naftogaz 
(2006) 
 
Marginal production and transport costs are taken as constant over time in real terms. On the 
one hand, development of new gas fields in difficult terrain might drive up marginal cost; on the 
other hand, technical progress reduced them in the past. Estimations are based on the report of 
OME (2002), which takes future developments into account. They are cR = 12.3 $/tcm, cU = 
5.14 $/tcm, cB = 4.77 $/tcm, and cN = 18.54 $/tcm, taken from Hirschhausen v. et al. (2005). 
The demand function shifts outward over time, reflecting the fact that total demand is expected 
to increase further while Western Europe's own production will decline after the depletion of UK 
reserves (expected around 2010). The constant parameter over the years is  
a = –0.789. The outward shifting effect is created by an increase of b. Estimates are b = 141.1 
$/tcm for 2004, b = 220 $/tcm for 2010 [which correspond to the scenario "demand expansion" 
in Hirschhausen v. et al. (2005)], and b = 260 $/tcm for 2030, in keeping with a further increase 
in demand for Russian gas. 
 
6.4.1 Results for the cooperative module 
 
6.4.1.1 Postdictions for 2004 
 
To obtain the solution for the comprehensive coalition, eq. (7) has to be maximized. This can be 
done in a simple, intuitive way, avoiding Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Since the marginal cost of 
transport through Belarus is lowest, routes through Ukraine will not be used unless Belarus 
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reaches its capacity. Therefore, the first step is to take the FOC of (7) w.r.t. xB  (assuming  
xU = 0 for now), which gives  
 
                                             
B
BU,R,
x∂
∏∂
= 2axB + b - cR - cB = 0, implying      (29) 
 
                                                           xB
*
a2
bcc BR −+ = .        (30) 
 
When inserting the data of section 6.4 (see also Table A.1, in the appendix) in (30), one finds that 
x*B > cB. Therefore, there is excess demand to be met by Ukraine. Knowing that, (7) can be 
differentiated w.r.t. xU to calculate x*U, 
 
                 
U
BU,R,
x∂
∏∂
 = 2axU + 2axB + b - cR - cU = 0, implying     (31) 
 
                                                      x*U = a2
ax2bcc BUR −−+        (32) 
 
One obtains x*B – cB = 20 bcm/a, x*U = 58.365 bcm/a, x*T = 78.365 bcm/a, p* = 79.27 $/tcm, 
and П* B,U,R  = 4,853 mn. $. In the case of K = {R,U}, derivation of eq. (8) yield 
 
                                                           xU
*
a2
bcc UR −+* =         (33) 
 
The results this time are, x**U = 78.365 bcm/a, p** = 79.27 $/tcm, and П** U,R  = 4,845 mn. $. 
Finally, the solution for K = {R,B} is 
 
x***B = a2
bcc BR −+ .                             (34) 
 
In this case, the capacity limit is reached again so that x***B = 20 bcm/a, p*** = 125.32 $/tcm, 
and П*** B,R  = 2,165 mn. $. 
To calculate the Shapley and the Banzhaf values, Table 2 is useful. MB stands for the marginal 
contribution of a player to a coalition in a sequence of accession ρ, which depends on the player's 
position in the sequence. Bargaining power can then be calculated from eqs. (2), and (3), and (4), 
and (5), respectively. Although the Banzhaf value is deemed more appropriate, it differs but little 
from the Shapley counterpart. Both values agree in that Russia dominates not only the other two 
countries individiually but even jointly. 
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Table 2: Marginal contributions, Shapley value and Banzhaf value (2004) 
Sequence ρ MBR (ρ) MBU (ρ) MBB (ρ) Sum ($ mn.) 
(R, U, B) 0 4,845 8 4,853 
(R, B, U) 0 2,688 2,165 4,853 
(U, R, B) 4,845 0 8 4,853 
(U, B, R) 4,853 0 0 4,853 
(B, R, U) 2,165 2,688 0 4,853 
(B, U, R) 4,853 0 0 4,853 
Sum  
(=Shapley value after 
multiplication by 
(1/n!) 
16,716 10,221 2,181 29,118 
Bargaining power 
(Shapley value) 0.574 0.351 0.075 1 
Bargaining power 
(Banzhaf value) 0.561 0.341 0.098 1 
 
6.4.1.2 Predictions for 2010 
 
As before, the cheapest alternative will be used up to its limit before using the next one in the 
order of merit. Thus, for K = {R,U,B}, Belarus will be used, followed by Ukraine and, given 
demand, by the now available NEGP. Using (30) and (32) and plugging in the figures from Table 
A.1, one can see that the capacity of Belarus is fully used. However, Ukraine's capacity limit is not 
reached, leaving NEGP idle. The results are: x*B = 30 bcm/a, x*U = 98.37 bcm/a, x*N = 0 
bcm/a, p* = 118.72 $/tcm, and П* B,U,R  = 13,012 mn. $. 
In the case K = {R,U}, Ukraine's capacity will be used before Russia's own. Putting the relevant 
figures into (34) shows that Ukraine's capacity is not sufficient to satisfy demand. Therefore, 
excess gas has to be transported through the NEGP. It is calculated from 
 
                                          
N
UR,
x∂
∏∂
 = 2axN + b - cN + 2a xU = 0, implying     (35) 
 
                                                          x**N = a2
ax2bc UN −− .       (36) 
 
In all, the results are x**U = 120 bcm/a, x**N = 7.67 bcm/a, p** = 119.27 $/tcm, and П** U,R  = 
12,992 mn. $. The outcome for K = {R,B} is calculated in analogous manner. The capacity of 
Belarus turns out not be enough to meet demand. To calculate the quantity allocated to NEGP, 
one forms the pertinent FOC, 
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N
BR,
x∂
∏∂
 = 2axN + b - cN + 2a xB = 0, implying      (37) 
 
                                                          xN
***
a2
ax2bc BN −− = .                  (38) 
 
The results show that the NEGP capacity limit is exceeded as well, hence x***B= 30 bcm/a, 
x***N = 27.5 bcm/a, p*** = 174.63 bcm/a, and П*** B,R  = 9,019 mn. $. For Russia alone, 
differentiating (10) yields 
 
                                                      
N
R
x∂
∏∂
 = 2axN + b - cN = 0, implying      (39) 
 
        xN
°
a2
bcN − = .                             (40) 
 
The outcomes are therefore xN
° = 27.5 bcm/a, p° = 198.3 $/tcm, and ПR
°
 
 = 4,943 mn. $, 
taking account of the capacity constraint. The values for bargaining power can be calculated as 
before. The results for 2010 are presented in Table 3. As expected, both indicators point to an 
increase of Russia’s bargaining power compared to 2004 (see Table 2), mainly to the detriment of 
Ukraine. 
 
Table 3: Bargaining power (2010) 
Russia Ukraine Belarus Sum 
Bargaining power 
(Shapley value) 0.742 0.205 0.053 1 
Bargaining power 
(Banzhaf value) 0.712 0.215 0.073 1 
 
6.4.1.3 Predictions for 2030 
The calculations are analogous to the ones for the year 2010. Assuming that Belarus completes 
only the Yamal 2 (Variant 1), they are for K = {R,U,B}, x* B  = 58 bcm/a,  
x*U = 95.7 bcm/a, x*N = 0 bcm/a, p* = 138.72 $/tcm, П* B,U,R  = 18,664 mn.$; For K = 
{R,U}, one obtains x**U = 120 bcm/a, x*N = 33.02 bcm/a, p** = 139.27, П** U,R  = 18,606 
mn.$. For K = {R,B}, the values are x***B = 58 bcm/a, x***N = 55 bcm/a, p*** = 170.84 
$/tcm, П*** B,R  = 17,295 mn.$. Finally, for K = {R}one has xN
° = 55 bcm/a, p° = 216.6 
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$/tcm, ПR
°
 
 = 10,893 mn. $. The associated values of bargaining power are displayed in Table 4. 
Russia’s position improves even more than in 2010, again to the detriment of Ukraine. 
 
Table 4: Bargaining power (2030, Variant 1) 
Russia Ukraine Belarus Sum 
Bargaining power 
(Shapley value) 0.849 0.093 0.058 1 
Bargaining power 
(Banzhaf value) 0.808 0.112 0.080 1 
 
Finally, construction of Yamal 3 may be achieved by 2030 as well (Variant 2), the results are for 
K = {R,U,B}, xB
* = 86 bcm/a, xU
* = 67.7 bcm/a, xN
* = 0 bcm/a, p
B,U,R
* = 138.72 $/tcm, 
П * = 18,674 mn.$. For the case K = {R,U}, one has xU
**
U,R
 = 120 bcm/a, x**N = 33.02 
bcm/a, p** = 139.27, П**  = 18,606 mn.$. The coalition K = {R,B} yields  
x***B = 86 bcm/a, xN*** = 55 bcm/a, p*** = 148.75 $/tcm, П*** B,R  = 18,486 mn.$, while for 
K = {R} one obtains xN
° = 55 bcm/a, p° = 216.6 $/tcm, ПR
°
 
 = 10,893 mn.$. The resulting 
bargaining power values are entered in Table 5. Compared to Table 4, the increase of Russia’s 
bargaining power is minimal. Therefore, it is doubtful that Russia will in fact construct the 
expanded variant of Yamal 3. 
 
Table 5: Bargaining power (2030, Variant 2) 
Russia Ukraine Belarus Sum 
Bargaining power 
(Shapley value) 0.859 0.072 0.069 1 
Bargaining power 
(Banzhaf value) 0.811 0.096 0.093 1 
 
6.4.2 Results for the non-cooperative module 
 
This section based on the same demand and cost parameters as before. The additional problem is 
to translate Russia's bargaining power (PR, obtained from the Banzhaf value, say) into the 
indicator of bargaining power (σ) appearing in eqs. (13) and (14). For P R → 1, (maximum 
bargaining power for Russia), σ → – ∞, while for P R →  0, σ → –1. The non-cooperative 
scenario can only arise if 0 < P R < 1. If P R = 0, Russia has no bargaining power at all, whereas 
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if P R = 1, it has all the bargaining power. In the first case, it is constrained to cooperate, while in 
the second case, it can force the others to cooperate. Hirschhausen v. et al. (2005) calibrate σ to –
8.13953 for a year when P R = 0.5 and Ukraine is the only transit country. With this information, 
one can map Russia's bargaining power P R into σ, using 
 
                                                            σ = 
R
P
P
R
−1
56298716.16 (–1).       (41) 
 
6.4.2.1 Postdictions for 2004 
 
Russia's bargaining power for the year 2004 is σ = –11 according to eq. (41). Moreover,  
xN = 0, since NEGP does not exist yet. Other parameters and the results for K = {R,U,B} are 
taken from the cooperative module expounded in section 6.4.1 (see Table A.1). The respective 
formulas from section 6.3.2 can be used to calculate the outcomes of the different coalitions. The 
results are presented in Table 6. The postdicted total amount of gas is lower than the actual flows 
measured in 2004. This is because the demand function was estimated for earlier years, neglecting 
the increase in demand that had occurred in the meantime. By shifting the demand function 
outward, resulting in b = 192, the simulation results could be made to match actual observations. 
However, the main findings of the simulation are not modified by these changes, and therefore b 
= 141.1 is retained (see Table A.1).  
 
Table 6: Postdictions for 2004 (annual values) 
2004 (R\U\B) (1) 
({R,U}\B) 
(2) 
({R,B}\U) 
(3) 
(R\{U,B}) 
(4) 
{R,U,B} 
(5) 
xU (bcm) 52.33 76.33 52.34 54.21 58.37 
xB (bcm) 20 2.04 20 20 20 
xN (bcm) - - - - - 
p ($/tcm) 84.03 79.27 84.03 82.55 79.27 
tU ($/tcm) 9.9 5.14 9.9 8.33 5.14 
tB ($/tcm) 6.59 4.96 4.77 8.33 4.77 
ПR (mn. $) 4,539 - - 4,595 - 
ПU (mn. $) 249 - 249 - - 
ПB (mn. $) 36 0.5 - - - 
ПK (mn. $) - 4,846 4,575 244 4,853 
Σ П (mn. $) 4,824 4,846 4,824 4,839 4,853 
 
As standard economic theory suggests, the largest amount of gas is transported when all players 
cooperate, avoiding double marginalization along the supply chain. Indeed, both xU and xB 
Russian Gas to Western Europe: A Game-theoretic Analysis 
  
 
130 
 
attain their maximum value and price its minimum [see column (5) of Table 6]. Also, the sum of 
profits is maximum in the case of the comprehensive coalition (4,853 mn. $ annually). Thus, 
consumers get the most gas at the lowest price, while the producer-transporter coalition reaps the 
highest profit. The opposite situation prevails when every player is on its own and no 
cooperation is achieved [see column (1)]. However, differences in the total profit are small, 
suggesting that co-operation is not very lucrative. Moreover, the transit countries make a smaller 
profit when they form a coalition [compare col. (4) with cols. (2) and (5) of Table 6]. This is a 
result of the uniform transit fee and Russia's high bargaining power combined with its 
Stackelberg leader position. A coalition between the transit countries is therefore not predicted 
for the time of writing (2007).  
Nash equilibria (NE) are displayed in Table 7. The first entry represents the payoff to Russia, the 
second, to Ukraine, and the last one, to Belarus. The base scenario is where all players choose to 
be non-cooperative, with payoffs {4,539, 249, 36}. Whenever Russia is part of a coalition, it is 
assumed to get all the profit and to pay shares Si to its coalition partners, providing an incentive 
to form the coalition. The Si value depends on the player's outside option (associated with not 
cooperating), which varies with the constellation. The assumption is that offer Si that exceeds the 
player's outside option will be accepted and cooperation achieved. If the coalition consists only of 
the transit countries, Ukraine is assumed to receive the whole profit, ceding a share to Belarus. It 
could also be the other way round without affecting the final outcome.  
 
Table 7:  Payoff matrix and Nash equilibria for 2004 
Russia cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) non-cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperative (c) 4,853-SU–SB1 ; SU ; SB1 4,846–SU ; SU ; 0.5 
non-cooperative (nc) 4,575–SB2 ; 249 ; SB2 4,539 ; 249 ; 36 
 
Russia non-cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) not cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperative (c) 4,595 ; 244–SB2 ; SB2 4,539 ; 249 ; 36 
non-cooperative (nc) 4,539 ; 249 ; 36 4,539 ; 249 ; 36 
 
Underlined payoffs represent the player's best response to the other players' choices. There are 
three NE in pure strategies. Russia and Ukraine would prefer the NE with (c,c,c), because they 
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would get a higher payoff than in the (nc,nc,nc) benchmark scenario, whereas Belarus would be 
better off in the (nc,c,nc) NE. One might argue that Russia, being an essential player with the 
dominating power, can establish the cooperative NE by offering S U  > 249 and  
SB1 > 0.5. But Belarus then could try to establish the non-cooperative NE by offering Ukraine a 
share of its own profit, inducing it to be non-cooperative. Yet Belarus could offer a maximum 
payment of a mere 35.5 = 36 – 0.5 to Ukraine without being worse off itself, while Russia could 
offer Ukraine up to 64.5 = 4,853 – 249 – 0.5 – 4,539 for cooperation, thus always outbidding 
Belarus. Therefore the cooperative NE is far more likely to obtain than the non-cooperative NE. 
Still, the fact that Belarus prefers the non-cooperative NE results in a higher effective payment to 
Ukraine. Russia has to offer SU > 284.5 = 249 + 35.5 to make sure that Ukraine will cooperate 
and not be forestalled by an offer from Belarus. Therefore, Russia's side payments that suffice for 
establishing the grand coalition are SU = 284.5 + ω and SB1 = 0.5 + ω, with SU + SB1 < 314 = 
4,853 – 4,539 to make sure that Russia is better off as well, and ω > 0 any small number.  
 
6.4.2.2 Predictions for 2010 
 
The total amount of gas shipped in this simulation (some 128 bcm/a, see sum of top three rows 
of Table 8) squares quite well with the amount predicted by IEA (see section 6.2.4). However, it 
is remarkable that the profits going to Ukraine and Belarus  
($ mn. 178 and 35, respectively) are lower than in 2004 ($ mn. 249 and 36, see Table 6, col. 1), 
although both countries expanded their transit capacities. This can be explained by the increase in 
Russia's bargaining power thanks to completion of the NEGP. With its own transport route, 
Russia changes from an essential player to a dictatorial one. While Russia clearly is the big winner, 
the transit countries hardly profit from the increase in demand.  
    A coalition including Russia and Ukraine again is profitable [see cols. (2) and (5) of Table 8], 
whereas a coalition comprising Russia and Belarus is without extra benefit. Cooperation between 
Russia and Ukraine produces the second-highest total profit, which makes sense because Ukraine 
is still the low-cost provider of most transit capacity. 
Table 9 presents the payoffs for the year 2010. The NE are the same as for 2004. Belarus again 
prefers the two cooperative NE and would therefore offer Ukraine a payment up to 32 = 35 - 3 
for not cooperating with Russia. Thus, Russia's offers ensuring cooperation of the other players 
are SU > 210 and SB1 > 3, or more generally SU = 210 + ω and SB1 = 3 + ω, with SU + SB1 < 
252. These side payments guarantee that the cooperative rather than the non-cooperative NE is 
achieved. 
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Table 8: Predictions for 2010 (annual values) 
2010 (R\U\B) (1) 
({R,U}\B) 
(2) 
({R,B}\U) 
(3) 
(R\{U,B}) 
(4) 
{R,U,B} 
(5) 
xU (bcm) 67.52 120 67.52 68.55 98.37 
xB (bcm) 30 8.19 30 30 30 
xN (bcm) 27.5 0 27.5 27.5 0 
p ($/tcm) 121.36 118.85 121.36 120.55 118.72 
tU ($/tcm) 7.78 5.14 7.78 6.88 5.14 
tB ($/tcm) 5.94 5.09 4.77 6.88 4.77 
ПR (mn. $) 12,760 - - 12,795 - 
ПU (mn. $) 178 - 178 - - 
ПB (mn. $) 35 3 - - - 
ПK (mn. $) - 13,001 12,795 182 13,012 
Σ П (mn. $) 12,973 13,004 12,973 12,977 13,012 
 
Table 9: Payoff matrix and Nash equilibria for 2010 
Russia cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) non-cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperate (c) 13,012–SU–SB1 ; SU ; SB1 13,001–SU ; SU ; 3 
non-cooperate (nc) 12,795–SB2 ; 178 ; SB2 12,760 ; 178 ; 35 
 
Russia non-cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) non-cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperative (c) 12,795 ; 182–SB2 ; SB2 12,760 ; 178 ; 35 
non-cooperative (nc) 12,760 ; 178 ; 35 12,760 ; 178 ; 35 
 
 
6.4.2.3 Predictions for 2030 
 
As mentioned in section 6.4, there are two different scenarios for 2030 (see Table A.1 for 
parameter values).  
For the year 2030, the quantity of gas derived from the simulation and the IEA forecast are again 
quite close. Also, the grand coalition produces the highest total profit and the non-cooperative 
constellation, the lowest. The profit of a coalition between Russia and Belarus again exceeds the 
sum of their non-cooperative profits; in contrast to earlier years, however, the increment does 
not approach zero [compare cols. (1) and (3) in Tables 6 and 8] because Belarus has increased its 
capacity, resulting in cost savings. For the same reason, a transit coalition formed by Ukraine and 
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Belarus now turns profitable [compare cols. (1) and (4) of Table 6]. Although Ukraine continues 
to have the largest capacity, its profit decreases due to Russia’s higher degree of independency 
and thus bargaining power.  
 
Table 10: Predictions for 2030  
2030 (1) (R\U\B) (1) 
({R,U}\B) 
(2) 
({R,B}\U) 
(3) 
(R\{U,B}) 
(4) 
{R,U,B} 
(5) 
xU (bcm) 44.15 120 39.71 39.6 95.7 
xB (bcm) 53.46 33.11 58 58 58 
xN (bcm) 55 0 55 55 0 
p ($/tcm) 139.6 139.19 139.51 139.6 138.72 
tU ($/tcm) 6.02 5.14 5.93 5.92 5.14 
tB ($/tcm) 5.83 5.43 4.77 5.92 4.77 
ПR (mn. $) 18,505 - - 18,504 - 
ПU (mn. $) 39 - 31 - - 
ПB (mn. $) 57 22 - - - 
ПK (mn. $) - 18,633 18,571 98 18,664 
Σ П (mn. $) 18,601 18,654 18,602 18,602 18,664 
 
As Table 11 shows, there are only two NE left, viz. the fully cooperative and the fully non-
cooperative. The third NE disappears because the transit coalition K = {U,B} now turns 
profitable. But against Russia, this coalition fails to be a NE, since Russia prefers the grand 
coalition. Indeed, K = {R,U,B} gives Russia enough payoff to be able to motivate Ukraine and 
Belarus to cooperate.  
 
Table 11: Payoff matrix and Nash equilibria for 2030 (Variant 1) 
Russia cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) non-cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperative (c) 18,664–SU1–SB1 ; SU1 ; SB1 18,633–SU2 ; SU2 ; 22 
non-cooperative (nc) 18,571–SB2 ; 31 ; SB2 18,505 ; 39 ; 57 
 
Russia non-cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) non-cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperative (c) 18,504 ; 98–SB2 ; 18,505 ; SB2 39 ; 57 
non-cooperative (nc) 18,505 ; 39 ; 57 18,505 ; 39 ; 57 
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While no coalition with Russia and only one transit country is more profitable than the grand 
coalition, the outsider would always want to offer the other transit country a payment sufficient 
to win it over. However Russia can outbid the outsider; specifically, the conditions for achieving 
the grand coalition are, SU1 > 39, SB1 > 57, and 98 < SU1 + SB1 < 160. 
 
Table 12: Predictions for 2030 (Variant 2) 
2030 (2) (R\U\B) (1) 
({R,U}\B) 
(2) 
({R,B}\U) 
(3) 
(R\{U,B}) 
(4) 
{R,U,B} 
(5) 
xU (bcm) 44.05 120 28.35 11.63 67.7 
xB (bcm) 53.58 33.13 86 86 86 
xN (bcm) 55 0 38.66 55 0 
p ($/tcm) 139.57 139.18 139.27 139.57 138.72 
tU ($/tcm) 5.99 5.14 5.63 5.9 5.14 
tB ($/tcm) 5.81 5.41 4.77 5.9 4.77 
ПR (mn. $) 18,507 - - 18,506 - 
ПU (mn. $) 38 - 16 - - 
ПB (mn. $) 56 21 - - - 
ПK (mn. $) - 18,633 18,616 106 18,674 
Σ П (mn. $) 18,601 18,654 18,631 18,613 18,674 
 
    For the second variant of the scenario 2030, see again Table A.1 for parameter values. The 
left-hand side of Table 12 shows that total profit is again maximum when all players cooperate 
[col. (5] and is minimum when they fail to do so [col. (1)].  
 
Table 13: Payoff matrix and Nash equilibria for 2030 (Variant 2) 
Russia cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) non-cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperative (c) 18,674–SU1–SB1 ; SU1 ; SB1 18,633–SU2 ; SU2 ; 21 
non-cooperative (nc) 18,616–SB2 ; 16 ; SB2 18,507 ; 38 ; 56 
 
Russia non-cooperative 
Belarus 
cooperative (c) non-cooperative (nc) 
Ukraine 
cooperative (c) 18,506 ; 106–SB2 ; 18,507 ; SB2 38 ; 56 
non-cooperative (nc) 18,507 ; 38 ; 56 18,507 ; 38 ; 56 
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6.4.2.4 Strategy analysis 
 
As shown in the preceding subsections, the grand coalition is a NE, constituting the dominant 
solution for rational players under stated assumptions. It is Pareto-efficient since no player can 
increase its payoff without diminishing that of another player. Cooperation is also the dominant 
strategy in a repeated game, provided the discount rate is zero or the same for all players. 
Differing discount rates would affect the bargaining power of the players over time, possibly 
resulting in changed strategies.  
    As can be seen from Tables 8 and 9, the opening of the first NEGP by 2010 has an enormous 
effect on Russia's profit. However, the increase in capacity thanks to the second pipeline still 
brings significant additional payoff (see Tables 10 and 12). Thus, Russia's strategy of continuously 
developing and increasing its own transport capacity is very lucrative. Because in the grand 
coalition NEGP is not used at all, the question arises whether its construction makes sense. Yet 
without this addition to capacity, Russia's bargaining power would be less. This in turn would 
require higher side payments for establishing the grand coalition, resulting in reduced profits. 
Also, it is questionable whether the mere threat of building the NEGP would lead to the same 
outcomes, its credibility being limited in view of long construction time. However, construction 
of the first NEGP pipeline probably cannot be stopped anymore. This could be seen as a 
sufficiently strong commitment for rendering the threat of adding the second pipeline credible 
and letting Russia still benefit from an increase of its bargaining power.  
Moreover, it is rational for Russia to encourage Belarus to increase its capacity. The logic is that 
Belarus has the lowest marginal cost of operation, which determines the transit fee charged. This 
serves to minimize shipping cost to Russia. Another important factor is that an increase in the 
capacity of Belarus serves to weaken Ukraine's position as the main transit country at least to a 
certain point, lowering the value of Ukraine’s outside options and making it less costly for Russia 
to achieve the grand coalition.  
The strategy of Belarus to continuously increase its transit capacity results in increasing payoffs. It 
is the only way to substantially profit from the gas transit game with favorable prospects 
attracting foreign investors to finance the projects. Even Russia is interested in an increase of 
Belarus' capacity and would presumably act in its favor. Yamal 1 already has been built on 
Russia's initiative and financial support. On the other hand, Belarus tries hard to maintain control 
over its transit pipelines to Russia. Any extension of its capacity would mainly cut into Ukraine's 
profit, adding to existing tension between the two countries. 
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6.5 Summary and conclusion 
 
The emergence of independent transit countries in the Eurasian gas chain has forced Russia to 
reassess its options. Specifically, Ukraine and Belarus have been trying to capitalize on their 
strategic transit position, hiking up transit fees while failing to pay their gas bills. Russia in turn is 
reluctant to pay high transit fees to "its former provinces". It seeks to attain autarky with regard 
to its gas transports by means of the Northern European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) by foreclosing 
competition to Blue Stream by buying up the gas from the Caspian region. This paper analyzes 
the decision-making situation of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, applying both cooperative and 
noncooperative game theory. The cooperative module shows that the building of transport 
routes under its exclusive control boosts Russia's bargaining power vis-à-vis the two transit 
countries in all coalitions, enabling it to siphon off future profits from an increasing demand for 
gas. Using side payments, it is predicted to have the capability of establishing the grand coalition 
(comprising all the three countries considered). Ukraine turns out to be the big loser, its 
bargaining power and profits continuously decreasing during the next two decades. It does not 
have the option of increasing its transit capacity, as the predicted outcome of the non-
cooperative module is that this capacity will remain idle. Russia is building at least the first 
pipeline of the NEGP project. The only viable alternative for Ukraine is to cooperate, upgrading 
its pipeline system in order to reduce its marginal cost and to gain a competitive edge over 
Belarus. In all, the game-theoretic analysis performed in this paper leads to the prediction that 
Russia will succeed in forging the grand coalition comprising all the three countries studied here. 
The grand coalition is also the only Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium of the gas transit game, 
offering maximum payoff to each player, with side payments sufficient for its creation and 
maintenance. Even for the consumers in Western Europe, the grand coalition is a favorable 
outcome because it delivers a maximum amount of gas at the lowest price. 
    A few caveats need to pointed out, however. First, the analysis performed is purely economic. 
In reality, the gas transit game also involves geopolitical and military interests. The gas companies 
are not independent from their governments, and they are often used to pursue political 
objectives. Second, there exist no formal enforcement mechanisms for international contracts. As 
seen in 2006, transit countries can breach agreements without having to fear hard sanctions. 
Indeed, breach of contract constitutes a big threat to all sides of any gas transit agreement, at least 
until construction of the NEGP is completed. Afterwards, the hold-up problem will rapidly lose 
importance for Russia. Nevertheless, gas flows were never interrupted for a longer period of 
time. This speaks in favor of a certain dominance of economic over political objectives. Indeed, 
the likelihood of such an interruption is small, since Russia can put enormous pressure on transit 
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countries, who depend on Russia in many ways. Therefore, the economic analysis performed 
here is useful to understand the impacts of future changes on the gas chain. Various scenarios 
can be simulated, using published forecasts to predict outcomes in terms of prices, quantities of 
gas according to route, and profits accruing to companies and respective governments. Of 
course, the quality of these predictions crucially depends on the accuracy of these estimates. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Parameter values used in text 
 Symbol 2004 2010 2030 
Variant 1 Variant 2 
Ukraine capacity,bcm/a 
Belarus capacity, bcm/a 
CU 
CB 
100 120 58 120 86 120 
NEGP capacity CN - 27.5 55 55 
Russia’s bargaining power σ -11.00 -25.62 -50.32 -51.55 
XB where MCB = MCU = 5.14 - 2.04 4.74 9.31 9.95 
XB where MCB = MCU = MCN = 6.24 - - 18.83 36.99 37.89 
XU where MCB = MCU = MCN - - 14.09 27.68 28.35 
Russian MC, $/tcm 
Ukraine MC, $/tcm 
Belarus MC, $/tcm 
NEGP MC, $/tcm 
cR 
cB 
cU 
cN 
12.3 
4.77 
18.54 
 
12.3 
4.77 
18.54 
 
12.3 
4.77 
18.54 
 
12.3 
4.77 
18.54 
 
Slope of demand function 
Constant of demand function 
a 
b 
-0.789 
141.1 
-0.789 
220.0 
-0.789 
260.0 
-0.789 
260.0 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter briefly outlines key conclusions and policy recommendations that can be drawn 
from the presented essays, followed by some suggestions for future research.  
    The objective of the first essay in chapter 2 was to determine the efficient frontiers of 
electricity generation in the United States and Switzerland, taking into account their implications 
in terms of security of supply. Expected returns are defined as kWh of electricity per U.S. Dollar 
in levels, which amounts to adopting the so-called user view. As is true for the first four essays, 
the seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) method was adopted for estimating the 
covariance matrix used in determining efficient portfolios, because the error terms of the 
expected return regressions are correlated. One could argue that for a population as risk-averse as 
the U.S. and particularly the Swiss (Szpiro, 1986), the minimum variance (MV) portfolio is the 
appropriate one. For that reason, efficient portfolio recommendations in this chapter are limited 
to the MV case only. The feasible electricity generation mix for the United States contains 60 
percent Coal, 30 percent Gas, and 10 percent Oil, but no Nuclear power. Therefore current users 
in the U.S. are advised to substitute Nuclear power mainly with more Gas (up 12 percentage 
points) and Oil electricity (up 7 percentage points). However, although this generation mix 
minimizes volatility, concentration measures such as Shannon-Wiener and Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indices suggest that power generation technologies (and with them, supplies of primary energy 
sources) are not sufficiently diversified. The MV portfolio for Switzerland comprises 40 percent 
Nuclear, 32 percent Storage hydro, 24 percent Run of river, and 4 percent Solar, which is identical to 
the actual generation mix as of 2003 (AP2003). In addition, the Shannon-Wiener index shows a 
degree of diversification that is regarded as being secure. Thus, Swiss utilities appear to generate 
electricity efficiently and security of supply is not at risk. Consequently, no immediate changes 
appear recommendable. 
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    Chapter 3 pursues the same objective as chapter 2 in terms of determining efficient electricity-
generating portfolios, however, rather than using a user view, an investor view was adopted 
(changes of kWh per U.S. Dollar). Risk-averse investors in the United States are thus best advised 
to adopt a feasible MV portfolio comprising 60 percent Coal. This figure is identical to the user 
portfolio outlined in the preceding chapter. However, Gas should be replaced almost entirely 
(down to 1 percent). Nuclear, Oil and Wind should contribute 25 percent, 9 percent, and 5 
percent, respectively (note, Nuclear and Wind did not contribute to the feasible MV portfolio 
adopting a user view). A similar picture emerges for Switzerland, where investors are advised to 
take identical shares of Storage hydro and Solar as in the user portfolio (32 and 4 percent, 
respectively), however, Run of river should be phased out and substituted by more Nuclear power 
(up from 40 to 64 percent). Therefore, depending on the adopted view, different efficient 
portfolio mixes may arise. The research presented in this dissertation does not favor one view 
over another, because users and investors have conflicting perspectives. However, both, risk- 
averse users and investors do better by adopting at least 70 percent Coal and Gas in the United 
States and at least 76 percent Nuclear, Storage hydro and Solar  in Switzerland.  
    Chapter 4 investigated the gap between the actual portfolio and the efficiency frontiers to 
examine the scope of efficiency improvement of U.S. and Swiss electricity-generating technology 
portfolios, adopting both, user and investor views. The actual portfolios of generating 
technologies of the United States and Switzerland are off their respective efficiency frontiers. 
However, risk-averse investors and risk-neutral current users in the United States are 
considerably closer to their efficiency frontier than their Swiss counterparts, which arguably is 
due to earlier and more thorough deregulation of electricity markets in the United States. 
Therefore, a policy recommendation of continued electricity market liberalization might be of 
particular interest to Switzerland which has just recently started to give large users (in excess of 
100,000 kWh/year) the free choice of provider.  
    The objective of chapter 5 was to determine efficient electricity-generating portfolios in 
Switzerland in 2035. Focusing on the feasible MV portfolio again, Swiss power portfolio holders 
in 2035 would be best advised to adopt a technology mix containing 28 percent Gas, 20 percent 
Run of river, 13 percent Storage hydro, 9 percent Nuclear, and 5 percent each of Solar, Smallhydro, 
Wind, Biomass, Incineration, and Biogas, respectively. This mix generates more expected return, less 
risk, offers more security of supply and a higher return-to-risk ratio than the actual portfolio in 
2000. However, this generation mix comes at the cost of higher CO2 emissions. Switzerland has 
allocated its Kyoto emission reductions strongly in favor of transport fuels at the expense of 
electricity generation (IEA, 2007). This commitment now may turn out to be a stumbling block 
Conclusions 
143 
 
for the attainment of a future power mix that is both efficient and secure, unless policy is 
addressed to increase CO2 targets towards electricity generation and away from transportation. 
Finally, chapter 6 analyzed the decision-making situation facing Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, to 
see whether a coalition to ship gas to Western Europe is beneficial for them. Both cooperative 
and noncooperative game theory is applied to see whether all three countries do better by 
cooperating in the gas transit business. The game-theoretic analysis performed in this paper leads 
to the prediction that Russia will succeed in forging the grand coalition comprising Ukraine, 
Belarus and itself. This grand coalition is also the only Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium of the 
gas transit game, offering a maximum payoff to each player, with side payments sufficient for its 
creation and maintenance. In addition, consumers in Western Europe favor the grand coalition, 
as it delivers a maximum amount of gas at the lowest price. Therefore policy recommendations 
should seek to facilitate cooperation between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.     
    Further research could usefully deal with the following issues. First, additional countries could 
be included in chapters 2-5, such as economies with fully liberalized electricity markets (e.g. 
United Kingdom, Spain, and Norway). It would be interesting to see how these countries 
compare to the ones presented in chapters 2-5, in particular, whether the scope of efficiency 
improvement shrinks even more than the semi-liberalized electricity market in the United States 
(Chapter 3). In addition, investments in energy technology appear irreversible, raising the issue of 
their optimal timing which cannot be addressed by Markowitz mean-variance theory in chapters 
2-5. A promising approach in these cases is real options theory (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) whose 
prescriptions might differ from those presented here. Third, rather than limiting the analyses on 
to electricity-generating portfolios only, a wider perspective could be adopted in chapters 2-5, 
including data on transportation and long-distance heating, which all play an important role in 
achieving a more efficient use of energy. Finally, in chapter 6 more recent data on simulated and 
published forecasts could be used as a sensitivity analysis to predict outcomes in terms of prices, 
quantities of gas according to route, and profits accruing to companies and respective 
governments. 
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